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ABSTRACT 
International Space Law and Norms: An Approach for Assessing Compliance 
David Lindgren 
The number and types of space activities and space actors continue to increase, posing new 
and unique challenges for space governance and policy. Presently, a comprehensive, periodic, 
and systematic measure of states’ efforts to comply with existing international space law and 
norms does not exist, suggesting a critical need to ensure robust and informed policymaking 
as space activities and actors increase. The evidence-based policymaking and programming 
movement, alongside the rise of ratings and rankings research, suggest the utility of such an 
assessment to informing policymaking and identifying compliance or partial or non-
compliance of spacefaring countries.  
Numerous ratings and rankings assessments measure country-level trends across various 
sectors, including but not limited to business, democracy, economics, human rights, 
governance, and prosperity. However, none currently measure the behaviour and policies of 
countries regarding the exploration and use of outer space. An annual space report, published 
by the Space Security Index, does provide an overview of space activities and trends 
according to various thematic areas, but neither provides a historical nor baseline comparison 
of states’ behaviour.  
This dissertation endeavours to propose a set of criteria, grounded in international space 
treaties and United Nations-level principles, resolutions, and guidelines, for which space 
policy stakeholders can apply to countries and develop a comparative understanding of their 
levels of compliance with binding international space law and non-binding space norms. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
As governments, citizens, and corporations increasingly engage in outer space activities, the 
governance of behaviour according to internationally accepted laws and norms remains 
paramount now more than ever to ensuring the continued access to and use of space for all. 
While some countries may subscribe wholly to these laws and norms, others may ignore them 
or actively attempt to subvert them for various economic or political reasons. These conditions 
therefore create the need for a strong, public understanding of all spacefaring states’ behaviour 
for monitoring their adherence to the very same international laws and norms that made their 
own access to and use of space possible. This dissertation proposes a contribution to the field 
of space policy and governance in an effort to address a gap in the evaluation of states’ 
behaviours in outer space. A comprehensive, periodic, and systematic measure of states’ efforts 
to comply with international space law and normative behaviour does not exist, suggesting a 
critical need to ensure robust and informed debate around countries’ activities in outer space. 
Therefore, this dissertation endeavours to propose a set of criteria comprising a framework for 
which space policy stakeholders can apply to countries and develop a comparative 
understanding of their levels of compliance with international space law and normative 
practices with regard to outer space. This contribution conceptually sits among the increasing 
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body of work on ratings and rankings of countries on a variety of issue areas ranging from 
health and environment to democracy and human rights, in addition to the evidence-based 
policy and programming movement. 
As democratic governments and states developed with normative governance 
processes as part of their political consolidation and development throughout history, so did 
too elements of society in the form of civil society organisations that strove to hold them 
accountable and responsive to the needs and interest of the population at large. Contemporary 
understandings of civil society as antagonists to state governments and promoters of political 
change came about during the social movements against Eastern European communist states 
during the 1970s and 1980s; however, Gordon White offers a more inclusive and conceptually 
useful approach for understanding what is meant by civil society in the present day: “an 
intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organisations which 
are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily 
by members of society to protect or extended their interests or values,” (Burnell and Calvert 
2004). This dissertation therefore employs this approach for framing and understanding civil 
society as a potential user group for the framework proposed in later chapters. 
In particular, given the advent of international governance mechanisms and regimes, 
such as the United Nations, the growth of civil society as a critical and accountability-seeking 
voice developed in this sphere too. This area witnessed the growth of international and cross-
national civil society groups seeking to not only advocate at the international level toward the 
corresponding international institutions, but also as a means of encouraging domestication of 
international law and norms among domestic institutions. The Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR) Process, for example, was established in 2006 through which countries review each 
other’s human rights record in an effort to improve the human rights environment in each. Civil 
society organisations play an important role in the review process, and help to provide informed 
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and critical analysis of each state’s record by participating in the review meetings, providing 
background information, advocating in bilateral and multilateral meetings with the state 
reviewers, and monitoring implementation of UPR recommendations. Moreover, the existence 
of a platform such as the UPR has allowed civil organisations the opportunity to leverage the 
international happenings at the UPR (i.e. state-to-state peer review) for the benefit of domestic 
advocacy initiatives. As an example of this, Eric Tars and Deodonne Bhattarai (2011) cite the 
case of housing in the United States following that country’s 2010 review. The UPR review 
led to a nationwide consultation including a year-long assessment of human rights by 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) that resulted in reports of findings supplied to the 
Obama Administration and U.S. government, which in turn on March 18, 2011 reacted 
positively in advancing the rights to housing for citizens. 
 Therefore, with the growth of international governance regimes and normative 
practices for states to follow, the governance and use of outer space sits as an emerging area in 
which similar critical and accountability-seeking dynamics must evolve given its relatively 
nascent stage of development, as compared to other areas in which international governance 
mechanisms exist such as human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, and trade, among others. 
 Similarly, as seen with the growth of national and international civil society groups, 
the use and implementation of evidence-based advocacy techniques accompanied their rise to 
improve their policy advocacy effectiveness and legitimacy among policymakers. Included as 
part of their use of evidenced-based advocacy, civil society has strived to integrate data-based 
and quasi-academically rigorous and sound methodological and evaluation techniques to 
provide for this evidenced-based advocacy. Numerous civil society groups, such as 
Transparency International or Freedom House, largely including institutions based in the 
Global North advocating for democracy, human rights, and good governance, prove as some 
examples whereby groups developed standard methodologies and indicators and established 
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ways of measuring against such indicators on a periodic basis so as to develop comparable, 
historical datasets tracking progress in the areas in which they monitor.  
 This research would prove remiss to suggest such types of reviews and methods are 
not applied to assess activities in outer space, however, the example of the Space Security Index 
(2018) only measures such activities within a limited scope and understanding of the space 
environment. This assessment of space security, in addition to a review of contemporary ratings 
and rankings system implemented by civil society organisations, is discussed in subsequent 
sections of this dissertation. 
1.1 Objectives of this research 
 
The research undertaken here is meant to explore, develop, and describe a framework whereby 
states’ behaviour in outer space is assessed according to the ratified outer space treaties in 
addition to established consensus-based norms developed by the UN Committee on the 
Peaceful Use of Outer Space that have evolved through the ongoing use of outer space by the 
respective states. Moreover, this framework will be developed with a purposeful Global South 
perspective, emphasising equitability and inclusivity of perspectives and interests as to which 
elements of the framework should be prioritised in the assessment. The framework will strive 
to incorporate views from governmental and intergovernmental bodies, industry, academia, 
and civil society. 
 As described above, contemporary tools and methodologies exist for measuring and 
tracking compliance with internationally accepted standards of practice established in formal 
instruments of international law such as treaties or established in practice as norms. 
 Many of the existing tools and methodologies for monitoring governmental behaviour 
and compliance with standards and norms exist in an attempt to promote and create awareness 
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of states’ compliance with their obligations under international law. Several of these tools are 
found in the democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) field in an effort to generate 
action and advocacy toward increased adherence and compliance with internationally accepted 
standards and norms. Employing a Theory of Change methodology, as an example of one such 
tool, in their programming logic, many of the organisations operating in the DRG sector rely 
on these tools and methodologies, and their application therein, to identify, in an evidenced-
based approach, gaps and deficiencies in governmental behaviour that would then be used by 
citizens and organised groups alike to advocate for improvements in those areas that were 
assessed. The framework proposed in the following chapters follows a similar approach.  
1.2 Evidence-based programming and policymaking 
 
As noted previously, this dissertation emerges from two historical movements, namely the 
evidence-based policy and programming movement and the accompanying rise of international 
ratings and rankings research. The following sections explore these trends and identify, where 
applicable, their relationships to the proposed framework assessing countries’ levels of 
compliance with international space law and the challenges and potential pitfalls such a 
framework should avoid in its development and application. 
 Evidence-based policy, and thus evidenced-based programming, emerged in the 
1980s and 1990s. Cornish (2015) notes that “Emerging in the mid-1980s, the Evidence-Based 
Policy (EBP) movement has gained supporters, become a commonplace in many disciplines, 
and become a gatekeeper for the allocation of intervention funding.” Cornish (2015) continues 
“The important claims [for evidence-based policy] were claims about a science that is empirical 
(i.e. based on examination of the world rather than hearsay or ideology), and which is 
disinterested (i.e. independent of political influence).” Foss Hansen (2014) builds on this by 
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writing of the developing evidence-based policy movement emerging from the field of 
medicine to other fields such as public health, social care, education, and international 
development. As suggested here, the evidence-based movement emerged from the health and 
medical disciplines during the 1980s and early 1990s and shifted to in the social science and 
development fields as well. Evidence-based programming used by international development 
organisations, including those across the spectrum ranging from health and agriculture to 
democracy and human rights, has increased over the past decade. Craig Valters (2014) argues 
that social practice has striven to be informed by evidence and that practitioners have sought 
out and implemented tools based on prevailing development theories. 
 In particular, this has been due to the push for increased monitoring and evaluation 
demands imposed upon these groups, especially as resources, often publicly funded, require 
justification for their expense in the political arena. Especially regarding United States foreign 
assistance, Ferrarello (2017) highlights “There’s a misconception about U.S. spending on 
foreign assistance. While public opinion polls suggest that Americans believe foreign aid 
makes up roughly 25 percent of federal spending, it actually makes up a mere one percent of 
the federal budget.” Politicians in the United States, and elsewhere, have often targeted foreign 
assistance due to these prevailing misconceptions among the public, including President 
Donald Trump who, Ferrarello (2017) notes, sought to reduce foreign by 37 percent and merge 
the United States’s principal international development agency, USAID, with the Department 
of State, a more diplomatic and politically-oriented organisation within the U.S. government. 
This is supported when Nermine Wally (2018) of the Cairo Institute for Liberal Arts and 
Sciences notes: “Both beneficiaries and donors of international aid have increasingly been 
pressured by their partners and constituents to capture what works, how it works and for whom 
it works in a both rigorous and systematic way. Donors and governments alike are expected to 
utilise the findings emerging from evaluation in their decision-making process to justify 
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resource mobilisation.” Harry Jones of the Overseas Development Institute (2012) supports 
this viewpoint as he writes of high stakes when it comes the need to improve learning efficiently 
and cost-effectively while also making the results of learning and evaluation relevant and useful 
to actual practice. 
 Therefore, organisations, including those in the democracy and human rights field, 
have moved toward evidence-based programming in order to perform their work more 
effectively and achieve results, while simultaneously responding to donor demands for greater 
justification of their work. According to a London School of Economics report, “Theories of 
Change are increasingly mandatory for implementing agencies to submit to donors in the aid 
industry,” (Craig 2014). 
 For example, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), has been using the theory of change methodology in its work since 2010 in order to 
better inform DFID development approaches and efforts. In a 2012 review of DFID, the 
importance of theory of change and evidence-based programming in the department’s work 
was highlighted as follows: “Theory of change thinking is used to explain rationales and how 
things are intended to work, but also to explore new possibilities through critical thinking… 
Critical thinking is cross-checked with evidence from research (qualitative and quantitative) 
and wider learning that brings other analytical perspectives, referenced to stakeholders’, 
partners’ and beneficiaries’ contextual knowledge” (Vogel 2012). Similarly, the United 
Nations Development Group (2018) views its approach toward theory of change as a 
programming methodology in the following way: “A theory of change can help a United 
Nations Country Team (UNCT) systematically think through the many underlying and root 
causes of development challenges, and how they influence each other, when determining what 
an UNDAF should address as a priority to maximize the UN’s contribution to achieving 
development change.” 
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 As seen here with the further introduction of a requirement for rigorous tools and 
methodologies to develop and guide programming, organisations have responded through the 
use of surveys and other forms of social science research, largely for those operating in the 
democracy and human rights field. In an attempt to make their programming more sound and 
legitimate, surveys and ratings and rankings have gained influence. Although some of these 
approaches and surveys, such as the annual Freedom House Freedom in the World report, have 
been in existence for decades, others are relatively new, such as the CIVICUS Monitor. The 
general use of ratings and rankings by these organisations is explored in the upcoming section, 
followed by an overview of the most popular and well-known of these international rankings.  
1.3 Ratings and rankings research 
 
In addition to this dissertation being situated among the evidence-based movement for 
programming, it also sits well within efforts to provide insights and research on international 
and country-level processes through ratings and rankings research. Several such organisations 
and surveys of these types exist presently, although some have existed longer than others. 
Academics and policymakers alike have argued for and against these international ratings and 
rankings, demonstrating that advantages and disadvantages exist for each. However, generally, 
these approaches, also called scorecards, are used to measure how countries or other actors 
perform in certain policy areas. 
 Because of the ease with which these reports can be consumed by policymakers and 
the public, they are often used to pressure countries into being ranked; hence, countries often 
take these reports seriously. According to Judith Kelley (2017), “For example, if your country 
is at the bottom of a well-respected scorecard for “Ease of Doing Business,” you might find 
that international businesses start to avoid investing in your economy.” Sarah Sunn Bush 
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(2017) agrees with Judith Kelley when she writes that scorecards are influential toward 
improving countries’ behaviours. As such, more than 180 ratings have been developed to 
measure country-level performance in different issue areas. Robert Gregory (2014) supports 
this observation in the growth of the measures used to evaluate countries: “Apart from the WGI 
[World Governance Index], there has been an explosion of indexes and indicators, as various 
international organisations develop measures to rank comparatively the performances of 
different countries, both globally and regionally.” These measures are used as a form of social 
pressure by countries and organisations alike to influence each other’s behaviour as the exercise 
of military or economic sanctions diminishes. 
 Compared to the advent of evidence-based programming described previously in this 
dissertation, which emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s, the majority of measures of 
countries’ performance developed after 1990 despite their existence, such as in the form of 
sovereign credit ratings, since the 1930s. Judith Kelly and Beth Simmons (2014) argue that this 
explosion in ratings and rankings has been due to various contemporary trends:  
“Meanwhile, the cost of exerting pressure via information has declined. While not costless, it 
has never been easier to collect and distribute reasonably credible information from highly 
decentralized sources on a global scale than it is today. Moreover, the indicization of 
information is a natural response to demands for transparency and accountability (Mathiason 
2004). It is likely that the convergence of normative prohibitions against overt force and the 
ease of collecting, analysing, and disseminating information globally has encouraged the turn 
to indicators as tools of international influence.” 
 Therefore, ratings and rankings serve as a more cost-effective and internationally-
acceptable way of exerting pressure outside of military and economic action, thus constituting 
a form of soft power countries are able to exercise. The move toward using ratings and rankings 
to exert pressure has also been driven in part by “a combination of rational interests, market 
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demand, and institutional design. This is most notable in relation to private market governance, 
where one of the main motivations behind benchmarking has been to produce useable 
information that improves how actors respond to market forces and conditions,” (Broome and 
Quirk 2015). The rating system to be proposed later in this dissertation falls squarely in this 
growth and accepted use of these measures of countries’ performance: “Benchmarking efforts 
now play a key role in policy coordination and institutional design among states and IOs 
[international organisations] faced with collective action problems over climate change, 
disaster, management, and human development,” (Broome and Quirk 2015). 
 With the growth of ratings and rankings, however, there have been various areas of 
concern and critique toward some of these instruments in use. Gregory Michener (2015), in an 
examination of international transparency policy indexes, specifically highlights some of these 
challenges when he writes: 
“The driving question here is whether the design of policy evaluations, particularly those using 
index-based formats, is motivating “the right type of compliance”. Impressive scores across 
several international transparency policy indexes (ITPIs) by countries with uneven, if not 
questionable institutional track records understandably raise questions about how easily 
“gamed” these measures might be (Eisenkopf, 2009; Hood, 2012, pp. S86–S88). In other 
words, what (avoidable) “loopholes” might indexes afford by reason of flawed evaluative 
strategies, designs, or challenges associated with the evaluation of policies via the composite 
index format?” 
 Nelson Espeland and Michael Sauder (2007) point to a further complication with 
ratings and rankings as they note that those being measured alter and modify their behaviour 
in response to being measured and observed through the process of reactivity and reflexivity. 
Indeed, the intended purposes of many ratings and rankings, particularly those used by 
international advocacy organisations, is in fact to modify behaviour of those being measured 
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and to equip advocates and other policymakers with the evidence they need to pressure for 
change. Despite the tension here, Espeland and Sauder (2007) do highlight an important 
phenomenon that occurs when those being measured know they are being measured, namely 
playing to the test and trying to improve scores on indicators themselves without actual 
improvements in on-the-ground conditions. Therefore, although advocates and consumers of 
rankings information may encourage those countries being measured to undertake efforts to 
improve their behaviour (assuming it is deficient or non-compliant in some regard), they may 
encounter the risk of countries merely following a rote exercise of conforming to the 
measurement parameters without undergoing deep or substantive reform efforts.  
1.4 Structure of this dissertation 
 
Given the extent to which ratings and rankings systems, and the organisations that implement 
them, have come to characterise much of the political economic understanding of the world, it 
remains important in Chapter 2 to explore some of the most well-known of these and the 
methodologies behind their assessments. Thereafter, this dissertation continues with a 
discussion of a select group of these examples to illustrate challenges associated with these, 
some of which have been referenced in the preceding section and which will prove important 
for consideration in the development and description of the framework to be proposed for 
assessing compliance with international law and norms regarding the use of outer space. 
Chapter 3 then moves on to explore the existing set of international laws and norms relating to 
outer space, and discusses which of these will be used for informing the proposed framework. 
Chapter 4 will seek to understand the various elements comprising assessment methodologies 
and which to use based upon identified best practices contained in previous research. Chapter 
4 helps ground Chapter 5, wherein the proposed framework is described in detail accompanied 
by questions for each indicator and a scoring guide to assist with arriving at a comprehensive 
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assessment score. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by exploring the potential scores 
resulting from the application of the framework to the three test cases (the United States, South 
Korea, and South Africa), and the various ranges and categories (i.e. highly compliant, mostly 
compliant, partially compliant, minimally compliant, or non-compliant) in which these scores 
fall for purposes of advocacy and decision-making.  
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2 EXISTING RATINGS AND 
RANKINGS SYSTEMS 
One such example of a ranking and ratings system sits with the global civil society alliance 
organisation CIVICUS in the form its CIVICUS Monitor. This system rates countries according 
to five categories, including closed, repressed, obstructed, narrowed, and open, which are used 
to assess civil society freedoms across the world. As CIVICUS describes in its methodology 
report on the system, it relies on civil society-produced reports on civic space, international 
indices compiled by international civil society organisations, CIVICUS-produced and country-
specific reports, narrative and quantitative reports produced by the group’s in-country partners, 
and user feedback. Based upon a system of weighting of each of these inputs and review by 
independent experts, a score is produced on a range of 1 to 100 with each category classification 
corresponding to a numerical score (for example a ‘closed’ country sits in the score range of 1 
to 20). 
 Freedom House, a United States-based organisation, produces several ratings and 
rankings reports; however, the most well-known of these is the annual Freedom in the World 
report, which classifies countries as free, partly free, and not free according to scoring of 
political rights and civil liberties. A country’s score, which translates into to its category 
classification, is determined by an expert analysis who writes a narrative report and scores the 
country based upon a series of questions, assigning each question a numerical value from 0 to 
4. There are two main groups of questions used by Freedom House to arrive at its overall scores 
for countries, including political rights and civil liberties questions. Each of these are then 
further divided in to subgroups, including electoral process, political pluralism and 
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participation, and functioning of questions for the political rights group and freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy and individual rights questions for the civil liberties group. The questions in each of 
these groups and subgroups are based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 
by the United Nations in 1948, demonstrating that the assessment is a normative assessment of 
countries based on existing and accepted international law and understandings of rights. 
However, Freedom House (2018) clarifies in its methodological description that it does “assess 
the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals, rather than governments or 
government performance per se. Political rights and civil liberties can be affected by both state 
and nonstate actors, including insurgents and other armed groups.” 
 Transparency International, an international civil society organisation promoting good 
governance, developed another well-known ratings and rankings system, the Corruptions 
Perception Index (CPI). The CPI is a composite indicator that was developed in 1995, and 
which was revised in 2012 in order to allow historical comparison of countries’ scores over 
time. The CPI develops its corruption indicator based on 13 sources of data that address 
questions of bribery, diversion of public monies, use of public office for private gain, civil 
service nepotism, and state capture by elites. A country is assigned a score based on an average 
of at least three of the 13 data sources, which is made possible by recalibrating the data sources 
own scores on to a 0 to 100 range. This rescaling of the source data is necessary as the various 
sources do not follow the same ratings and rankings approach when developing their own 
individual indicator scores. The CPI 2017 relied on these 13 data sources and their indicators, 
some of which are discussed in more detail in this dissertation, including: the African 
Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Sustainable Governance Indicators, Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Economist 
Intelligence Unit Country Risk Service, Freedom House Nations in Transit, Global Insight 
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Country Risk Ratings, IMD World Competitiveness Centre World Competitiveness Yearbook 
Executive Opinion Survey, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence, The 
PRS Group International Country Risk Guide, World Bank Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment, World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey, World Justice Project Rule 
of Law Index Expert Survey, and Varieties of Democracy. 
 The World Bank, in collaboration with the United States-based think tank Brookings 
Institution, produces another commonly used ratings and rankings system, the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). As the name suggests, the WGI have addressed six areas of 
governance for countries and territories since 1996. The areas of measurement include voice 
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Similar to Transparency 
International’s CPI, the WGI are a composite of indicators based on over 30 existing data 
sources, which include four different types of data such as surveys of households and firms, 
commercial business information providers, non-governmental organisations, and public sector 
organisations. In fact, the WGI indicators rely upon data provided by the Heritage Foundation, 
Freedom House and Transparency International, in addition to base data sources that already 
serve as inputs to Transparency International’s own assessment (for example, the Varieties of 
Democracy Project and the Economist’s Intelligence Unit). This suggests that some sources of 
data have outsized influence, and therefore suggests problematic methodological issues, within 
the ratings and rankings ecosystem. While an exploration of these challenges, and how they 
occur, is outside the scope of this current dissertation, they demonstrate the importance of 
caution in developing a new framework for a ratings and rankings system as this dissertation 
endeavours to do in ensuring adequate rigor and avoiding overreliance on certain source data. 
 A relatively new ratings and rankings system, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance, “measures and monitors governance performance in African 
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countries,” (2018). As such, it offers an annual assessment of only African countries across 
four categories of governance, which it defines as “the provision of the political, social and 
economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from his or her 
state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens,” (2018). The four categories 
of governance include safe and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable 
economic opportunity, and human development, which are further broken down in to 14 sub-
categories that include 100 indicators of governance. While the breadth of the indicators 
included in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance is quite extensive, measuring over 100 
difference aspects of governance, the system does suffer from some of the same challenges as 
other ratings and rankings systems in that it relies on existing data sources, which themselves 
are composite indicators of other indicators. As with the World Bank’s WGI, this index relies 
on the Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, and Transparency International’s indices, which 
are discussed in other sections, in addition to indicators that comprise these systems 
themselves, such as those used by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Varieties of Democracy Institute, and even the World Bank. Despite the index’s origination in 
2007 as a more recent system compared to the World Bank’s WGI or Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World, it still encounters challenges as it collects and collates data from other 
sources rather than being an originator of data itself. These challenges are even further 
complicated as the index itself serves as a data provider to some of its own sources of data, 
including the Economist’s Intelligence Unit, the Varieties of Democracy Institute, and the 
Centre for Democratic Development Ghana’s African Electoral Index and Sanction in Africa 
Index. 
 
2.1 Ratings and rankings systems: economics and business 
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In addition to measures of democracy, human rights, and governance, economic ratings and 
rankings systems also exist that offer insights in to countries’ levels of economic freedom, 
business environment, labour conditions, and overall prosperity.  
 The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom is an example of one such 
economic rating and ranking system. The Heritage Foundation, a right-leaning think tank based 
in the United States, measures economic freedom among four categories that each have three 
sub-categories with indicators scaled on a range of 0 to 100 attached to them. These four 
categories include the rule of law, which measures property rights, government integrity, and 
judicial effectiveness; government size, which includes government spending, tax burden, and 
fiscal health; regulatory efficiency, which includes business freedom, labour freedom, and 
monetary freedom; and open markets, which includes trade freedom, investment freedom, and 
financial freedom. Once a numerical score is assigned a country, it is ranked among all others 
that are measured in order to produce comparable data. Countries are then further grouped in 
to five colour categories based on their score ranges (for example, dark green for scores 80 to 
100, light green for scores 70 to 79.9, yellow for scores 60 to 69.9, orange for scores 50 to 59.9, 
and red for scores 0 to 49.9. 
 The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index is also a well-known ratings and 
rankings system used to assess economic issues within countries. The Ease of Doing Business 
ranking for a country is calculated relative to other countries included in the assessment through 
the calculation of a score known as the distance to frontier, whereby this score “benchmarks 
economies with respect to regulatory best practice, showing the absolute distance to the best 
performance,” (World Bank 2018). There are 41 individual indicators for a which a distance to 
frontier score is assessed for each country among a total of 10 different categories, including 
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, 
getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing 
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contracts, and resolving insolvency. Given that each indicator is based on best practice as 
observed globally since 2005, different countries can thereby set the best performance standard 
across various indicators. For example, the Ease of Doing Business Index 2018 featured New 
Zealand as having the best practice in the amount of time for starting a business, whereas Japan 
had set the best practice in terms of cost for getting electricity. Given the use of the distance to 
frontier calculation, this helps the World Bank to easily identify when reforms takes place 
within a country since the magnitude of the change in the distance to frontier gap helps to signal 
when these changes occur. This illustrates a clear example of the use of a ratings and rankings 
system such as the Ease of Doing Business Index in helping the World Bank to identify 
progress, or the lack thereof, in implementing policy reforms toward a particular objective (i.e. 
improving the business environment).  
 Another sizable, yet thematically interesting ratings and rankings system, is the 
Legatum Institute’s Prosperity Index. This index measures nine areas which it believes 
contribute to prosperity, including a country’s business environment, economic quality, 
environment, health, education, safety and security, social capital, personal freedom, and 
governance. The index differs from other systems as it seeks to advance a specific 
understanding of the concept of prosperity, which the Legatum Institute (2017) believes is 
“created by both economic wealth and social wellbeing working together in a relationship 
where each benefits and advances the other.” As such, the index provides measurements on 
104 variables attributed to each of the nine areas listed above, and which the organisation has 
identified, based on its own academic and analytical work, that determines countries’ economic 
performance and social wellbeing. Although the index performs a number of statistical 
manoeuvres, including weighting of indicators and areas, it too relies on external data sources, 
similar to many of the other ratings and rankings systems described previously in this 
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dissertation. Again, the same cast of data sources, such as Freedom House and the World 
Bank’s WGI, serve as important contributors across many of the index’s 104 variables. 
2.2 Select ratings and rankings systems and associated challenges 
 
As has been illustrated with these examples of ratings and rankings systems, some key 
challenges come to the fore. In addition to those noted already, we will explore in this section 
a selection of these assessments further as they typify the challenges faced by others.  
 The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) prove to be one such 
system that has been closely studied. One critique toward the WGI focuses on its conceptual 
definition of governance, a challenge encountered by other ratings and rankings systems 
explored elsewhere in this dissertation. “Although the concept of governance is widely 
discussed among policymakers and scholars, there is, as of yet, no strong consensus around a 
single definition of governance or institutional quality,” (Kraay et al. 2010).  
 In addition, the World Bank’s other indicator system, the Ease of Doing Business 
Index, has also been critiqued previously falling victim to contemporary understandings of 
governance and regulation during the time it was developed without ensuring relevance over 
time as social science and development theory evolved. In a 2008 review of the World Bank’s 
Ease of Doing Business Index, an evaluation found that “[the Ease of Doing Business Index] 
was, in fact, a symptom of the Zeitgeist at the time…the methodology presumes that less 
regulation is better than more than regulation, in every case, everywhere,” (Engle Merry et al. 
2015). Because of this neoliberal approach in its first iterations, this index proposed indicators, 
and as such measured countries, in an attempt to normalise its underlying assumptions toward 
the subject matter even though those assumptions were unsettled and had not achieved 
normative international consensus. For example, Engle Merry et al. (2015) point out that the 
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‘employing workers’ component of the Ease of Doing Business Index had been promoting an 
unsettled conceptualisation of labour market regulation, which was being disputed by the 
International Trade Union Confederation and bypassing International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) conventions. 
 This example, although later revised and then eliminated as an indicator by the World 
Bank, represents one of the pitfalls in which ratings and rankings systems can encounter as 
they seek to normalise underlying assumptions that go in to the definition and application of 
indicators, thereby having potential real-world policy implications as powerful, decision-
making organisations rely on indicators to guide their work.  
 Another powerful example, and potential challenge posed by the World Bank’s 
system and indicators more generally in promoting a ‘study to the test’ approach, is highlighted 
by Sam Scheuth (2016) when he writes about the country of Georgia: 
“In the case of (Caucasus) Georgia, the government carefully targeted its reforms to 
raise the country’s DBI [Doing Business Index] ranking, which vaulted from 100 out 
of 155 in 2006 into the top 20 by 2008 (World Bank and IFC 2006a 2007). This rankings 
ascension, in turn, was used in an investment promotion campaign designed to dispel 
the country’s profile as a post-Soviet failed state and recast it as a new “frontier market.” 
Concurrently, the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Georgia tripled 
between 2005 and 2007, as a results of which it was the world’s ninth-highest-ranked 
recipient of FDI as a percentage of GDP (UNCTAD 2008)…the Georgia investment 
promotion strategy targeted higher DBI rankings by using its indicators as a schema for 
legal reforms.” 
The example of Georgia well demonstrates not only how an organisation’s adoption and use 
of an indicator guides decision-making for policymakers within that organisation, but also how 
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indicators have been internalised by those being measured themselves in order to game their 
policies toward certain outcomes.  
 Another such example selected from the above discussion of ratings and rankings 
systems exists in the form of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World survey. Similar to the 
World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index that has the potential to guide investment and 
policy decisions toward countries, the Freedom in the World survey is specifically identified 
as part of the decision-making parameters implemented by the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), a United States government bilateral development organisation. 
Specifically, when identifying which countries are eligible to receive development assistance, 
the MCC sets “hard hurdles” that must be met in the realms of democratic rights (defined as 
political rights or civil liberties) and control of corruption. Whereas the control of corruption 
indicator is established by the World Bank’s WGI assessment, the political rights indicator and 
civil liberties indicator each used by the MCC are established by Freedom House. The rationale 
from the MCC (2017) for using these Freedom House indicators is as follows: “Requiring that 
a country pass either the Political Rights or Civil Liberties indicator creates a democratic 
incentive for countries, recognizes the importance democracy plays in driving poverty-
reducing economic growth, and holds MCC accountable to working with the best governed, 
poorest countries.” In essence, the MCC represents a powerful example whereby indicators are 
used to inform consequential funding and policy decisions. As such, Freedom House, as the 
developer of such indicators, holds significant power in this regard, despite the Freedom in the 
World survey also suffering from challenges similar to the World Bank’s ratings and rankings 
systems. One such challenge presented by Nils Steiner (2016) arises when he notes that the 
Freedom in the World results “tend to favour US allies and/or disfavor major antagonists of 
the US government,” which “…raises concerns that closer links between governments and 
organisations rating third countries might be dangerous in that they can lead to the presence of 
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political bias in the ratings.” The implication present in Steiner’s study is that, as an 
organisation based in the United States and funded in part by the United States government, 
Freedom House ratings proposed by its system are politically biased, without claims as to 
whether this is intentional or unintentional.  
 Sarah Sunn Bush further highlights this challenge, particularly when ratings and 
rankings systems such as the Freedom House Freedom in the World Survey come into formal 
use by governments. In a discussion of the MCC, Sunn Bush (2017) notes, “…the ideological 
alignment that encourages U.S. policymakers to use the FITW ratings makes them problematic 
to use for certain functions.” This alignment between the indicators and American 
policymakers was made possible because the Freedom House survey coincided with and 
reinforced policymakers’ ideas about liberal democracy. This is problematic, particularly when 
used for contemporary policymaking, because if “…the benchmarks that are used to implement 
conditionality [of MCC development assistance] are biased in favour of U.S. allies, then the 
stated purpose of the [MCC] program is undermined,” (Sunn Bush 2017). Sunn Bush 
essentially argues that because the Freedom House survey is already in alignment with 
American ideas of liberal democracy, those countries most likely to not presently conform with 
these same ideas (i.e. non-American allies) would not be eligible to receive development 
assistance, despite it being a stated goal by the MCC that it seeks to encourage democratic 
policy reform. Given this scenario, the ratings and rankings system, having reached a desired 
and codified level of use by an influential policymaking organisation (i.e. the MCC), is 
undercut in its overall goal to promote democracy and human rights by the same factor that 
made it so successful with policymakers in the first place, namely its alignment with prevailing 
attitudes and conceptions in the United States of what constitutes a liberal democracy. 
 The above exercise reviewing non-space related ratings and rankings systems and 
their associated challenges is not meant to undermine the proposed framework contained 
Chapter 2: Existing ratings and rankings systems 
                                                                                         23 
herein, but rather to guide and inform around the potential pitfalls such a system may encounter 
once applied and used. This review also assists in situating the proposed framework as it 
follows from the two historical movements, namely the evidence-based policy and 
programming movement associated closely with the rise of ratings and rankings systems across 
disparate fields of research and practice. 
2.3 The Space Security Index 
 
Although numerous indicators and ratings and rankings systems exist across a variety of issue 
areas as explored above, the Space Security Index (SSI) remains the only space-related 
assessment in existence. This is where this dissertation is expected to make its most significant 
contribution in offering an additional resource for advocates and policymakers alike on a more 
general basis for understanding the use of outer space by states, not necessarily focused on only 
security of the space environment. According to Project Ploughshares (2018), a supporter of 
the SSI, “The Space Security Index is the first and only annual, comprehensive and integrated 
assessment of space security. The project seeks to provide a policy-neutral fact base of trends 
and developments in space security based on primary, open-source research in an annual 
report.” Project Ploughshares considers space security a politicised issue area, and views SSI 
as an important fact-based (i.e. evidence-based) tool in informing policy discussions regarding 
space security challenges and responses. SSI (2018) describes its efforts as “Based on 
seventeen indicators of space security, it provides background information and in-depth 
analysis on key trends and developments in the space field.”  
 In terms of its methodology, SSI first defines space security as “the secure and 
sustainable access to and use of space and freedom from space-based threats” (2018). SSI 
structures its annual report around four themes, including condition and knowledge of the space 
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environment, access to and use of space by various actors, security of space systems, and outer 
space governance. Each of these themes includes a number of indicators; however, only three 
of the total 17 indicators deal exclusively with outer space governance, the primary emphasis 
of this dissertation as described in later chapters. The methodology for the SSI report relies 
upon expert surveys and inputs through working groups that ultimately result in “a broad 
overview of international perceptions of space security,” (Space Security Index 2014). 
 The SSI differs from the previous systems discussed earlier in this dissertation as it 
does not necessarily rate or rank countries in terms of its subject matter, space security. Rather, 
the SSI offers an overview of the state of certain topics each year for its assessment, which then 
highlights important developments that took place during the year that affected the topic noted 
in the indicator. Therefore, the use of the word indicator within the SSI is not used in the 
normative understanding of the term as a way to measure change away from a baseline or 
toward a target, but rather to simply indicate a specific topic for discussion within report on the 
four broader themes of space environment, access to and use of space by various actors, 
security of space systems, and outer space governance. For example, the fourth theme 
contained in the SSI 2017 report, which is an overview of space security in calendar year 2016, 
begins with its first indicator, Indicator 4.1: National space policies, conducting an overview 
of national space policy trends generally before addressing country-specific developments that 
occurred in 2016 (i.e. the United State Air Force’s Space command white paper; the European 
Defence Action Plan; the Chinese white paper on space activities; the thematic topic of policies 
regarding space resource utilisation; the African space policy and strategy; and, the adoption 
of space policies by upcoming spacefaring countries). While the information and analysis 
presented for this indicator and the others included within the SSI prove insightful and relevant 
to understanding space security, the SSI fails to take a normative approach to behaviour by 
states in their access and use of outer space, which nominally serves as a goal for other ratings 
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and rankings systems discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, aside from informing and 
guiding policymaking. However, this is to be expected of the SSI since it makes no claim to 
the contrary when it clearly articulates its aim to “to improve transparency on space activities 
and provide a common, comprehensive, objective knowledge base to support the development 
of dialogue and policies that contribute to the security and sustainability of outer space,” (Space 
Security Index 2017). 
 There remains a paucity of comprehensive and periodic review of countries’ 
behaviour and operations in space, especially with regard to international space law and 
established norms. This is not to contend that research on countries’ space policies and space 
activities does not exist; however, it does not exist in the form explored in the first chapter of 
this dissertation. The SSI provides the closest periodic review, but it neither assesses countries 
individually, nor does it present a comparison of relevant countries’ behaviours according to 
international space law and norms in order to evaluate whether space activities and policies 
take place in the spirit of ensuring access and use of outer space by all. The assessment 
performed by the SSI also does not follow a rigorous and regularly applied methodology. 
Indeed, SSI’s annual reports rely on expert analysis and are then considered in a review 
workshop; however, this review is done on a discussion and narrative basis against particular 
indicators, which are largely certain topics comprising broader themes. The indicators included 
in the SSI are neither applied to all spacefaring countries per se, nor are they used to assess 
progress from a baseline measure or toward a target. 
2.4 Gaps in existing space policy research 
 
Given the SSI’s role in informing debate around states’ behaviour in outer space rather than 
setting the terms of the conversation, this illustrates a challenge confronting the international 
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space community. Presently, there remains a lack of a consistent approach to measure 
countries’ adherence and compliance with international law and normative practices with 
regards to the access and use of outer space. This lack of measurement is owing to various 
factors, including difficulties in measuring compliance because of a lack of deliverable and 
specific measures and indicators within existing international instruments, difficulties in 
measuring compliance because of open-ended interpretations of international instruments and 
tracking domestication of said instruments by each signatory state, and disagreement over the 
weighting of different parts of international instruments by various space actors depending 
from which sector they approach the issue (i.e. civil society, military, government, or industry). 
For example, civil society would, hypothetically, prioritise transparency and accountability in 
the access to and use of outer space, whereas governments would prioritise national security 
and access components and industry would prioritise use and ownership of space resources.  
 Additionally, the nascent stage of development for international space law, compared 
to other areas of international law, combined with the relatively few international space 
advocacy and research groups (again, comparable to other fields) leads to uncertainty and 
disagreement on how to interpret alternative and competing approaches for access to and use 
of outer space. Unequal access to information by different groups across civil society, 
government, and industry also compounds this challenge in being able to successfully and 
comprehensively measure and monitor states’ behaviour regarding outer space. Therefore, 
given these conditions and the undefined consensus for what constitutes good behaviour versus 
bad behaviour for the access and use of outer space, this dissertation will seek to make a 
contribution in setting normative understandings for how states should behave according to a 
common baseline despite different, and sometimes competing, priorities and interests. This 
dissertation remains fully cognitive of the normative language used herein and its liability to 
be confined to only contemporary understandings of the topic without ensuring flexibility for 
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future iterations and developments that may take place in the field, in addition to potentially 
subscribing to limited understandings of the subject from a Global North, dominant power, 
and/or spacefaring state’s perspective, given how conceptualisations from these groups of how 
space should be accessed and used form the basis of many present-day space policy debates.  
 The following chapter therefore seeks to address these concerns by first further 
defining the problem, discussing the current condition of international space law and relevant 
advocacy and research groups, and the impetus for suggesting a normative, yet flexible, 
inclusive, and responsive framework for how states’ behaviours regarding outer space can be 
assessed.  
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3 INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 
AND NORMS 
The criteria used to develop the framework for assessing countries’ compliance with 
international space law and norms will be derived from existing international legally binding 
instruments and non-binding guidelines and resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) and the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA). UNCOPUOS serves as the venue in which international space law is 
developed, and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) serves the 
committee’s secretariat and to operationalise many of the functions agreed by the committee 
and the UN more generally.  
 Since 1967, the international community has developed five treaties relating to the 
access and use of outer space. These are: the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Rescue 
Agreement of 1968, the Liability Convention of 1972, the Registration Convention of 1975, 
and the Moon Agreement of 1979 that all comprise the binding forms of international law that 
relate to the access and use of outer space. However, there are only four of these that have 
received a majority of state signatories whereas the Moon Agreement has only received a 
relatively small number of signatories. In addition to the treaties, five relevant declarations and 
sets of legal principles that relate to outer space include the Declaration of Legal Principles of 
1963, the Broadcasting Principles of 1982, the Remote Sensing Principles of 1986, the Nuclear 
Power Sources Principles of 1992, and the Benefits Declaration of 1996. These treaties and 
sets of principles will be explored further in the section below, which will be followed by a 
discussion of relevant provisions of UNGA resolutions. 
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3.1 Differences in binding and non-binding international instruments 
 
International law, comprising binding commitments in which states subject themselves to being 
governed and bound by rules of agreements, largely exists in the form of treaties as these 
binding instruments. This differs from non-binding instruments such guidelines or 
recommendations that do not have the same level of international accountability. The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO 2017) summarises this 
well when it writes of binding instruments versus non-binding instruments: “Binding 
instruments, or ‘hard law’, establish rules expressly recognized by the contracting States 
(Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice)…By ratifying the instrument, 
States explicitly recognize their obligation to respect the terms of the treaty.” This affects 
domestic laws of countries as well because “In accordance with the principle of primacy of the 
international law over national law, State Parties are bound to adapt their national legislation 
to the provisions of the treaty and introduce all relevant measures in their national legal system 
to implement their obligations…” (UNESCO 2017). 
 Separately, according to UNESCO (2017), “Non-binding instruments, or ‘soft law’, 
provide guidelines of conduct, which are neither strictly biding norms of law, nor completely 
irrelevant political maxims…Main examples of non-binding instruments are declarations, 
recommendations and resolutions.”  Since international space law and norms established 
around the access to and use of outer space are found in both binding, international legal 
agreements (i.e. treaties) and non-binding instruments, it remains important to understand the 
basis of these non-binding instruments in addition to the binding treaties.  
“Declarations do no create legal obligations for States that adopt them. They reflect 
principles on which these States agree at the time of their adoption and proclaim [as] 
standards [of behaviour], which though non-binding, [nevertheless] impose moral 
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obligations…recommendations are intended to influence the development of national 
laws and practices…[and] resolutions are formal expressions of opinion by a legislative 
body or a public meeting. The resolutions made by the United Nations General 
Assembly…are the therefore an expression of the Member States of these 
Organizations,” (UNESCO 2017). 
3.2 Binding international space law treaties 
 
In this section, this dissertation will explore the binding instruments that comprise international 
space law in the form of the five outer space treaties. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, formally 
known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signifies the first binding 
instrument used by the international community regarding access to and the use of outer space. 
In its first article, Article I, it establishes key principles on the exploration and use of space for 
the benefit of all countries, the freedom of access and exploration of the moon and celestial 
bodies on a basis of equality, and the freedom of scientific investigation. The treaty goes on to 
discuss and establish other important principles and key foundational components of 
international space law, including non-appropriation of celestial bodies through sovereignty 
claims or by means of use or occupation, peaceful use of space and the non-placement of 
nuclear weapons in space, provision of assistance to astronauts during emergencies, 
irrespective of their origin, state responsibility and authorisation and supervision for national 
activities in space, liability of launched objects, registration of launched objects, and reciprocity 
of use of space assets on celestial bodies. Indeed, as seen in upcoming sections, some of these 
provisions established in the Outer Space Treaty formed the basis of the other subsequently 
adopted binding instruments, including the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, and 
the Registration Convention. The Outer Space Treaty, in addition to the others mentioned here, 
Chapter 3: International space law and norms 
                                                                                         31 
will form the basis of the criteria comprising the framework described later in this dissertation, 
accompanied by criteria also assigned to non-binding documents regarding outer space. 
 Following the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, formally known as the 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, was adopted in 1968. Article I of the Rescue Agreement clearly 
lays out the responsibilities of states pertaining to accidents and emergencies involving 
astronauts: “Each Contracting Party which receives information or discovers that the personnel 
of a spacecraft have suffered accident or are experiencing conditions of distress or have made 
an emergency landing or unintended landing in territory under its jurisdiction…shall 
immediately notify the launching authority or…immediately make a public announcement by 
all appropriate means of communication,” (UNOOSA 2017). Article 2 specifically states that 
“…a Contracting Party [state]…shall immediately take all possible steps to rescue them 
[astronauts] and render them all necessary assistance,” (UNOOSA 2017). Here is where the 
Rescue Agreement gains its name as it establishes the principle of rescue and assistance for all 
astronauts, irrespective of origin or launching state, in the case of emergencies. In subsequent 
articles of the treaty, it goes on to establish principles for providing assistance if states are able 
to do so despite distressed astronauts not being under their jurisdiction, the safe and prompt 
return of astronauts to their launch state once found, and the notification, recovery, and return 
of space objects and component parts. 
 The third international treaty on outer space is the Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, commonly known as the Liability Convention. 
The convention begins by noting its assumption that space actors intend to operate safely when 
they launch space objects “…taking into consideration that, notwithstanding the precautionary 
measures to be taken by States and international intergovernmental organizations involved in 
the launch of space objects,” (UNOOSA 2017). This suggests that the treaty assumes space 
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actors act in good faith with regard to space, and in particular the launching of space objects, 
which may increasingly prove to be a challenging assumption to make as space activities 
increase and the domain becomes increasingly congested and contested. Information and 
analysis confirming, or denying, this assumption and others like it that form the basis of 
international space law remains one of the areas in which this dissertation strives to contribute 
to informed decision-making and policymaking. Nonetheless, similar to those before it, the 
Liability Convention establishes a number of principles which states must follow to remain 
compliant with international law. These principles, created in its several articles and provisions, 
include: the absolute liability of launching states for damage caused by their space objects to 
anything on the Earth’s surface or flying aircraft; the process of establishing fault for damage 
done to other space objects; the responsibility and payment of compensation to third-party 
states if damage results from two launching states; the joint responsibility and liability of 
launching states if they jointly launch a space object; the exoneration of liability of launching 
states due to gross negligence or act or omission with intent to cause damage by the state 
claiming compensation; the claims process for compensation; the statute of limitations of one 
year for a claim to be made following the date of occurrence of the damage or the identification 
of the liable launching state; and the provision of appropriate and rapid assistance to a damage-
affected state in the case of larger-scale danger to human life or interference to living conditions 
or functioning of important centres. 
 Given the emphasis on compensation for damage caused by launching states to the 
Earth’s surface, aircraft, and space objects with varying levels of liability depending on where 
the damage occurs, some have argued that the Liability Convention promotes the larger 
international space law norm prohibiting the militarisation of space, and therefore the conduct 
of damage-causing space warfighting activities. Pavle Kilibarda (2017) describes this well in 
writing, “Whereas militarization in the broadest sense is legal, the concept of liability at least 
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constrains the ‘weaponization of space’ (means as the use of outer space for direct force 
deployment in situations of armed violence)…As a matter of treaty interpretation, it seems 
absurd to suggest that a treaty which clearly covers cases of accident would not also apply to 
damage caused deliberately, or is limited to deliberate damage caused outside of an armed 
conflict.” The interpretation of the Liability Convention alongside other documents comprising 
international space law assists with determining how military space activities should be treated 
in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. 
 The fourth, and remaining commonly adopted, international treaty on outer space is 
the Registration Convention, formally known as the Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space. This treaty helps to further explain and codify elements established 
in previous treaties regarding the registration of space objects. The Registration Convention, 
opened for ratification in 1975. In Article II, it makes it the responsibility of launching states 
to develop and maintain individual, national registries of objects they launch into space and to 
register on an ongoing basis these objects in the registry. In subsequent articles of the 
convention, it goes on to create other, more specific provisions, including: an instruction to the 
UN Secretary-General for the UN to maintain its own registry of space objects based on 
information provided to it by launching states. The information to be provided includes the 
details of the launch and characteristics of the space object that was launched, which should 
also be included in the individual launching states’ and UN registries. The convention also 
details the process for how states should identify other space objects that cause damage to their 
own spacecraft. 
 The fifth and final treaty regarding the access to and use of outer space is the Moon 
Agreement, otherwise known as the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies. The Moon Agreement is the least popular outer space treaty, having 
had only 18 states that have ratified or acceded to it. This may be due to the treaty featuring a 
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number of restrictive terms and provisions, and the introduction of a principle in Article 4 
stating “The exploration and use of the Moon shall be the province of all mankind and shall be 
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries…” (UNOOSA 2017). This is later 
elaborated in Article 11 as well when it notes “The Moon and its natural resources are the 
common heritage of mankind…” (UNOOSA 2017). Other restrictive provisions included in 
Article 3 forbid military bases, installations, and fortifications; weapons testing; and military 
manoeuvres on the Moon; the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, on, or in the 
Moon; whereas Article 4 goes on to also state “Due regard shall be paid to the interests of 
present and future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of living and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development” (UNOOSA 2017) regarding the 
use of the Moon. Perhaps the most contentious of the Moon Agreement’s provisions regards 
its position of the use of the Moon’s natural resources established through the aforementioned 
common heritage of mankind principle it sets forth:  
“States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an integrational regime, 
including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of 
the Moon…The main purposes of the international regime to be established shall 
include…an equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from those 
resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the 
efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the 
exploration of the Moon, shall be given special consideration.” (UNOOSA 2017). 
 Given such emphasis on resource sharing, leading spacefaring countries have not 
ratified or acceded to the Moon Agreement, making it essentially an ineffective and, in practice, 
negligible treaty with no effect on space activities. Whereas the treaty aims to establish a 
number of best practices and guiding principles for the cooperative use and exploitation of the 
Moon and celestial bodies, particularly from a Global South perspective with its emphasis on 
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the distribution of benefits to developing countries who may otherwise lack access to such 
resources and the ability to benefit from them, it fails to meet the necessary geopolitical and 
economic realities of the current space environment and the priorities of those engaging in 
activities in the domain. Thus, given the Moon Agreement’s low level of ratification and 
accession by countries and its minimal effect on current outer space governance, it will not be 
considered for purposes of developing the framework proposed in later chapters of this 
dissertation because it does not reflect the interests of spacefaring countries and the standards 
to which they hold each other accountable. 
3.3 Binding international space-related treaties 
 
Now that the main five treaties on outer space have been discussed in the previous section, it 
remains important to take note of the other space-related treaties that will be considered for 
purposes of assessment within the framework for understanding countries’ level of compliance 
with international space law and norms. These specific treaties will not be discussed at detail 
in the current section as was done for the previous five treaties as these do not deal exclusively 
with outer space and may prove too institution, technical, or project-specific, making them not 
useful for interpreting and arriving at larger and more applicable norms of behaviour in outer 
space. An assessment will be made in the upcoming chapters for whether provisions of these 
treaties are incorporated in the framework’s criteria; however, for purposes of this section, it is 
instructive to note what these space-related treaties are in order to acknowledge the context in 
which this dissertation seeks to make its contribution. Therefore, these space-related treaties 
include the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and 
under Water of 1963; the Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying 
Signals Transmitted by Satellite of 1974; the Agreement Relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization of 1971; the Agreement on the Establishment of 
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the INTERSPUTNIK International System and Organization of Space Communications of 
1971; the Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency of 1975; the 
Agreement of the Arab Corporation for Space Communications of 1976; the Agreement on 
Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes of 1976; the 
Convention on the International Mobile Satellite Organization of 1976; the Convention 
Establishing the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization of 1982; the Convention 
for the Establishment of European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological 
Satellites of 1983; and the International Telecommunication Union Constitution and 
Convention of 1992. 
3.4 Non-binding international principles, resolutions, and guidelines 
 
In this section, we discuss the various principles, resolutions, and guidelines adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Principles adopted by the UNGA include the 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space (1963), Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for 
International Direct Television Broadcasting (1982), Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of 
the Earth from Outer Space (1986), Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources 
in Outer Space (1992), and the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular 
Account the Needs of Developing Countries (1996). Furthermore, UNGA-adopted resolutions 
include the 1961 resolution on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, 
the 2000 resolution on the use of geostationary orbit, the 2004 resolution on the concept of the 
launching state, the 2007 resolution on the registration of space objects, and the 2013 resolution 
on recommendations for national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of 
outer space. Finally, UN guidelines and frameworks developed to guide the use of outer space 
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include the 2007 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space, and the 2009 Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in 
Outer Space. 
 The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1963) represented the first UNGA-level legal expression 
for how states should operate in outer space. This later evolved into the Outer Space of Treaty 
of 1967, which represented the culmination of these non-binding principles in a binding 
international treaty which states could ratify. As was later included in the Outer Space Treaty, 
the Declaration of Legal Principles by which states should abide include: the exploration and 
use of outer space for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind; freedom of exploration of 
space and celestial bodies; non-appropriation of space and celestial bodies; state responsibility 
and authorization and supervision of space activities; non-interference in space;  registration 
and liability of launched space objects; and the provision of assistance to astronauts regardless 
of nationality. For purposes of the framework that is later discussed in this dissertation, the 
Declaration of Legal Principles will not be included in the rating system as the same concepts 
discussed in it are revisited in the Outer Space Treaty, which represents the binding 
international law form of these same principles. Therefore, the Outer Space Treaty will be 
included among the rating criteria, whereas its predecessor, the Declaration of Legal Principles, 
will not.  
 In addition to the Declaration of Legal Principles, the second non-binding set of 
principles adopted by the UNGA include the Principles Governing the Use by States of 
Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (1982). This set of 
principles was adopted by the UNGA to reaffirm “…international direct television 
broadcasting by satellite should be carried out in a manner compatible with the sovereign rights 
of States, including the principle of non-intervention, as well as with the right of everyone to 
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seek, receive, and impart information and ideas…” (UNOOSA 2017). The principles also 
establish the principles of free dissemination and mutual exchange of cultural and scientific 
information and knowledge, contributions toward educational, social, and economic 
development, equal rights of all states to broadcast by satellites, international cooperation and 
special assistance to developing countries for international broadcasting, settlement for 
disputes, state responsibility, duty and right to consult between the broadcasting state and 
receiving state, protection of copyright and neighbouring rights, and notification to the United 
Nations. 
 Following the UNGA’s adoption of the principles relating to international 
broadcasting, the UNGA adopted the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from 
Outer Space in 1986. Similar to many previously discussed international instruments regarding 
outer space, this set of principles begins by affirming that remote sensing activities should be 
carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, in addition to defining what is 
meant by remote sensing, primary data, processed data, analysed information, and remote 
sensing activities. Interestingly, when defining remote sensing, the UNGA limits its definition 
to only those activities that are used for “the purposes of improving natural resources 
management, land use and the protection of the environment,” (UNOOSA 2017) which only 
captures a portion of the scope of remote sensing activities given their applicability in other 
contexts, notably defence and intelligence. The principles go on to further outline that remote 
sensing should not be conducted in a manner detrimental to the legitimate rights and interests 
of the states being sensed; remote sensing states should include other states in their remote 
sensing activities; remote sensing states should establish and operate data collection and 
storage and processing and interpretation through agreements with other states; states should 
provide technical assistance to other states on remote sensing activities, notification of the 
United Nations of remote sensing activities; remote sensing activities should promote the 
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protection of the environment and natural resources; states that have remote sensing activities 
should furnish information if it is capable of preventing harm to the environment and mitigating 
the effect of natural disasters; and the rights of sensed states to have access to primary, 
processed, and analysed data for territory under their jurisdiction on a non-discriminatory basis 
and for a reasonable cost. 
 Another set of principles the UNGA adopted include the Principles Relevant to the 
Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, which were adopted in 1992. The first unique 
principle established in this set features the principle to minimise the amount of radioactive 
material in space by restricting its use to only those missions that could not be operated in a 
reasonable way by non-nuclear sources, and it is noted as such in the context that states should 
exercise as much caution as possible and with high a degree of confidence that nuclear material 
should not affect individuals, populations, or the biosphere with contamination. These 
principles go on to note numerous items, including those that reference previously established 
standards by other international authorities such as the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection. These principles are: the protection of the public against radiation 
according to internationally set standards; limited exposure during accidents through the 
proactive design and construction of nuclear power systems that conform to international 
standards; the incorporation of the defence-in-depth concept during design, construction, and 
operations of nuclear systems; the operation of nuclear reactors only on interplanetary 
missions, sufficiently high orbits, or low-Earth orbits so long as post-mission they are disposed 
of in high orbits; the development of nuclear reactors using only uranium-235 fuel and 
operations only once in orbit; the conduct of a safety assessment prior to launch; notification 
of re-entry of a nuclear power source to those states that may be affected; consultation with 
concerned states; assistance for tracking of a re-entry of a nuclear power source, and assistance 
by the launching state and others with the capabilities to eliminate the effects of a re-entered 
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object within those states that are affected; the responsibility of states for objects they or those 
within their jurisdiction launch; and liability and compensation for damage caused in 
accordance with existing international law. 
 The final, and most recent set of principles adopted by the UNGA, include the 
Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the 
Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of 
Developing Countries (the so-called Benefits Declaration) which was adopted in 1996. These 
principles essentially affirm other sentiments expressed elsewhere in international instruments 
on outer space regarding the participation and mutual benefit of all states in the exploration and 
use of outer space. In particular, the principles note: the free determination of all states 
regarding their participation with other states on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis; 
the fairness and reasonableness of cooperative contracts between states;  the contribution of 
leading spacefaring countries to new and upcoming space programmes by developing countries 
through international cooperation activities; the use of various means of cooperation including 
government-to-government, non-government-to-non-government and global, multilateral, 
regional, and bilateral; the promotion and development of space science and technology; the 
exchange of expertise and technology between states; the use of space applications for 
developing states to achieve their development goals with support from various organisations 
and agencies; and the strengthening of UNCOPUOS as an international forum information 
exchange and the further developing of the UN Programme on Space Applications by countries 
with the requisite capabilities. 
 Separate from UNGA-adopted principles as described above, the UNGA has adopted 
other resolutions related to the exploration and use of outer space. The first of these related 
resolutions was the 1961 resolution on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer 
space, which predates both the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles and 1967 Outer Space 
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Treaty. Given that constitutes the earliest expression of a UN position on the exploration and 
use of outer space, its relevance can be found in the provisions contained within the Declaration 
on Legal Principles and the Outer Space Treaty, which are inherited, albeit in a more detailed 
expression, from those contained within the 1961 resolution.  Similarly, the 1961 resolution 
encourages the registration of launches with UNCOPUOS; tasks the UN Secretary-General 
with maintaining a registry of launches; and charges the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space with maintaining contact with governments on outer space affairs, providing 
the exchange of information, and promoting international cooperation in space. 
 The UNGA also affirmed in 2000 its support of the UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee 
when it endorsed the subcommittee’s agreement on the use of the geostationary orbit as a finite 
and limited natural resource. Essentially, the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS via the 
UNGA recommended that: states should coordinate on access to and use of geostationary orbits 
in an equitable manner according to the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) rules; 
states already with access to geostationary orbit and its spectrum should take steps to ensure 
developing countries seeking access to the same resource should have equitable access; and 
states, including developed and developing, should file their requests for access to the orbit via 
the ITU. As described earlier in the agreement made by the Legal Subcommittee, these 
recommendations were made with regard to the previously existing practice of “first come, 
first served” concerning geostationary orbit, which limited in practice access to the orbit by 
developing countries since developed countries had already been active there given their 
advanced capabilities in outer space. 
 Similar to the 2000 resolution, the UNGA adopted a resolution in 2004 on the 
application of the concept of the launching state. Contained in the resolution, the UNGA made 
a number of recommendations for which states should consider for conduct of their space 
activities, including best practices for codifying international space law. The resolution 
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specifically noted that states should enact and implement national laws that allowed for the 
authorization and supervision of activities in outer space of non-governmental entities within 
their jurisdiction; states should implement conclusions to their joint launch and cooperation 
programmes with regard to the Liability Convention; UNCOPUOS should request information 
from states on their current practices of on-orbit transfer of ownership of space objects; states 
should harmonise their domestic and national laws with international law; and UNCOPUOS 
should assist states in developing national laws by providing them with information on the 
outer space treaties. 
 The 2004 resolution, which specifically highlighted the development of national laws 
in alignment with international law, was further elaborated upon in a 2007 UNGA-adopted 
resolution that included recommendations on enhancing the practices of states and international 
intergovernmental organisations in registering space objects. Specifically, the 2007 resolution 
encouraged states and international intergovernmental organisations to ratify or accede and 
follow practices set out in the binding Registration Convention, in addition to encouraging 
states to provide uniform and expanded information on their space objects. Moreover, the 
resolution acknowledged the existing fact that some states and international intergovernmental 
organisations had yet to ratify and follow the Registration Convention, and therefore suggested 
a solution should be sought to deal with how space objects of these groups should be registered 
even though their status was still unagreed. Interestingly, UNGA resolution 1721 B (XVI) 
adopted in 1961 also serves as an alternative avenue for states to register space objects in 
addition to the Registration Convention; however, the lack of registration of certain states and 
international intergovernmental organisations, either through the Registration Convention or 
the 1961 resolution, still remains problematic. The 2007 resolution also continued to build off 
of the 2004 resolution regarding the transfer of ownership of space objects, and instructed states 
on the types of information that should be provided to the UN regarding such transfers, in 
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addition to requesting UNOOSA to provide a model registration form including the 
information states should supply for registration purposes and means in which states could 
contact focal points concerning the space objects registered by each state.  
 As with the 2004 and 2007 resolutions, the UNGA’s 2013 resolution included even 
more detailed recommendations on national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and 
use of outer space. This resolution specifically outlined which types of activities national laws 
and frameworks should include regarding best practice and compliance with international laws. 
The UNGA’s recommendations suggest that states’ regulatory frameworks should account for: 
the launch of objects into and their return from outer space, the launch and re-entry sites, 
operations, and control of space objects; the design and manufacture of spacecraft; the 
application of space science and technology and exploration activities; and determination of 
jurisdiction of space activities and the authorisation and supervision of such activities. 
Specifically regarding authorisation, the resolution established that states should set the 
conditions and procedures for different steps in the authorisation process, including granting, 
modifying, or suspending and revoking authorisation, and making these steps clear in legal and 
regulatory frameworks. On supervision, the UNGA recommended states should conduct on-
site inspections and require general reporting by space actors, and that administrative 
procedures and penalties should be in place should space actors not be in compliance with the 
licensing regime. Other recommendations in the resolution include suggesting to states that the 
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, are followed by 
those conducting space activities, in addition to prescriptions on how states should maintain 
their national registry of space objects and how states should ensure processes for claiming and 
receiving compensation from damage caused by space objects and how states should record 
and report the transfer of ownership of space objects already in orbit. 
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 In addition to the above principles and resolutions adopted by the UNGA, it has also 
endorsed, in coordination with work done through UNCOPUOUS, non-binding guidelines for 
states to follow regarding their activities in outer space. Specifically, these include the Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines and the Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source 
Applications. In recognition of the growing problem and threat posed by space debris, the 
UNGA endorsed in 2007 seven guidelines proposed by UNCOPUOS. These guidelines are as 
follows: 
1) Limit debris released during normal operations; 
2) Minimize the potential for break-ups during operational phases; 
3) Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit; 
4) Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities; 
5) Minimize potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy; 
6) Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the 
low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission; and 
7) Limited the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital states with 
the geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission. 
Each of these guidelines is elaborated in the resolution document; however, for purposes of 
this current section, they are listed here and will be detailed later in this dissertation when used 
to help inform the development of criteria comprising the compliance assessment framework.  
 UNCOPUOS guidelines contained with the Safety Framework for Nuclear Power 
Source Applications in Outer Space also provide helpful areas in which to measure compliance 
with best practices of space activities. The Safety Framework, endorsed in 2009 by 
UNCOPUOS, has an overriding safety objective similar to that contained in the Principles 
Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, to “protect people and the 
environment in Earth’s biosphere from potential hazards associated with relevant launch, 
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operation and end-of-service phases of space nuclear power source applications,” (UNOOSA 
2017). Beyond this, the guidelines go on to suggest specific issue areas that states’ governments 
must address when considering the use of nuclear power sources (NPS) in space activities, and 
makes inter alia following recommendations: 
1) “Governments that authorize or approve space nuclear power source missions should 
establish safety policies, requirements, and processes; 
2) The governments mission approval process should verify that the rationale for using 
the space nuclear power source application has been appropriately justified; 
3) A mission launch authorisation process for space nuclear power source applications 
should be established and sustained; and 
4) Preparations should be made to respond to emergencies involving a space nuclear 
power source,” (UNOOSA 2017). 
Separate from its prescriptions toward states’ governments, the framework acknowledges that 
responsibilities should also rest with the management of organisations deploying nuclear power 
in space activities, and therefore the framework makes the following recommendations targeted 
toward these managers and their organisations: 
1) “The prime responsibility for safety should rest with the organisation that conducts 
the space nuclear power source mission; 
2) Effective leadership and management for safety should be established and sustained 
in the organisation that conducts the space nuclear power source mission; 
3) Technical competence in nuclear safety should be established and maintained for 
space nuclear power source applications;  
4) Design and development processes should provide the higher level of safety that can 
reasonably be achieved;  
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5) Risk assessments should be conducted to characterise the radiation risks to people and 
the environment; and  
6) All practical efforts should be made to mitigate the consequences of potential 
accidents,” (UNOOSA 2017). 
Indeed, as was done in the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, the provisions within this 
framework are further detailed in the UNCOPUOS resolution; however, for purposes of this 
current section, the NPS guidelines are only described in brief and will be further detailed in 
later sections as they are considered for specific criteria require for developing the compliance 
assessment framework. 
 Beyond the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and the Nuclear Power Source Safety 
Framework, a set of voluntary guidelines also requires attention and inclusion within the 
framework proposed in the next chapter. These guidelines are the recommendations from the 
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence-building measures 
(TCBM), the European Union’s International Code of Conduct on Space Activities, and the 
UNCOPUOS guidelines on the long-term sustainability (LTS) of outer space. The guidelines 
contained within these three separate initiatives are different from past initiatives because they 
are driven from the “bottom-up” and have involved in some cases input from non-state actors 
(Secure World Foundation 2018). For example, Russia proposed the GGE, which was adopted 
by the UNGA in 2010 and eventually convened in 2011 to include experts from 15 different 
countries who made “recommendations on how governments can share information with an 
aim to creative mutual understanding and trust, reducing misperceptions and miscalculations 
and thereby helping to prevent military confrontation and to foster regional and global 
security,” (Secure World Foundation 2018). Similarly in 2010, the European Union proposed 
its Code of Conduct to promote international best practices for space activities; however, this 
initiative has stalled since 2015 because of disagreements as to the legal status of the Code of 
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Conduct and whether countries would see it in competition with legally binding space and arms 
control treaties (Secure World Foundation 2018). Nonetheless, the European initiative reflected 
a good faith effort, as did the Russian GGE initiative, to outline and create the basis for 
normative behaviours that countries could follow in carrying out their space activities.  
 Perhaps the broadest and most subscribed to initiative of the three described here is 
the set of guidelines proposed by the UNCOPUOS Working Group on the Long-Term 
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. As with the other two initiatives, the UNCOPUOS 
working group formed in 2010 and concluded its work in June 2018, which resulted in 21 
guidelines agreed to by the UNCOPUOS member states through its consensus-based decision-
making process. In its role as a convening space for emerging, intermediate, and advanced 
spacefaring countries, UNCOPUOS’s LTS guidelines are meant to help develop national and 
international practices and frameworks while also remaining flexible enough to adapt the 
frameworks to country-specific circumstances and conditions (Secure World Foundation 
2018). Specifically, the LTS guidelines are intended for supporting international organizations 
and countries to develop policies that “avoid causing harm to the outer space environment and 
the safety of space operations,” (Secure World Foundation 2018). Importantly, the LTS 
guidelines cover a broad variety of space sustainability topics and are organised according to 
four categories: policy and regulatory framework for space activities; safety of space 
operations; international cooperation, capacity-building and awareness; and scientific and 
technical research and development.  The guidelines range from high-level recommendations 
such as Guideline A.1 “Adopt, revise and amend, as necessary, national regulatory frameworks 
for outer space activities” to specific, granular-level recommendations such as a Guideline B.4 
“Perform conjunction assessment during all orbital phases of controlled flight,” (Secure World 
Foundation 2018). The set of LTS guidelines, along with the European Unions’ Code of 
Conduct and the GGE’s transparency and confidence-building measures, are incorporated in 
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the assessment framework as an important consideration for countries to follow in terms of 
non-binding international norms of behaviour in outer space. 
 Given this dissertation has now discussed the two movements for evidence-based 
programming and policymaking alongside a review of existing ratings and rankings systems 
and consideration of their potential challenges, in addition to a review of existing binding and 
non-binding international space law and established norms via the UN system, the upcoming 
chapters will describe a framework, and the criteria contained therein, for assessing countries’ 
levels of compliance and adherence to international space law and norms. This proposed 
framework will be placed within the growing world of other ratings and rankings systems, 
albeit with an emphasis on space and fulfilling an existing gap in space policy literature 
whereby an annual and systematic, open-source assessment of countries’ space policies and 
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4 ELEMENTS COMPRISING 
ASSESSMENT 
METHODOLOGIES 
Now that this dissertation’s contribution has been placed within existing literature and 
movements, in addition to having reviewed the subject matter of international space law and 
UN established norms, this chapter will first discuss the methodological elements that will 
guide the development of a framework and associated criteria before moving to a discussion of 
the actual framework and structure with which an assessment of countries’ space policies can 
be conducted. For this section discussing and identifying the key elements which should be 
considered for a ratings and rankings system that relies upon best practices, the following 
questions will be considered as these are derived from a 2014 study performed by Rachel 
Gisselquist (2014) based upon her “review of the research literature and on three years of 
research in practices, specifically the author’s experience in developing a well-used measure 
of governance [i.e. the Ibrahim Index of African Governance].” Specifically, Gisselquist’s set 
of guiding questions will be used to develop this assessment framework because they help to 
address issue areas that she and others have identified as problematic as it pertains to such 
assessments, including needing to attend to social science methodology fundamentals, such as 
concept formation, content validity, reliability, replicability, robustness, and relevance;  
descriptive complexity, theoretical fit, the precision of estimates, and correct weighting. The 
ten guiding questions that will be addressed in the upcoming sections are: 
1. What precisely does it [the assessment] aim to measure? 
2. Does the operational definition capture the concept? 
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3. How good (reliable, valid, and complete) are the data? 
4. Is the measure (including all of its sub-components) transparent and replicable? 
5. How sensitive and robust is the measure to different data and design choices? 
6. Does the measure allow the analyst to address key questions of interest? 
7. Does the measure fully capture governance in all its complexity? 
8. Does the measure behave as theory predicts? 
9. How precise are index values and are confidence intervals specified? 
10. Is the weighting correct? 
Prior to answering each of these questions as it pertains to the proposed assessment, Gisselquist 
(2014) also proposed three additional issue areas that should be considered for those producing 
such indices:  
“First, in deciding whether to produce a new governance index, they should consider 
its value-added in a field with dozens of existing measures. Second, does the utility of 
the index justify its costs?... Third, legitimacy: Governance assessments can have major 
real-world implications, from aid allocations to investor perceptions. Will the index as 
designed and implemented be considered legitimate by those assessed?” 
Regarding the first question proposed above, the proposed assessment does add value as it is 
making a contribution in a niche field whereby no annual and systematic reviews of countries’ 
compliance with international space law and norms exists. As discussed previously, the Space 
Security Index (SSI) comes closest to offering this type of review; however, its indicators are 
largely topic and issue areas that are used for guiding and structuring the annual report rather 
than quantitative indicators in the evaluative definition of the word in terms of defining a 
baseline and measuring change against that baseline. The indicators within the SSI are used to 
indicate a specific topic for discussion within report on the four broader themes of space 
environment, access to and use of space by various actors, security of space systems, and outer 
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space governance. Additionally, only one indicator, placed under the theme of outer space 
governance as defined by the report, specifically addresses national space policies. Therefore, 
this suggests that the SSI may prove to be useful a resource from which to draw data in the 
application of this dissertation’s proposed assessment framework; however, as a report itself, 
it does not fall within the realm of an international rating and ranking system. 
 The second question posed above concerns costs of applying the methodology through 
research. As this framework is novel in that this is the first time it is being proposed, it remains 
difficult to answer question since there is no past evidence from which to draw. However, it 
can be projected that the research behind the assessment would rely upon existing data, and in 
the cases where they there may gaps, researchers would conduct a desk review of national laws 
and policies and perform media analysis of space activities conducted by countries. This 
suggests time and effort spent by researchers would come at a cost for implementing the 
assessment, although other costs, such as travel or access fees, would likely prove minimal 
given many of the documents needed for the review sit in the public domain. The context of an 
increasingly congested and contested outer space domain accompanied by rise in new and 
challenging issue areas, such as space debris and space traffic management, justifies the need 
for a new tool to assess compliance with international laws and norms, particularly given no 
such tool exists as yet and the estimated costs for implementing it would only include time and 
effort of researchers accessing and analysing public domain and open source information.  
 The third and final question that must be addressed, prior to following the ten guiding 
questions described previously, concerns whether this assessment will be considered legitimate 
by those it is assessing and by others using the assessment. Given the data used to inform the 
analysis of the assessment will be derived from public domain and open access UN repositories 
and countries’ own documents, the legitimacy of the data should not be a concern. Moreover, 
the standard of assessment used in the framework itself will be based on international treaties, 
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resolutions, principles, and guidelines adopted at the UN level and for which the majority of 
the international community have endorsed. For example, while the Moon Agreement may 
exist as a binding international legal instrument governing space activities on the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, it will not be included in this assessment for purposes of defining which 
criteria countries should be assessed since very few countries have ratified or acceded to that 
treaty. The Moon Agreement has been ratified by so few countries (11 signatories; 18 parties 
as of 2019), and none with a history of lunar exploration or imminent plans to explore the moon 
or use its resources, that it would not be instructive to apply the framework of this work to 
assessing implementation practice of countries regarding the Moon Agreement. It would thus 
be unfair to measure countries according to a set of rules they themselves have not ratified. 
 Important distinctions such as this should help to alleviate concerns regarding the 
legitimacy of the framework, in addition to the following ten considerations that will be made 
as it is developed since these ten guiding questions follow best practices for international 
ratings and rankings systems. Given these preliminary questions have been addressed situating 
the proposed assessment in terms of its value-added, justification, and legitimacy, it now 
remains to discuss the framework with regard to the ten guiding questions asked by Gisselquist. 
4.1 What precisely does it aim to measure? 
The assessment proposed herein aims to measure how well countries comply with international 
space law and norms as set forth in the previously discussed international treaties, resolutions, 
and guidelines. For purposes of defining compliance, this concerns how countries adhere to, 
follow, and observe these laws and norms both in theory (i.e. existing domestic laws, policies 
and regulations, and/or frameworks) and in practice (i.e. the effective regulation of space 
activities that countries conduct). Conceptually, the international community has yet to define 
many issues regarding the exploration and use of outer space. For example, the demarcation 
point between airspace and outer space remains an unsettled and open issue in air and space 
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law (Oduntan 2003). However, existing disagreements, and therefore the accompanying lack 
of conceptual clarity, do not hinder the conceptual strength upon which this framework will 
rely as the assessment is primarily utilitarian and measuring what already exists and has been 
agreed upon by the international community. In fact, this framework will purposely exclude 
areas in which agreement and conceptual clarity have not been achieved in order to ensure its 
legitimacy and relevance among space actors. 
4.2 Does the operational definition capture the concept? 
 
Gisselquist (2014) argues that “Once a concept has been properly specified, the next step 
logically and chronologically, is to operationalize it. An operational definition should identify 
the component(s) to be included in the measure and specify how these components are put 
together in a manner that is consistent with the core concept.” As has been done in earlier 
sections defining what constitutes international space law and norms, this question has been 
answered. Indeed, the components comprising international space law and norms have been 
identified as comprising both the binding outer space treaties and other space-related treaties 
and agreements, and the non-binding UN principles, resolutions, and guidelines. These 
documents constitute, for purposes of this assessment, international space law and norms, and 
are therefore valid in terms of the measurement’s content. 
4.3 How good (reliable, valid, and complete) are the data? 
 
This third question is posed to move beyond only measuring the validity of the assessment’s 
concept and definitions by also forcing the consideration of data quality and its validity and 
reliability. “Validity refers to whether the measure accurately captures what it purports to 
capture. Reliability refers to the consistency of the measure,” (Gisselquist 2014). The data used 
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for this assessment will primarily be public domain and open source documents developed by 
the UN and countries themselves. UN-produced data is expected to likely be valid and reliable; 
however, country-produced data, and the availability of data country to country, may prove 
challenging. Indeed, countries may have in place domestic laws and regulations that should 
exist in the public domain, but which may be unpublished or difficult to access. Additionally, 
some countries may not have laws and regulations in place in which to measure compliance, 
or may not conduct space activities, thereby limiting the pool of countries that may be assessed. 
Therefore, this assessment will initially strive to only measure those countries with sufficiently 
valid, reliable, and complete data in which to apply the framework. This consequently implies 
that only spacefaring countries will at first be assessed, but this pool of countries will likely 
grow as more entrants appear in the outer space domain and as more governments seek to 
participate in space policymaking fora. 
4.4 Is the measure (including all of its sub-components) transparent 
and replicable? 
 
In her review and recommendations for ratings and rankings systems, Gisselquist suggests that 
such assessments need to be transparent and replicable because they have political 
consequences, in that assessments are used for political decision-making and sometimes 
allocation of resources and therefore require transparency to ensure all involved are aware of 
the inputs and methods used. The proposed framework, as it will be described in upcoming 
sections, will be transparent and replicable. Indeed, this dissertation seeks to ensure the highest 
level of transparency and replicability of the assessment in order to guarantee its relevance, 
usefulness, and applicability to space actors while remaining inclusive and respectful of 
divergent interests and varying viewpoints on the exploration and use of outer space. This in 
particular requires that the framework accounts for different stakeholder groups, including civil 
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society, government, and industry, and the most efficient way of doing this is by describing the 
framework in detail and offering it in a transparent manner for review in this dissertation.  
4.5 How sensitive and robust is the measure to different data and 
design choices? 
 
Gisselquist (2014) notes “There are few hard rules about the ‘best’ data sources, indicators, 
methods of normalization, and weighting and aggregation. Well-designed indexes however 
describe and justify their choices in each of these areas and examine the impact of these choices 
on the robustness of results.” Here, it is suggested that designing a measure is subjective in 
some manner; however, it remains incumbent on the developers of an assessment to explain 
their rationale as much as possible for the selection of indicators, source data, and weighting 
and aggregation of scores because “they [the index producers] have the burden of showing that 
they are not (at least intentionally) cherry picking,” (Gisselquist 2014). The explanation and 
description of the framework contained in this dissertation seeks to satisfy this requirement by 
explaining the rationale for the data and design choices, which again are based on 
internationally agreed and established law and norms found within UN-level treaty, resolution, 
and guideline documents. The explanation for the framework’s design choices will be 
presented for each indicator in the upcoming sections. 
4.6 Does the measure address key questions of interest? 
 
This guideline is meant to ensure that the assessment actually measures what is purported to be 
measured, and that the assessment is used only in such a way that makes sense for the data and 
unit of analysis that is being assessed. “Index users should consider whether it captures 
empirically what is under investigation, including country coverage, time coverage, and the 
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level of analysis at which measurement is taken…” (Gisselquist 2014). As explained 
previously, the framework makes clear the units of measure are at the country level, and 
initially only applicable to those countries with sufficiently available data to assess in terms of 
national space laws, regulations, and frameworks. Moreover, this framework emphasises its 
application on an annual basis with future work to feature its first-time application and, 
hopefully, subsequent annual use. Perhaps as the framework continues to be applied over time 
and the legitimacy of the rating grows,  more countries will make their data available in the 
hope of receiving a good rating.  
4.7 Does the measure fully capture governance in all its complexity? 
 
The assessment proposed herein does not claim to capture governance of space activities in all 
its complexity, particularly given the resources needed for conducting the assessment remain 
constrained themselves to only existing and internationally established space law and norms. 
Given that space policy and space governance continues to evolve as more and more actors 
enter the domain, presently not all governance issues areas have been settled or, in some cases, 
even contemplated by the international community. Therefore, all aspects of governance are 
not captured, yet for those that are included in the assessment they will be fully detailed and 
addressed by the indicators in upcoming sections. 
4.8 Does the measure behave as theory predicts? 
 
This guideline is approached in two ways: assessing the measurement by comparing it against 
other measurements of the same concept, or assessing the measurement by seeing how it is 
connected to other concepts that are theoretically derived. Since the assessment proposed in 
this dissertation is the first of its kind in the space policy literature, the first approach described 
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here is moot; therefore, the second approach requires consideration in order to successfully 
answer this guideline question. To help place this guideline in the realm of ratings and rankings 
systems, Gisselquist (2014) offers the Word Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
as an example for “…exploring the relationship between governance and growth…” This is 
instructive for determining to which other concepts space policy is related and how compliance 
with international law relates to other theoretically derived relationships. In this way, the 
measurement would be useful for exploring the relationship between global governance and 
peace and security, which would suggest that, with increased compliance with global 
governance regimes, then peace and security in the outer space domain would improve.  
 For an answer to be found for this guideline question, the assessment framework 
would need to first be applied and the results thereof would require comparison with trends 
that endanger the fragile status quo of peace and security trends in outer space, such as the 
number of incidents of cooperation and the number of incidents of conflict or adversarial 
behaviour. Once this exercise is completed, only then would an answer would be available for 
determining whether the measure behaves as theory predicts. For example, if the assessment 
found most spacefaring countries were proving compliant with international space law and 
norms, then this should correspond with a peaceful and secure space domain. However, if there 
were a number of conflicts or adversarial actions taking place within the review period yet the 
measurement was demonstrating compliance on a large scale, the assessment would not be 
behaving as theory would predict since theory suggests compliance with international law and 
norms decreases conflict and adversarial behaviour. The assessment would require a baseline 
to demonstrate this change, thus the existing status quo of peace and security in outer space 
would serve as this. 
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4.9 How precisely can index values and confidence intervals be 
specified? 
 
Whereas Gisselquist (2014) suggests that following this guideline is less important compared 
to others, she does note that “…index producers should somehow acknowledge the uncertainty 
and imprecision surrounding scores.” In order to adhere to this guideline, the framework 
proposed here will adopt a similar approach as taken by the World Bank’s WGI confidence 
intervals whereby “The estimation of the standard error is not based on the survey sample size, 
but rather on the number of assessments for each country and the degree to which their scores 
are consistent with each other,” (Gisselquist 2014). While the compliance assessment will 
largely draw upon UN and country-specific source documents, other source data will be used, 
such as the Space Security Index, to complement and inform the ratings, and help to compare 
how different reports assess the same country. 
4.10 Is the weighting correct? 
 
The rationale for weighting in traditional governance ratings and rankings systems comes from 
two concepts, namely the degree of confidence in each component’s accuracy and the relative 
importance of each component to governance. For purposes of this assessment, however, 
weighting will not be done in an effort to signal that certain components of space policy 
governance and adherence to international laws and norms are more important than other 
components. Rather, this assessment will weight its components based upon whether a law or 
norm is binding or non-binding, and in an effort to reflect an inclusive set of perspectives 
pertaining to outer space decision-making and policymaking. The assessment will weight in 
this manner as binding international law represents a more consequential, and thus more 
pressing, area for policymakers to follow, while also representing generally greater consensus 
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and willingness to be held accountable at the international level as compared to non-binding 
norms established in UN resolutions, principles, and guidelines. Moreover, this dissertation 
recognises that international law-making is often a process resulting from negotiations and 
agreements taking place among leading powers, excluding the perspectives of lesser powers or 
those involved on the periphery. According to Nico Krisch (2005), “Most predominant states 
have been active forces behind the development of international law, and they have made 
extensive use of the international legal order to stabilize and improve their position.” Therefore, 
this assessment seeks to balance, through its weighting of different components measuring 
compliance, the importance of binding international law with the fact that the process that 
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5 FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING 
COMPLIANCE 
Since this dissertation has now explored the two movements from which our assessment 
framework emerges, namely the evidence-based programming and policymaking movement 
and the ratings and rankings movement, alongside the subject matter that will be assessed and 
the best practices for doing so, this chapter will now detail the assessment framework and its 
associated indicators, accompanied by a brief description of what is meant by each, together 
with their respective scoring and weighting schemes. Prior to embarking on this, it remains 
prudent to affirm the objective this assessment seeks to achieve, which is to understand 
countries’ levels of compliance with international space law and norms, and to rate counties 
according to how well they comply. The purpose of this assessment is not only to inform 
policymakers, but also to introduce an accountability and advocacy tool useful for promoting 
behaviour that is in the spirit of the peaceful exploration and use of outer space by all countries, 
a well-established principle found throughout international treaties, resolutions, and guidelines 
regarding outer space. 
5.1 General scoring of the framework  
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates how the various scoring elements are compiled to arrive at an overall 
assessment score and category designation of highly compliant, mostly compliant, partially 
compliant, minimally compliant, and non-compliant for each country that is assessed.  
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General/Policy-Related Treaties Nuclear Test Ban TreatySatellite Signals Convention
Non-Binding International Law Score
Direct TV Broadcasting Principles
Remote Sensing Principles






Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
Nuclear Power Source Safety Framework
Voluntary Guidelines
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures
European Union International Code of Conduct
UNCOPUOS Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines
Figure 5.1: Relationship of Assessment Framework Scoring Elements 
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A comprehensive assessment framework is presented below in the form of a set of tables 
containing questions that assess levels of compliance among three different types of 
spacefaring countries: advanced, intermediate, and emerging.  
 Given the varying levels of space activities conducted by each of these different types 
of countries, some assessment areas may apply to some countries but not to others. As such, 
some questions are not applied to intermediate and/or emerging spacefaring countries, resulting 
in different scoring potentials for each tier (advanced, intermediate, or emerging). The ranges 
for the scoring potentials of each tier and the category intervals that determine whether 
countries are highly, mostly, partially, minimally, or non-compliant are presented below in 
Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.3: Legend for Applicable Questions Based on Space Activity 
Applicable to Advanced spacefaring countries ONLY 
Applicable to Advanced and Intermediate spacefaring countries ONLY 
Applicable to Advanced, Intermediate, and Emerging spacefaring countries 
 
A legend is provided in Figure 5.3 to guide how the assessment framework should be applied 
to which each of spacefaring country based upon its level of space activities. The questions 
presented in each table below are coloured in with the appropriate designation as to whether 
they apply only to advanced spacefaring countries, only to advanced and intermediate 
spacefaring countries, or to all advanced, intermediate, and emerging spacefaring countries.  
 Additionally, as evidenced below in the possible scoring for each question included 
in the framework, a range of possible replies is used to capture the various degrees and possible 
responses for each issue area, such as “always,” “sometimes,” or “never.” For questions where 
"sometimes" is a possible response, the country should be scored the minimum amount of 
points possible (i.e. zero) in cases where the incident has only occurred once. "Sometimes" 
implies that the country has had at least more than one opportunity to demonstrate some level 
of compliance with international space law and norms. However, if the record only consists of 
one example and non-compliance was demonstrated, then the country should be assessed a 
score of zero for non-compliance.  
 For example, if only one opportunity existed for a country to provide assistance to an 
astronaut in distress and the country decided not to provide assistance, then a score of zero 
should be assessed. However, if two opportunities existed for a country to provide assistance 
to an astronaut in distress and it provided assistance in one case and refused to provide 
assistance in the second case, then a score of one for "sometimes" should be assessed. 
Chapter 5: Framework for assessing compliance 
 
                                                                                         64 
 Table A below describes the aggregate scoring potential for all questions related to 
the binding international law and non-binding international law categories within the 
assessment framework. The aggregate score is derived by summing the two category scores 
from Tables B.1 (binding international law score) and Table B.2 (non-binding international 
law score).  
A Aggregate Score 
Binding International Law Score 
(Enter total from last line of Table B.1) 
Advanced: XX / 20.15 
Intermediate: XX / 18.90 
Emerging: XX / 16.90  
Non-Binding International Law Score 
(Enter total from last line of Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 20.40 
Intermediate: XX / 20.40 
Emerging: XX / 13.80 
Total  
(Sum binding and non-binding 
international law scores) 
Advanced: XX / 40.50 
Intermediate: XX / 39.30 
Emerging: XX / 30.70 
Table B.1 below captures the score for those sections relevant to binding international law 
instruments, including space-specific and space-related international treaties. The score for 
each section, space-specific international treaties and space-related international treaties, 
respectively, is weighted by 50 percent and then summed to arrive at the overall binding 
international law score. 
B.1 Binding International Law Score 
Space-specific International Treaties 
(Use total from last line of Table B.1.1 
and multiply by .50) 
Advanced: XX / 14.25 
Intermediate: XX / 13.0 
Emerging: XX / 11.0 
Space-related International Treaties 
(Use total from last line of Table B.1.2 
and multiply by .50) 
Advanced: XX / 5.90 
Intermediate: XX / 5.90 
Emerging: XX / 5.90  
Total  
(Sum space-specific and space-related 
treaties scores and then bring total to 
Table A) 
Advanced: XX / 20.15 
Intermediate: XX / 18.90 
Emerging: XX / 16.90 
Table B.1.1 below illustrates the scoring potential for all tiers of spacefaring countries 
(advanced, intermediate, and emerging) according to how well they comply with space-specific 
international treaties. For this section, the scores for each treaty that is assessed (i.e. the Outer 
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Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the Registration 
Convention) are weighted by 25 percent and then summed to arrive at the overall score for the 
space-specific international treaties. The colour cording in the table serves as a reminder that 
some assessment questions are only relevant to advanced and intermediate spacefaring 
countries, thus these questions are filled in according to the legend found in Figure 5.3 above. 
B.1.1 Space-specific International Treaties 
(a) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (25 percent of section score) 
 
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty? 
Yes, fully = 2 
Yes, with reservations = 1 
No = 0 
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or 
administrative regulations or procedures? 
Full domestication = 2 
Partial domestication = 1 
No domestication = 0 
c.       Article I: Do country’s laws or administrative regulations 
or procedures recognise the role of international law? 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No recognition = 0 
d.      Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures affirm that the exploration and use 
of outer space should be carried out for the benefit and 
interests of all countries? 
Full affirmation = 2 
Partial affirmation = 1 
No affirmation = 0 
e.       Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures recognise outer space as the 
province of all mankind? 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No affirmation = 0 
f.        Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures recognise that outer space should be 
free for exploration without discrimination and with free 
access to celestial bodies? 
 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No recognition = 0 
g.      Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures recognise the freedom of scientific 
investigation in outer space? 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No recognition = 0 
h.      Article I: Does the country facilitate and participate in 
international scientific investigation? 
Frequently = 2 
Occasionally = 1 
Never = 0 
i.        Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures allow for, or encourage, the 
appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies by claims of 
sovereignty, use, or occupation? 
Always = 0 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 2 
j.        Article II: Does the country, by its actions or the actions 
of those within its jurisdiction, appropriate, or encourage the 
appropriation of, outer space and celestial bodies and 
resources by claims of sovereignty, use, or occupation? 
Frequently = 0 
Occasionally = 1 
No = 2 
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Article III: Elements of this article are already captured in 
questions asked above, therefore no separate scoring is 
assessed. 
 
k.      Article IV: Has the country placed into orbit or installed 
on celestial bodies weapons of mass destruction, including 
nuclear weapons? 
Repeatedly = 0 
Once = 1 
No = 2 
l.        Article IV: Has the country established bases, 
installations, or fortifications, or tested weapons or conducted 
military manoeuvres on celestial bodies? 
Repeatedly = 0 
Once = 1 
No = 2 
m.    Article IV: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures allow for the conduct of such types 
of activities as described in Question ‘l’ above? 
Always = 0 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 2 
n.      Article V: Has the country either provided assistance or 
rejected assistance to astronauts of other countries who are in 
distress? 
Always provided /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes provided = 1 
Never provided = 0 
o.      Article V: Does the country proactively inform the United 
Nations and other countries regarding potentially dangerous 
phenomena to astronauts? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
p.      Article VI: Does the country have in place an 
authorisation and supervision regime for space activities 
conducted by non-governmental entities? 
Yes = 2 
Partial = 1 
No = 0 
q.      Article VII: Does the country recognise its liability as a 
launching state in its laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures? 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No recognition = 0 
r.        Article VII: Has the country denied its liability as a 
launching state for damage caused? 
Always = 0 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 2 
s.       Article VIII: Does the country maintain an updated 
national registry of launched space objects? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
t.        Article VIII: Has the country ever returned a space object 
belonging to another country, but which landed in its 
jurisdiction? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
u.      Article IX: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures account for avoiding harmful 
contamination, including debris, of the space environment? 
Full account = 2 
Partial account = 1 
No account = 0 
v.      Article IX: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures seek to limit damage to the Earth 
environment by extraterrestrial material? 
Full account = 2 
Partial account = 1 
No account = 0 
w.    Article X: Does the country allow other countries to 
observe the flight of space objects that it launches? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
x.      Article XI: Does the country inform the United Nations 
and other countries of its space activities, including the 
nature, conduct, location, and results of the activities? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
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y.      Article XII: Does the country allow access and visits to 
its outer space stations, installations, equipment, and vehicles, 
provided reasonable notification of a such visit is given by the 
visiting representatives? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Articles XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, and XVII: These are 
administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.   
Treaty score  
(Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 
Advanced: XX / 12.50 
Intermediate: XX / 10 
Emerging: XX / 6.5 
  
(b) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space (25 percent of section score) 
 
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty? 
Yes, in full = 2 
Yes, with reservations = 1 
No = 0 
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or 
administrative regulations or procedures? 
 
Full domestication = 2 
Partial domestication = 1 
No domestication = 0 
c.       Article 1: Has the country notified the launching state(s) 
of astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or 
made emergency landings? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
d.      Article 1: Has the country notified the United Nations of 
astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or 
made emergency landings? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
e.       Article 2: Has the country taken all possible steps to 
rescue and render all necessary assistance to astronauts who 
have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made emergency 
landings? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
f.        Article 3: Has the country provided assistance in search 
and rescue operations for astronauts who have suffered 
accidents, been in distress, or made emergency landings? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
g.      Article 4: Has the country safely and promptly returned to 
their launching states astronauts who have suffered accidents, 
been in distress, or made emergency landings? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
h.      Article 5: Has the country notified the launching state and 
United Nations of a space object or part of a space object that 
has returned to Earth? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
i.        Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space 
object landed practicably assisted to recover the object or its 
parts? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
Chapter 5: Framework for assessing compliance 
 
                                                                                         68 
j.        Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space 
object landed returned the space object or its parts and 
provided their identifying data to the launching state? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
k.      Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space 
object landed eliminated the possibility of its danger if it is 
found to be hazardous or deleterious? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
l.        Article 5: Has the launching state paid for expenses 
related to the recovery and return of space object or its part 
incurred by the country in which the space object landed? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10: These are administrative articles, 
therefore no scoring is assessed.   
Treaty score  
(Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 
Advanced: XX / 6 
Intermediate: XX / 6 
Emerging: XX / 6 
  
(c) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused 
by Space Objects (25 percent of section score) 
 
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty? 
Yes, in full = 2 
Yes, with reservations = 1 
No = 0 
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or 
administrative regulations or procedures? 
Full domestication = 2 
Partial domestication = 1 
No domestication = 0 
Article I provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, 
therefore no scoring is assessed.    
c.       Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures recognise its liability to pay 
compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the 
Earth’s surface or aircraft in flight? 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No recognition = 0 
d.      Article II: Has the country refused to pay compensation 
in practice for damage caused by its space objects on the 
Earth's surface or aircraft in flight? 
Always = 0 
Sometimes = 1 
Never / not applicable = 2 
e.       Article III: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures recognise its liability owing to its 
fault or fault of persons for which it is responsible in the case 
of damage to another space object, persons, or property in 
space of another launching state? 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No recognition = 0 
f.        Article III: Has the country refused to accept liability in 
the case of damage to another space object, persons, or 
property in space of another launching state caused by its fault 
or fault of persons for which it is responsible? 
Always = 0 
Sometimes = 1 
Never / not applicable = 2 
g.      Article IV: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures recognise its absolute joint and 
several liability with a second-party launching state if its space 
object caused damage to the second-party launching state’s 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No recognition = 0 
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space object, which then resulted in damage on the Earth’s 
surface or aircraft in flight of a third state? 
h.      Article IV: Does the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures recognise its joint and several 
liability apportioned according to fault with a second-party 
launching state if its space object caused damage to the second-
party launching state’s space object, which then resulted in 
damage to a third state’s space object, person, or property in 
space? 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No recognition = 0 
i.        Article IV: Has the country refused to pay compensation 
according to its fault in cases of joint and several liability for 
damage caused to a third-party state? 
Always = 0 
Sometimes = 1 
Never / not applicable = 2 
j.        Article V: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures recognise joint and several liability 
in cases when it and another state jointly launch a space object? 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No recognition = 0 
k.      Article V: Do country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures account for its roles a joint launch 
participant if a space object is launched from its territory or 
facility? 
Full account = 2 
Partial account = 1 
No account = 0 
Articles VI and VII sets forth conditions under which other 
articles apply and is not actionable by states, therefore no 
scoring is assessed. 
  
l.        Article VIII: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures provide for a claims and 
compensation process for damage which it may suffer by other 
launching states? 
Full provision = 2 
Partial provision = 1 
No provision = 0 
Article IX, X, XI, XII, and XIII prescribe the 
administrative details through which claims and 
compensation should be processed, therefore no scoring is 
assessed.   
  Articles XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, and XVIII prescribe the administrative details through which a Claims Commission 
should be established and make adjudications in the case of 
no settlements through diplomatic channels established 
elsewhere in the treaty, therefore no scoring is assessed. 
m.    Article XIX: Has the country refused or failed to pay 
compensation or an award decided by a Claims Commission as 
set forth in other treaty articles? 
Always = 0 
Sometimes = 1 
Never / not applicable = 2 
Article XX prescribes the process through which the 
expenses associated with the Claims Commission should be 
borne by state participants, therefore no scoring is 
assessed.  
  
n.      Article XXI: Has the country rendered appropriate and 
rapid assistance in cases when a space object presents large-
scale danger to human life or interferes with a population’s 
living conditions or functioning of a vital centre? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
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Articles XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII: 
These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is 
assessed. 
  
Treaty score  
(Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 
Advanced: XX / 7 
Intermediate: XX / 7 
Emerging: XX / 7 
  
(d) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space (25 percent of section score)  
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty? 
Yes, in full = 2 
Yes, with reservations = 1 
No = 0 
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or 
administrative regulations or procedures? 
Full domestication = 2 
Partial domestication = 1 
No domestication = 0 
Article I provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, 
therefore no scoring is assessed.   
c.       Article II: Does the country maintain an updated national 
registry of launched space objects that it launches and that it 
launches jointly with other launching states? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Article III describes actions to be taken by the United 
Nations rather than a specific country, therefore no scoring 
is assessed. 
  
d.      Article IV: Does the country provide detailed information 
to the United Nations for its launched space objects, including 
name of the country, space object registration number, date and 
territory of launch, basic orbital parameters, and general 
function of the space object? 
Full information /  
not applicable= 2 
Partial information = 1 
No information = 0 
e.       Article IV: Does the country update the United Nations on 
space objects for which it previously shared information, but 
which are no longer in Earth orbit? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Article V describes a procedural administrative action, 
therefore no scoring is assessed.    
f.        Article VI: Does the country assist with providing 
identifying information it has gained through space monitoring 
and tracking facilities for space objects that are unidentifiable 
and which are of a hazardous or deleterious nature? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Articles VII, VIII, IX, X, and XII: These are administrative 
articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.   
 
Treaty score  
(Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 
 
Advanced: XX / 3 
Intermediate: XX / 3 
Emerging: XX / 3 
Total  
(Sum the above treaty scores and bring total to Table B.1) 
Advanced: XX / 28.50 
Intermediate: XX / 26.0 
Emerging: XX / 22.0 
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Table B.1.2 below illustrates the scoring potential for space-related international treaties. The 
Nuclear Weapon Test Ban Treaty and the Satellite Signals Convention are considered for this 
section, as well as institution-related treaties. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Satellite 
Signals Convention are accorded a 70 percent weighting for this section, while the score 
resulting from the institution-related treaties are weighted 30 percent. Once weighted, the 
scores are summed to produce the overall score for the space-related international treaties 
section, which is used in Table B.1 above. 
B.1.2 Space-related International Treaties 
(a) Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and under Water 
 
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty? 
Yes, fully = 2 
Yes, with reservations = 1 
No = 0 
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures? 
Full domestication = 2 
Partial domestication = 1 
No domestication = 0 
iii. Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures prohibit, prevent, and forbid the 
carrying out of nuclear weapon tests at places under its 
jurisdiction or control, including in the atmosphere and outer 
space and underwater? 
Full prohibition = 2 
Partial prohibition = 1 
No prohibition = 0 
iv. Article I: Since implementing the treaty, has the country 
carried out a nuclear weapon test at a place under its 
jurisdiction or control, including in the atmosphere and outer 
space and underwater? 
Repeatedly = 0 
Once = 1 
Never = 2 
Articles II, III, IV, and V: These are administrative articles, 
therefore no scoring is assessed.   
Treaty score  
(Sum the above scores) 
Advanced: XX / 8 
Intermediate: XX / 8 
Emerging: XX / 8 
  
(b) Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-
Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite 
 
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty? 
Yes, in full = 2 
Yes, with reservations = 1 
No = 0 
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures? 
 
Full domestication = 2 
Partial domestication = 1 
No domestication = 0 
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Article 1 provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, 
therefore no scoring is assessed.   
iii. Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative 
regulations or procedures prevent the distribution on or from 
its territory programme-carrying signals by distributors for 
whom the emitted signal to or passing through the satellite is 
not intended? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
iv. Article II: Has the country, by its actions or the actions of 
those within its jurisdiction, allowed for the distribution on or 
from its territory programme-carrying signals by distributors 
for whom the emitted signal to or passing through the satellite 
is not intended? 
Always = 0 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 2 
Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 describe the conditions in which 
Article 2 applies, therefore no scoring is assessed.   
Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12: These are administrative 
articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.   
Treaty score  
(Sum the above scores) 
Advanced: XX / 8 
Intermediate: XX / 8 
Emerging: XX / 8 
  
(c) Institution-related treaties   
Individual treaties within this subsection are not scored as they are institution-specific and 
in some case outdated and therefore irrelevant. However, collectively if a country ratified or 
acceded to at least two of these treaties, it will be assessed a score of 2 to demonstrate its 
participation and cooperation in international legal instruments and organisations related to 
space, a key principle promoted in international space law documents. Therefore, the 
following treaties for consideration are: 
i. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(ITSO) 
ii. Agreement on the Establishment of the INTERSPUTNIK International System and 
Organization of Space Communications 
iii. Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (ESA) 
iv. Agreement of the Arab Corporation for Space Communications (ARABSAT) 
v. Agreement on Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful 
Purposes (INTERCOSMOS) 
vi. Convention on the International Mobile Satellite Organization 
vii. Convention Establishing the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(EUTELSAT) 
viii. Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) 
ix. International Telecommunication Constitution and Convention 
Treaty score  
(Multiply score by .30) 
Advanced: XX / 0.6 
Intermediate: XX /0.6 
Emerging: XX / 0.6 
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Total  
(Sum the treaty scores from (a) and (b) and multiply by .70 and 
then sum with (c) score; bring total to Table B.1) 
Advanced: XX /11.80 
Intermediate: XX / 11.80 
Advanced: XX / 11.80 
Table B.2 below captures the score for those elements comprising non-binding international 
law, including the various principles, resolutions, and guidelines developed by the United 
Nations and other international organisations. The score achieved in Table B.2 is used in Table 
A to arrive at the aggregate score. Similar to the binding international law questions, the legend 
presented in Figure 5.3 is used to determine which questions apply to which tier of country (i.e. 
advanced, intermediate, or emerging) in the questions posed in Tables B.2.1 – B.2.10.  
 The scores from Tables B.2.1 – B.2.10 are each weighted by 10 percent in Table B.2, 
whereas the score produced from Table B.2.11 on voluntary guidelines remains unweighted in 
Table B.2. The different treatment of the tables is done intentionally to accord the appropriate 
emphasis to UN-level principles, resolutions, and guidelines and the comprehensive voluntary 
guidelines, which themselves are a result of significant international consensus-making for 
supporting the future development of space policy and space legal frameworks. 
B.2 Non-Binding International Law Score 
(a) Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial 
Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
Broadcasting 
 (Enter total from Table B.2.1 and multiply by .10) 
Advanced: XX / 1.80 
Intermediate: XX / 1.80 
Emerging: XX / 1.80 
(b) Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from 
Outer Space 
(Enter total from Table B.2.2 and multiply by .10) 
Advanced: XX / 1.80 
Intermediate: XX / 1.80 
Emerging: XX / 1.80 
(c) Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources 
in Outer Space 
(Enter total from Table B.2.3 and multiply by .10) 
Advanced: XX / 3.0 
Intermediate: XX / 3.0 
Emerging: XX / 0.0  
(d) Declaration on International Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and 
in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular 
Account the Needs of Developing Countries 
(Enter total from Table B.2.4 and multiply by .10) 
Advanced: XX / 1.0 
Intermediate: XX / 1.0 
Emerging: XX / 0.0 
(e) International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer 
space: Some aspects concerning the use of the 
geostationary orbit 
(Enter total from Table B.2.5 and multiply by .10) 
Advanced: XX / 0.4 
Intermediate: XX / 0.4 
Emerging: XX /0.4 
Chapter 5: Framework for assessing compliance 
 
                                                                                         74 
(f) Application of the concept of the “launching State” 
(Enter total from Table B.2.6 and multiply by .10) 
Advanced: XX / 0.6 
Intermediate: XX / 0.6 
Emerging: XX / 0.6 
(g) Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States 
and international intergovernmental organizations in 
registering space objects 
(Enter total from Table B.2.7 and multiply by .10) 
Advanced: XX / 0.8 
Intermediate: XX / 0.8 
Emerging: XX / 0.4 
(h) Recommendations on national legislation relevant to the 
peaceful exploration and use of outer space 
(Enter total from Table B.2.8 and multiply by .10) 
Advanced: XX / 1.40 
Intermediate: XX / 1.40 
Emerging: XX / 1.20 
(i) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(Enter total from Table B.2.9 and multiply by .10) 
Advanced: XX / 1.40 
Intermediate: XX / 1.40 
Emerging: XX / 1.40 
(j) Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source 
Applications in Outer Space 
(Enter total from Table B.2.10 and multiply by .10) 
Advanced: XX / 2.0  
Intermediate: XX / 2.0 
Emerging: XX / 0.0 
(k) Voluntary guidelines for transparency and confidence-
building, space code of conduct, and long-term 
sustainability of space 
(Enter total from Table B.2.11) 
Advanced: XX / 6 
Intermediate: XX / 6 
Emerging: XX / 6 
Total 
(Sum scores from above and bring total to Table A) 
Advanced: XX / 20.4 
Intermediate: XX / 20.4 
Emerging: XX / 13.8 
 
B.2.1 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting 
1.      Are the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting 
activities respectful of state sovereignty, and do they follow 
the principle of non-intervention? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
2.      Do the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting 
activities promote the free dissemination and exchange of 
information and knowledge in cultural and scientific fields? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
3.      Does the country’s satellite direct television 
broadcasting activities assist in education and social and 
economic development? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
4.      Are the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting 
activities carried out on a friendly and cooperative basis 
with other countries? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
5.      Does the country have in a place an authorisation 
system through its laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures for the conduct of satellite direct television 
activities? 
Full implementation = 2 
Partial implementation = 1 
No implementation = 0 
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6.      Does the country consult with other states regarding 
broadcasting or receiving of satellite direct television 
broadcasting for purposes of coordinating the same service? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
7.      Does the country participate in agreements with other 
states for the protection of copyright and similar rights? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
8.      Does the country notify the United Nations of satellite 
direct television broadcasting? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
9.      Does the country notify and consult the receiving state 
of a satellite direct television signal of its intent to 
broadcast? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Principles score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 8 
Intermediate: XX/ 8 
Emerging: XX / 8 
 
 
B.2.2 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space 
1.      Does the country carry out remote sensing activities for 
the benefit and in the interests of all countries? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
2.      Does the country’s remote sensing activities observe the 
principle of full and permanent sovereignty of all states over 
their own wealth and natural resources? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
3.      Does the country allow for international cooperation and 
participation in its remote sensing activities? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
4.      Does the country enter into agreements with other states 
for the establishment and operation of data collection and 
storage stations and processing and interpretation facilities? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
5.      Does the country offer technical assistance on a regular 
basis to other states interested in conducting remote sensing 
activities? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
6.      Does the country inform the United Nations of its remote 
sensing activities? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
7.      Does the country disclose information to other states 
derived from remote sensing that could help avert harm to the 
Earth’s natural environment? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
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8.      Does the country disclose information to other states 
derived from processing and analysing remote sensing data 
that is useful to states affected, or likely to be affected, by 
natural disasters? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
9.      Does the country make available to remotely sensed 
states primary and processed data on the sensed state 
according to non-discriminatory and reasonable cost terms? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
10.  Does the country allow for opportunities for a remotely 
sensed state to participate and benefit from activities that 
remotely sense it, including but not limited to access to 
remotely sensed data and participation in remote sensing 
activities ? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Principles score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 18 
Intermediate: XX / 18 
Emerging: XX / 18 
 
 
B.2.3 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space 
1.      Does the country design and use space objects with 
nuclear power sources with high degrees of confidence to 
avoid hazardous levels associated with operational or 
accidental circumstances? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
2.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources 
follow design and construction that take into account generally 
accepted international radiological protection guidelines? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
3.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources 
possess the capability of correcting or counteracting failures or 
malfunctions? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
4.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources 
include systems that follow practices of redundancy, physical 
separation, functional isolation, and adequate independence of 
components? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
5.      Does the country only operate nuclear power sources on 
space objects that are on interplanetary missions, in 
sufficiently high orbits, and in low-Earth orbits that are later 
stored in sufficiently high orbits after their mission operations? 
Always /  
not applicable= 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
6.      Does the country’s space objects with nuclear power 
sources only use highly enriched uranium 235 as fuel? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
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7.      Does the country only make critical its nuclear reactors 
once they have reached their operating orbit or interplanetary 
trajectory? 
Always /  
not applicable= 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
8.      Does the country design and constructs its satellites with 
nuclear power sources to ensure that they do not become 
critical before reaching their operating orbit or interplanetary 
trajectory? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
9.      Does the country’s space objects with nuclear reactors 
include an effective and controlled disposal of the nuclear 
reactor for those in an operational orbit less than sufficiently 
high? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
10.  Does the country only use radioisotope generators in space 
objects that are in interplanetary missions, or in missions in 
Earth orbit but which are later disposed of in high orbit? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
11.  Does the country’s space object with radioisotope 
generators include containment systems that can withstand the 
heat and aerodynamic forces of re-entry, and which prevent 
the scattering of radioactive material in the environment? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
12.  Does the country conduct a comprehensive safety 
assessment for all phases of a mission for a space object with a 
nuclear power source? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
13.  Does the country indicate to the public and inform the 
United Nations of when it will launch a space object with a 
nuclear power source? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
14.  Does the country provide timely and updated information 
on space objects with nuclear power sources that malfunction 
and which may re-enter? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
15.  Does the country provide assistance to eliminate actual and 
possible harmful effects of re-entered space objects with 
nuclear power sources? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Principles score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 30 
Intermediate: XX / 30 
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B.2.4 
Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into 
Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries 
1.      Does the country engage in equitable and mutually 
acceptable cooperation with other states according to fair and 
reasonable contractual terms? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
2.      Does the country offer developing countries and countries 
with incipient space programmes opportunities to participate in 
advanced space activities? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
3.      Do the country’s space activities promote the development 
of space science and technology and its applications? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
4.      Do the country’s space activities help develop relevant and 
appropriate capabilities in states interested in space? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
5.      Do the country’s space activities facilitate the exchange of 
expertise and technology on a mutually acceptable basis? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
No = 0 
Declaration score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 10 
Intermediate: XX / 10 
Emerging: XX / 0 
 
B.2.5 International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space: Some aspects concerning the use of the geostationary orbit 
1.      Does the country already having access to a geostationary 
orbit/spectrum take all practicable steps to enable a 
developing country, which wishes to use the same, to have 
equitable access to the requested orbit/spectrum? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
2.      Does the country file satellite orbit and frequency 
requests according to International Telecommunications 
Union regulations? 
Always /  
not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Resolution score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 4 
Intermediate: XX / 4 
Emerging: XX / 4 
 
B.2.6 Application of the concept of the “launching State” 
1.      Does the country have in place national laws authorizing 
and providing for continuing supervision of non-
governmental entities operating in outer space? 
Full implementation = 2 
Partial implementation = 1 
No implementation = 0 
2.      Does the country voluntarily provide information for the 
on-orbit transfer of ownership of space objects? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
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3.      Does the country have harmonized national space laws 
with international space laws? 
Full harmonization = 2 
Partial harmonization = 1 
No harmonization = 0 
Resolution score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 6 
Intermediate: XX / 6 
Emerging: XX / 6 
 
B.2.7 Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international intergovernmental organizations in registering space objects 
1.      Does the country provide detailed information on its 
registered space objects to the United Nations, including: 
international designators, Coordinated Universal Time of 
launch date, kilometres and minutes and degrees of orbital 
parameters, geostationary orbit location (as applicable), 
change in status of operations, date decay or re-entry, date 
and condition of moving to a disposal orbit, and web links to 
space object information? 
All information = 2 
Partial information = 1 
No information = 0 
2.      Does the country from which the territory or facility a 
space object is launched jointly determine with other states 
or intergovernmental organisations which entity should 
register the space object? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
3.      If participating in a joint launch, does the country 
register the space object separately from its joint launching 
state? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
4.      If a space object changes supervision, does the country 
of registry provide to the United Nations detailed 
information, including date of change in supervision, 
identification of the new owner or operator, change in orbital 
position, and change of function? 
All information = 2 
Partial information = 1 
No information = 0 
Recommendations score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 8 
Intermediate: XX / 8 
Emerging: XX / 4 
 
B.2.8 Recommendations on national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space 
1.      Does the country have a national framework that 
governs the launch of objects into and their return from outer 
space, the operation of launch or re-entry sites and the 
operation and control of space objects in orbit, design and 
manufacture of spacecraft, application of space science and 
technology, and exploration activities and research? 
All = 2 
Some = 1 
None = 0 
2.      Does the country issue authorisations and ensure 
supervision over space activities carried out from its 
jurisdiction or elsewhere when carried out by its citizens or 
legally established persons? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
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3.      Does the country have a national authority that 
authorizes space activities, including procedures for 
granting, modifying, suspending, and revoking 
authorisations? 
All procedures = 2 
Some procedures = 1 
No procedures = 0 
4.      Does the country’s authorisation regime ensure the safe 
conduct and minimal risk to persons for space activities, 
including assessing the expertise and technical qualifications 
of space operators and requiring adherence to safety and 
technical standards in line with the Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines? 
Fully ensures = 2 
Partially ensures = 1 
Does not ensure = 0 
5.      Does the country’s supervision and authorisation regime 
include on-site inspections or general reporting 
requirements? 
Fully includes = 2 
Partially includes = 1 
Does not include = 0 
6.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures offer recourse from operators or owners of space 
objects if the country’s liability is engaged in the case of 
damages, such as through the use of insurance requirements 
or indemnification procedures? 
Full recourse = 2 
Partial recourse = 1 
No recourse = 0 
7.      Does the country’s supervision regime apply in case of 
transfer of ownership of space objects of non-governmental 
entities? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Recommendations score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 14 
Intermediate: XX / 14 
Emerging: XX / 12 
 
B.2.9 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
1.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures require space systems to be designed to not 
release debris during normal operations? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
2.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures require spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital 
stages to be designed to avoid accidental break-ups? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
3.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures require spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital 
stages to have disposal and passivation measures in the case 
of failure? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
4.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures require spacecraft operators to follow collision 
avoidance procedures through adjustment of launch times 
and on-orbit avoidance manoeuvres? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
5.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures require space objects to deplete or make safe 
their on-board sources of stored energy, including through 
passivation by removal of residual propellants, compressed 
fluids, and electrical storage devices? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
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6.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures limit the long-term presence of space objects in 
low-Earth orbit after their end of mission, including through 
controlled removal from orbit through re-entry or in orbits 
beyond low-Earth orbit? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
7.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures limit the long-term presence of space objects in 
geosynchronous Earth orbit after their end of mission, 
including through controlled removal to orbits beyond 
geosynchronous Earth orbit? 
Always = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Guidelines score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 14 
Intermediate: XX / 14 
Emerging: XX / 14 
 
 
B.2.10 Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space 
1.      Does the country have in place safety policies, 
requirements, and processes that protect people and the 
environment in Earth’s biosphere from potential hazards 
associated with relevant launch, operation, and end-of-
service phases of space nuclear power source applications? 
All phases / 
not applicable = 2 
Some phases = 1 
No phases = 0 
2.      Does the country’s space activities authorisation regime 
verify the rationale and require justification for the use of 
space nuclear power source applications? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
3.      Does the country’s space launch authorisation regime 
require an independent safety evaluation assessing the risk to 
people and the environment for launches, operations, and 
end-of-service phases for space nuclear power source 
applications? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
4.      Does the country conduct emergency preparedness 
activities, including emergency planning, training, rehearsals 
and development of procedures and communication 
protocols, in preparation for radiation exposure to people 
and the environment as a result of space nuclear power 
applications? 
Repeatedly = 2 
Once = 1 
Never = 0 
5.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures identify space operators of space nuclear power 
source applications as the primary responsibility holders for 
operations of such applications? 
Full recognition = 2 
Partial recognition = 1 
No recognition = 0 
6.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures require space operators to include safety 
management to form part of overall space mission 
management? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
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7.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures require space operations to have technical 
competence in nuclear safety, including qualified individuals 
and facilities for designing, testing, and analysing nuclear 
safety capabilities part of space missions? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
8.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures require space operators to integrate safety 
considerations from design to development to launch and 
operations and end-of-service for the entire space nuclear 
power source application? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
9.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures require space operators to conduct risk 
assessments on the launch, operation, and end-of-service 
phases of space nuclear power source applications? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
10.  Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures require mitigation measures for accidents of 
space nuclear power source applications with the potential to 
release radioactive material into the environment? 
Always / not applicable = 2 
Sometimes = 1 
Never = 0 
Framework score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 20 
Intermediate: XX / 20 
Emerging: XX / 0 
 
B.2.11 Voluntary guidelines for transparency and confidence-building, space code of conduct, and long-term sustainability of space 
Individual recommendations included within these three separate sets of guidelines are not 
scored. However, if a country has implemented a majority of the individual 
recommendations contained within each set of guidelines in either its legal or administrative 
practice, it will be assessed a score of 2 per set of guidelines. Therefore, the following sets 
of guidelines for consideration are: 
i. Recommendations from the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and 
Confidence-Building Measures 
ii. Recommendations from the European Union's International Code of Conduct on Outer 
Space Activities 
iii. Recommendations from the UNCOPUOS Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines 
Guidelines score  
(Sum scores from above and bring to Table B.2) 
Advanced: XX / 6 
Intermediate: XX / 6 
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5.2 Application of the framework to three test cases 
 
Given that the above tables present the general scoring of the framework, it remains necessary 
to apply the framework in practice to demonstrate its utility. As suggested previously, there are 
three tiers of spacefaring countries to which the framework will be applied, namely advanced, 
intermediate, and emerging countries. Based on the results from each assessment within each 
tier, a country can be assigned a rating of highly compliant, mostly compliant, partially 
compliant, minimally compliant, or non-compliant. As a reminder, the scoring ranges for each 
rating category according to whether a country is advanced, intermediate, or emerging is 
presented above in Figure 5.2.  
 One example from each tier has been selected to apply the framework and determine 
the countries’ levels of compliance with international space law and norms. These are the 
United States (advanced), South Korea (intermediate), and South Africa (emerging). Each 
example represents varying levels of space activities and unique developmental and regional 
differences. 
5.2.1 Scoring of the United States 
 
The United States received an overall score of 33.33 out of a total possible score of 40.55. This 
suggests the United States is a highly compliant country in terms of international space law and 
norms as it scores in the highest tier of possible scores, although it risks falling to the next 
rating below of mostly compliant given how closely its currently sits to the lower limit of the 
highly compliant rating. Specifically, it received a score of 19.03 out a of possible score of 
20.15 for the binding international law category, and it received a score of 14.30 out of a 
possible score of 20.40 for the non-binding law category. Generally, the scores suggest the 
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United States is a good actor in space and follows accepted international space law and norms. 
However, the country performs better in terms of its formal, legally binding obligations found 
within international treaties as compared to following non-binding norms contained within UN 
principles and resolutions and guidelines. If it were to be “graded,” the United States would 
receive a 94 percent grade on the binding international law category and a 70 percent grade on 
the non-binding category. This demonstrates that the United States’s performance on the 
binding international law category helped carry its overall score in to the highly compliant 
scoring range. In particular, the United States misses points in the non-binding category on the 
Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct 
Television Broadcasting and the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer 
Space. This is largely due to the United States conducting satellite broadcasting with 
governmental information to geopolitical adversaries. Similarly, the United States holds a well-
documented reputation for conducting remote sensing for its intelligence and surveillance 
operations (i.e. not for the benefit and in the interests of geopolitical adversaries who are 
remotely sensed), an area where most, if not all, states that possess remote sensing capabilities 
likely falter in adhering to the remote sensing principles.  If the United States wishes to 
maintain its highly compliant rating and to improve its overall score, the framework suggests 
that improvements could be made in adopting and abiding by additional non-binding guidelines 
and norms. 
 Figure 5.4 below presents the scoring of the United States for the various elements 
comprising the assessment framework, showing the assessed score out of the potential score 
possible for each element. Appendix I includes the detailed scoring for each question within 
the framework applied to the United States. 
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Binding International Law Score (19.03/20.15)
Space-Specific International Treaties (13.13/14.25)




Space-Re;ated International Treaties (5.9/5.9)
Institution-Related Treaties (2/2)
General/Policy-Related Treaties (11.2/11.2)
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (8/8)
Satellite Signals Convention (8/8)
Non-Binding International Law Score (14.3/20.4)
Direct TV Broadcasting Principles (13/18)
Remote Sensing Principles (12/18)
Nuclear Power Source Principles (30/30)
Developing Country Declaration (5/10)
Geostationary Orbit (3/4)
Launching State Concept (5/6)
Space Object Registration (8/8)
National Legislation Recommendations (13/14)
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (14/14)
Nuclear Power Source Safety Framework (20/20)
Voluntary Guidelines (2/6)
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (0/2)
European Union International Code of Conduct (0/2)
UNCOPUOS Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines (2/2)
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5.2.2 Scoring of South Korea 
 
South Korea received an overall score of 30.80 out of a total possible score of 39.30. Based on 
the ratings ranges presented above, this score suggests South Korea is a mostly compliant 
country in adhering to international space law and norms. Specifically, South Korea received 
a score of 18.28 out of a possible score of 18.90 for the binding international law category, and 
it received a score of 12.40 out of a possible score of 20.40 for the non-binding international 
law category. Similar to the United States, South Korea performs well in terms of ratifying and 
adhering to formal treaties and their various provisions, but it falters somewhat as it relates to 
the non-binding UN principles, resolutions, and guidelines that promote greater normative 
behaviour in space. South Korea’s performance in this regard may be due to its relatively more 
recent entry in to space activities, and as such has not rapidly enough developed laws or other 
structures to formalize many of these non-biding norms. For example, this is observed in the 
country’s adherence to the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, where the country lacks a 
formal legal requirement for space activities to always comply with the guidelines. Similar to 
the United States, South Korea also falters on the remote sensing principles as it conducts its 
own satellite surveillance without full respect of other states’ sovereignty, in particular North 
Korea. Progress in complying with these areas of the framework could lead to an improved 
rating in future assessments of South Korea. 
 Figure 5.5 below presents the scoring of South Korea for the various elements 
comprising the assessment framework, showing the assessed score out of the potential score 
possible for each element. Appendix II includes the detailed scoring for each question within 
the framework applied to South Korea. 
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Binding International Law Score (18.28/18.90)
Space-Specific International Treaties (12.4/13.0)




Space-Re;ated International Treaties (5.9/5.9)
Institution-Related Treaties (2/2)
General/Policy-Related Treaties (11.2/11.2)
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (8/8)
Satellite Signals Convention (8/8)
Non-Binding International Law Score (12.4/20.40)
Direct TV Broadcasting Principles (15/18)
Remote Sensing Principles (12/18)
Nuclear Power Source Principles (30/30)
Developing Country Declaration (10/10)
Geostationary Orbit (3/4)
Launching State Concept (6/6)
Space Object Registration (8/8)
National Legislation Recommendations (13/14)
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (7/14)
Nuclear Power Source Safety Framework (20/20)
Voluntary Guidelines (0/6)
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (0/2)
European Union International Code of Conduct (0/2)
UNCOPUOS Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines (0/2)
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5.2.3 Scoring of South Africa 
 
South Africa received an overall score of 19.80 out of a total possible score of 30.70, suggesting 
the country is mostly compliant in adhering to international space law and norms, although it 
sits on the cusp of the partially compliant rating and risks slipping in to that rating if it does not 
make improvements. As an emerging spacefaring country, many framework questions were 
not assessed toward South Africa given its lower level of space activity as compared to South 
Korea and the United States. Nonetheless, the framework demonstrates that South Africa does 
have room for improvement in further complying with international space and norms, 
particularly in the non-binding category. South Africa received a score of 12.98 out a possible 
score of 16.90 for the binding international law category, and it received a score of 6.40 out of 
a possible score of 13.60 for the non-binding category. South Africa’s lacklustre performance 
in the binding international law category is due in part to the country not having registered  its 
surveillance satellite Kondor-E, which was reported separately by the Russian Federation under 
a filing with the UN when it launched the satellite on South Africa’s behalf. Improving 
transparency of its space operations, which can be argued for most if not all spacefaring 
countries, can significantly increase the country’s score in future assessments. The country’s 
poor performance in the non-binding international law category is largely due to its legal and 
administrative frameworks failing to formally incorporate proactive guidelines, such as those 
around space debris mitigation, in their procedures. 
 Figure 5.6 below presents the scoring of South Africa the various elements comprising 
the assessment framework, showing the assessed score out of the potential score possible for 
each element. Appendix III includes the detailed scoring for each question within the 
framework applied to South Africa. 
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Binding International Law Score (12.98/16.90)
Space-Specific International Treaties (9.88/11)




Space-Re;ated International Treaties (3.1/5.9)
Institution-Related Treaties (2/2)
General/Policy-Related Treaties (5.6/11.2)
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (8/8)
Satellite Signals Convention (0/8)
Non-Binding International Law Score (6.4/13.60)
Direct TV Broadcasting Principles (16/18)
Remote Sensing Principles (17/18)
Nuclear Power Source Principles (0/0)
Developing Counyry Declaration (0/0)
Geostationary Orbit (4/4)
Launching State Concept (6/6)
Space Object Registration (3/4)
National Legislation Recommendations (11/12)
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (7/14)
Nuclear Power Source Safety Framework (0/0)
Voluntary Guidelines (0/6)
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (0/2)
European Union International Code of Conduct (0/2)
UNCOPUOS Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines (0/2)
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 Now that the framework and its associated questions and scoring methods have been 
described above, including rationales for the inclusion and exclusion of particular articles and 
provisions of international space law treaties, principles, resolutions, and guidelines as 
identified by the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs, this dissertation will conclude in the next 
chapter by discussing the scoring ramifications in addition to a discussion on the applicability 
of such a compliance assessment framework for advocacy and policymaking purposes. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
We have developed and presented a scoring framework to assess the compliance of states with 
international law and norms pertaining to outer space activities. The framework accounts for 
the different levels of space activities and capabilities in advanced, intermediate, and emerging 
spacefaring countries. The scoring of each relevant article and provision within treaties, 
principles, resolutions, and guidelines helps to illuminate the process through which document-
level scores, subsection scores, category scores, and total scores would be calculated using the 
framework for assessing space law compliance. The scoring also demonstrates the various 
scenarios in which scores can be calculated, including the range of what scores are possible 
using the assessment questions. The highest score that could be achieved by a country is 40.55 
points for an advanced country, 39.30 for an intermediate country, and 30.70 for an emerging 
country, whereas the lowest score that could be achieved by a country in any tier is 0 points.  
 In order to ensure correct weighting and consideration of the importance of binding 
international law found in treaty documents versus non-binding norms set forth in principles, 
resolutions, and guidelines, the scoring of questions within each subsection had to be calculated 
using a different range of values possible for each question. For example, the framework 
questions are divided into two categories: a binding international law category and a non-
binding international principles, resolutions, and guidelines category.  
 The binding international law category was further divided into two subsections: a 
subsection dealing only with space-specific international treaties (these are the four out of the 
five commonly known space treaties, excluding the Moon Agreement for reasons described 
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previously) and a subsection dealing with space-related international treaties. In order to assign 
more weight to the space-specific treaties to account for their exclusive focus on the exploration 
and use of outer space and the principles that are affirmed throughout these documents, the 
space-specific treaties subsection was weighted 70 percent and the space-related treaties 
subsection was weighted 30 percent of the total category score. Irrespective of the subsection, 
each question appearing within this category on binding international law was able to be scored 
on a scale of values ranging from two (2) for most compliant to zero (0) for least compliant. 
The only exception to this scoring approach within the binding international law category 
pertains to the scoring of countries participating in international institutions, which was scored 
on a range of two (2) for countries that participate or had participated in at least two 
international institutions set forth by treaties to zero (0) for those countries that had not 
participated in any treaty-based institutions. The scoring for this particular question was 
prescribed in such a manner so as to recognise the importance of the principle of international 
cooperation in outer space policy and activities without unduly punishing a country by 
assigning a zero (0) score for having not participated in what were region-specific (for example, 
EUTELSAT and ARABSAT) or at the time considered politically-aligned institutions (for 
example, ITSO was considered to be Western-oriented institution and INTERSPUTNIK was 
considered to be a Soviet-oriented institution during the Cold War). The same approach was 
used in the non-binding law category to determine countries’ voluntary levels of subscription 
to guidelines on transparency and confidence-building, the European Union code of conduct, 
and the UNCOPUOS long-term space sustainability guidelines. 
 Given the scoring of questions for the binding international law category was done on 
a range of two (2) to zero (0), the scoring of questions for the non-binding principles, 
resolutions, and guidelines was done using the same possible range of scores. As described 
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above, this was intentional to weight the more significant and consequential of the two sets of 
questions and those most forceful in terms of driving policy among countries. Unlike the 
binding international categories, which had weighted subsections, the non-binding category 
does not weight specific principles, resolutions, or guidelines more heavily than others, 
therefore all questions within this category are assigned equal weight for arriving at the 
category score.  
 Once each category’s score is assessed, both scores are summed to produce the total 
score for the country. Given the range of possible total scores is from 40.55 to 0 points for an 
advanced spacefaring country, the scores can be categorised according to intervals of 8.11 
points. Similarly, for an intermediate country, an interval of 7.86 points can be used to 
categorise scores ranging from 39.30 to 0, and an interval of 6.14 points can be used to 
categorise scores ranging from 30.70 to 0 for an emerging country. 
6.1 Interpretation of assessment results 
 
As described above, the framework produces five broad yet useful categories for understanding 
the general level of compliance a given country follows with regard to international space law 
and norms. A country that is highly compliant follows all or most of international space law 
and norms in both policy and practice, whereas a mostly compliant country follows most 
international space law and norms but has room to improve in both policy and practice. As 
demonstrated in the application of the framework to the United States, South Korea, and South 
Africa, highly compliant and mostly compliant countries tend to perform better in the binding 
international law category while lacking in the non-binding category for principles, resolutions, 
and guidelines. 
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 A partially compliant country, falling within the middle of the possible ratings, likely 
follows most of the binding international law with some inconsistencies, while lacking most 
adherence to the non-binding law and norms. A rating of minimally compliant and a rating of 
non-compliant indicate that a country does not observe international space law and norms, and 
is likely a threat to outer space peace, safety, security, and sustainability.  
 The approach proposed within this dissertation, as previously discussed, falls within 
two broader movements, the evidence-based programming and policymaking movement and 
the ratings and rankings movement. Therefore, the value of this framework rests with its ability 
to contribute in a meaningful manner to informed space policy dialogue and policymaking, in 
addition to making space policy and practices generally accessible and consumable by a larger 
public audience for education and awareness-raising purposes. The framework intends to assist 
academics and policymakers to identify countries needing improvement in their space policies 
and locating the specific issue areas needed to make those improvements. Moreover, the 
framework, and the results it produces, intends to aid advocates, civil society, and the broader 
public to identify countries and issue areas in which they could exert pressure to encourage 
reform and best policy and practice in compliance with international law and norms. Finally, 
the framework intends to serve as a foreign policy and diplomatic tool whereby leading 
compliant countries can use the results of the ranking to exert pressure on their peers to improve 
compliance. 
 This approach subscribes to a similar logic found within the evidence-based 
programming and policymaking movement in that it assumes that increased data and analysis 
will lead to improved policymaking. This approach further assumes that improved 
policymaking and compliance with international space law and norms will lead to fulfilment 
of the objectives set forth within international space policy documents, including the 
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achievement and maintenance of order, peace, safety, security, and sustainability in outer 
space.  
 The application of the framework on an annual basis also offers useful information 
and analysis that allows for the tracking of change over time, including improvement or 
worsening in compliance. This would assist academics, policymakers, and civil society and the 
public alike to, in near-real time, identify issue areas and undertake studies for understanding 
why such improvements or declines occur and to campaign for changes within the issue area 
of concern. With continued application over time, this framework would further normalise and 
propagate the policy and practices captured within the international space law and norms 
documents, and assist new space actors, including emerging spacefaring countries, in easily 
identifying and adopting leading best policy and practice. 
6.2 Model application and use of the framework 
 
Beyond the application of the framework to the three case studies within this paper, the real-
world application and use of the framework must be considered. As such, questions of who 
performs the assessment and to whom it applies with what consequences arise. Although it 
remains outside the scope of this dissertation to determine who will perform the application of 
the proposed framework, it is envisioned that the framework will be applied by an independent 
group of civil society organisations and academic institutions in anticipation that these groups 
would not be as biased or predisposed to certain ratings and assessments as would be corporate 
or governmental entities. The most successful of the ranking and rating assessments as 
described previously are those that have the most claim to independence and lack of 
interference from those groups with an interest to achieving a certain outcome. Indeed, the 
groups implementing these assessments have stressed the importance of receiving support from 
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private and non-governmental sources to avoid the impression of undue influence being exerted 
on outcomes of the assessments. Therefore, individual corporations and governmental agencies 
would likely form the least likely candidates constituting a group overseeing the application of 
the framework proposed herein given their vested interests in obtaining a favourable rating. 
Existing space civil society groups and relevant and qualified academic institutions, or centres 
or parts thereof, would comprise the most likely set of candidates responsible for application 
and implementation of the framework.  
 Given the group of organisations, or a representative body comprising representatives 
of such groups, would likely bear responsibility for applying the framework and arriving at its 
assessment conclusions ranging from highly compliant to non-compliant, the consequences of 
such an assessment would largely be unenforceable in the strictest sense of the word. 
International law itself is largely unenforceable unless states within the international 
community agree to subscribe to following a particular enforcement action. The consequences 
of a low assessment rating for a specific country would thus be exclusion from opportunities 
for collaboration with other spacefaring countries, and other ‘soft’ forms of consequences 
resulting from not observing binding and non-binding laws and norms accepted by the 
international space community. Similar to those ranking and rating assessments described 
previously, the consequences of a low ranking or rating are not implemented by a single 
government or international governmental organisation but are rather the opportunity costs and 
negative attention those low performers encounter. For example, the inclusion of Freedom 
House’s Freedom in the World rating in the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s decision-
making process on to whether award a development loan to a country depends of their rating 
in the assessment. While Freedom House as the civil society organisation is responsible for the 
assessment, the consequences of the rating are evidenced in the use of the rating in other 
governmental or international governmental processes, such as loan decision-making, thus 
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resulting in lost investment and opportunity costs for those who are rated poorly. It is 
envisioned the results of the application of this framework would operate similarly. For 
example, poorly rated countries would lose out on the opportunity to collaborate with other 
spacefaring countries, thus resulting in missed opportunities to learn new knowledge and 
technical expertise that would have otherwise been afforded in multilateral space mission 
collaborations.  
 As the framework contributes to a norm-setting process across the international 
community, countries that perform well in the assessment would want to work with other well-
performing countries, knowing they share the same or similar approaches to the access and use 
of outer space and compliance with binding and non-binding international space law and 
norms. Well-performing countries, in turn, would be less willing to work with poor performers 
as they may introduce elements of risk and non-compliance in joint space activities. Therefore, 
the consequences of inadequate compliance with international space law and norms would be 
imposed by the community of spacefaring nations themselves as positive behaviour would be 
encouraged and negative behaviour discouraged by the framework. To reinforce this approach, 
the example previously cited on the country of Georgia improving its Ease of Doing Business 
rating yielded significant returns and increases in foreign direct investment after it advanced 
its rating.  
 As such, the framework only functions when applied to state actors as state actors, 
according to international space law, are ultimately responsible for licensing and supervision 
of space activities, irrespective of whether they are conducted by national public or private 
entities. The regulatory and licensing and supervisory environment a state actor creates within 
its domain ultimately affects the character and nature of behaviours public and private entities 
follow. A government that remains lax in its licensing and supervision requirements would thus 
consequently create a lax and, likely, non-compliant environment in which private actors 
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alongside public actors would operate. Therefore, the framework would be intended to be 
applied primarily to state actors as the ultimate responsible parties for licensing and supervision 
of space activities.  
6.3 Recommendations and refinement of the framework 
 
The approach described herein does not claim to completely address all areas of space policy 
and practice given that, as mentioned above, new governmental and non-governmental entrants 
continue to increasingly participate in outer space activities and that new technologies and 
growing markets are evolving rapidly, posing new challenges and issues areas for outer space 
policymaking. For example, the issue of space debris has recently come to the forefront of 
space policy challenges, whereas as recently as three decades ago it was not considered a 
pressing issue. Therefore, it remains incumbent upon this framework to prove flexible and 
adaptable, incorporating new space law and norms for evaluation of compliance as they emerge 
at the international level. This demonstrates the framework’s cognizance of the fact that the 
space policy domain is continually changing and evolving as new actors and technological and 
economic factors facilitate increased access to, and use of, outer space. 
 As such, this dissertation concludes by inviting additional review of the proposed 
framework and suggestions for improvement so as to ensure its responsiveness and usefulness 
to the needs of the international space community. Purposeful decisions have been taken in 
terms of the framework’s structure and the composition, such as the exclusion of rating the 
Moon Agreement as an example, or the weighting of binding law versus non-binding norms 
contained within principles, resolutions, and guidelines. If it is determined as time evolves that 
these decisions are not responsive to the needs of the policy and civil society communities for 
purposes of promoting improved compliance, and therefore promoting the peace, security, and 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
                                                                                         99 
sustainability of outer space, then the framework remains adjustable and open to incorporating 
additional components for assessment. The dissertation also invites further review for 
strengthening the methodological soundness of the assessment, and for consideration of its 
applicability to new space entrants.  
 Finally, this dissertation suggests as next steps in a future research project the 
application of the proposed framework to a small group of established and current spacefaring 
countries. This would aid the assessment for identifying areas for improvement, and perhaps 
suggest a revision and further detailing of the five broad compliance categories established here 
(i.e. highly compliant, mostly compliant, partially compliant, minimally compliant, and non-
compliant) in order to allow greater differentiation of compliance among space actors. Beyond 
this initial application of the framework, the assessment could then continue to expand the 
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APPENDIX I SCORING FOR UNITED STATES 
APPENDIX II  SCORING FOR SOUTH KOREA 
APPENDIX III  SCORING FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
Appendix I: 
Scoring for United States
A
Total 
Advanced: 19.03 / 20.15
Advanced: 14.30 / 20.40
Advanced: 33.33 / 40.50(Sum binding and non-binding international law scores)
(Enter total from last line of Table B.2)
Aggregate Score
Binding International Law Score
(Enter total from last line of Table B.1)
Non-Binding International Law Score
Appendix I: Scoring for United States
B.1 Binding International Law Score
Space-specific International Treaties
(Use total from last line of Table B.1.1 and multiply by .50)
Space-related International Treaties
(Use total from last line of Table B.1.2 and multiply by .50)
Total 
(Sum space-specific and space-related treaties scores and then bring total to Table A)
B.1.1 Space-specific International Treaties Score
Yes, fully = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full affirmation = 2
Partial affirmation = 1 1
No affirmation = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 0
No affirmation = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Frequently = 2
Occassionally = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 2
Frequently = 0
Occassionally = 1 1
No = 2
Article III: Elements of this article are already captured in questions asked above, therefore no separate scoring is assessed. N/A
Repeatedly = 0
Once = 1 2
No = 2
Repeatedly = 0
Once = 1 2
No = 2
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 2
Always provided / not applicable = 2
Sometimes provided = 1 2
Never provided = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Yes = 2
Partial = 1 2
No = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 2
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Full account = 2
Partial account = 1 2
No account = 0
Full account = 2
Partial account = 1 2
No account = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Articles XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, and XVII: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 10.5
Yes, in full = 2
Advanced: 13.13 / 14.25
Advanced: 5.90 / 5.90
Advanced: 19.03 / 20.15
a. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
1.  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(25 percent of section score)
m.  Article IV: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures allow for the conduct of such types of activities as described in 
Question ‘l’ above?
b. Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c. Article I: Do country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise the role of international law?
d.  Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures affirm that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out
for the benefit and interests of all countries?
e. Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise outer space as the province of all mankind?
f. Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise that outer space should be free for exploration without
discrimination and with free access to celestial bodies?
g.  Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise the freedom of scientific investigation in outer space?
h.  Article I: Does the country facilitate and participate in international scientific investigation?
i.  Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures allow for, or encourage, the appropriation of outer space and celestial
bodies by claims of sovereignty, use, or occupation?
j.  Article II: Does the country, by its actions or the actions of those within its jurisdiction, appropriate, or encourage the appropriation of, outer space 
and celestial bodies and resources by claims of sovereignty, use, or occupation?
k.  Article IV: Has the country placed into orbit or installed on celestial bodies weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons?
l.  Article IV: Has the country established bases, installations, or fortifications, or tested weapons or conducted military manoeuvres on celestial
bodies?
y.  Article XII: Does the country allow access and visits to its outer space stations, installations, equipment, and vehicles, provided reasonable 
notification of a such visit is given by the visiting representatives?
n.  Article V: Has the country either provided assistance or rejected assistance to astronauts of other countries who are in distress?
o.  Article V: Does the country proactively inform the United Nations and other countries regarding potentially dangerous phenomena to astronauts?
p. Article VI: Does the country have in place an authorisation and supervision regime for space activities conducted by non-governmental entities?
q. Article VII: Does the country recognise its liability as a launching state in its laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
r. Article VII: Has the country denied its liability as a launching state for damage caused?
s. Article VIII: Does the country maintain an updated national registry of launched space objects?
t. Article VIII: Has the country ever returned a space object belonging to another country, but which landed in its jurisdiction?
u.  Article IX: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures account for avoiding harmful contamination, including debris, of the 
space environment?
v.  Article IX: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures seek to limit damage to the Earth environment by extraterrestrial
material?
w. Article X: Does the country allow other countries to observe the flight of space objects that it launches?
x.  Article XI: Does the country inform the United Nations and other countries of its space activities, including the nature, conduct, location, and results
of the activities?
2.  Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (25 percent of section
score)
a. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
Appendix I: Scoring for United States
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 6
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Article I provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, therefore no scoring is assessed. 
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full account = 2
Partial account = 1 2
No account = 0
Articles VI and VII sets forth conditions under which other articles apply and is not actionable by states, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Full provision = 2
Partial provision = 1 2
No provision = 0
Article IX, X, XI, XII, and XIII prescribe the administrative details through which claims and compensation should be processed, therefore no
scoring is assessed.
Articles XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, and XVIII prescribe the administrative details through which a Claims Commission should be established and
make adjudications in the case of no settlements through diplomatic channels established elsewhere in the treaty, therefore no scoring is
assessed.
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Article XX prescribes the process through which the expenses associated with the Claims Commission should be borne by state participants,
therefore no scoring is assessed. 
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Articles XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 7
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
3.      Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
i.        Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space object landed practicably assisted to recover the object or its parts?
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c.       Article 1: Has the country notified the launching state(s) of astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made emergency landings?
d.      Article 1: Has the country notified the United Nations of astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made emergency landings?
e.       Article 2: Has the country taken all possible steps to rescue and render all necessary assistance to astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in 
distress, or made emergency landings?
f.        Article 3: Has the country provided assistance in search and rescue operations for astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made 
emergency landings?
g.      Article 4: Has the country safely and promptly returned to their launching states astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made 
emergency landings?
h.      Article 5: Has the country notified the launching state and United Nations of a space object or part of a space object that has returned to Earth?
g.      Article IV: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its absolute joint and several liability with a second-party 
launching state if its space object caused damage to the second-party launching state’s space object, which then resulted in damage on the Earth’s surface 
or aircraft in flight of a third state?
j.        Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space object landed returned the space object or its parts and provided their identifying data to the 
launching state?
k.      Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space object landed eliminated the possibility of its danger if it is found to be hazardous or 
deleterious?
l.        Article 5: Has the launching state paid for expenses related to the recovery and return of space object or its part incurred by the country in which the 
space object landed?
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c.       Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its liability to pay compensation for damage caused by its 
space objects on the Earth’s surface or aircraft in flight?
d.      Article II: Has the country refused to pay compensation in practice for damage caused by its space objects on the Earth's surface or aircraft in flight?
e.       Article III: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its liability owing to its fault or fault of persons for which it 
is responsible in the case of damage to another space object, persons, or property in space of another launching state?
f.        Article III: Has the country refused to accept liability in the case of damage to another space object, persons, or property in space of another 
launching state caused by its fault or fault of persons for which it is responsible?
h.      Article IV: Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its joint and several liability apportioned according to fault 
with a second-party launching state if its space object caused damage to the second-party launching state’s space object, which then resulted in damage to 
a third state’s space object, person, or property in space?
i.        Article IV: Has the country refused to pay compensation according to its fault in cases of joint and several liability for damage caused to a third-
party state?
j.        Article V: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise joint and several liability in cases when it and another state 
jointly launch a space object?
k.      Article V: Do country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures account for its roles a joint launch participant if a space object is launched 
from its territory or facility?
l.        Article VIII: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures provide for a claims and compensation process for damage which it 
may suffer by other launching states?
m.    Article XIX: Has the country refused or failed to pay compensation or an award decided by a Claims Commission as set forth in other treaty articles?
n.      Article XXI: Has the country rendered appropriate and rapid assistance in cases when a space object presents large-scale danger to human life or 
interferes with a population’s living conditions or functioning of a vital centre?
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
4.      Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
Appendix I: Scoring for United States
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Article I provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Article III describes actions to be taken by the United Nations rather than a specific country, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Full information / not applicable= 2
Partial information = 1 1
No information = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Article V describes a procedural administrative action, therefore no scoring is assessed. 
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Articles VII, VIII, IX, X, and XII: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 2.75
Total (Sum the above treaty score and bring total to Table B.1) 26.25
B.1.2 Space-related International Treaties Score
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Full prohibition = 2
Partial prohibition = 1 2
No prohibition = 0
Repeatedly = 0
Once = 1 2
Never = 2
Articles II, III, IV, and V: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
8
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Article 1 provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 2
Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 describe the conditions in which Article 2 applies, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
8
c.      Institution-related treaties
0.6
11.8Total (Sum the treaty scores from (a) and (b) and multiply by .70 and then sum with © score; bring total to Table B.1)
Individual treaties within this subsection are not scored as they are institution-specific and in some cases outdated and therefore irrelevant. However, collectively if a country ratified or acceded to at least two of these 
treaties, it will be assessed a score of 2 to demonstrate its participation and cooperation in international legal instruments and organisations related to space, a key principle promoted in international space law 
documents. Therefore, the following treaties for consideration are: 
a.       Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
b.      Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores)
d.      Article IV: Does the country provide detailed information to the United Nations for its launched space objects, including name of the country, space 
object registration number, date and territory of launch, basic orbital parameters, and general function of the space object?
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c.       Article II: Does the country maintain an updated national registry of launched space objects that it launches and that it launches jointly with other 
launching states?
i. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
e.       Article IV: Does the country update the United Nations on space objects for which it previously shared information, but which are no longer in Earth 
orbit?
f.        Article VI: Does the country assist with providing identifying information it has gained through space monitoring and tracking facilities for space 
objects that are unidentifiable and which are of a hazardous or deleterious nature?
i. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
ii. Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
iii. Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures prohibit, prevent, and forbid the carrying out of nuclear weapon tests at
places under its jurisdiction or control, including in the atmosphere and outer space and underwater?
iv. Article I: Since implementing the treaty, has the country carried out a nuclear weapon test at a place under its jurisdiction or control, including in the
atmosphere and outer space and underwater?
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores)
iv. Agreement of the Arab Corporation for Space Communications (ARABSAT)
ii. Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
iii. Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures prevent the distribution on or from its territory programme-carrying
signals by distributors for whom the emitted signal to or passing through the satellite is not intended?
iv. Article II: Has the country, by its actions or the actions of those within its jurisdiction, allowed for the distribution on or from its territory programme-
carrying signals by distributors for whom the emitted signal to or passing through the satellite is not intended?
i. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO)
ii. Agreement on the Establishment of the INTERSPUTNIK International System and Organization of Space Communications
iii. Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (ESA)
v. Agreement on Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes (INTERCOSMOS)
vi. Convention on the International Mobile Satellite Organization
vii. Convention Establishing the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT)
viii. Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT)
ix. International Telecommunication Constitution and Convention
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B.2
(a) Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
Broadcasting
 (Enter total from Table B.2.1 and multiply by .10)
(b) Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.2 and multiply by .10)
(c) Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.3 and multiply by .10)
(d) Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the 
Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries
(Enter total from Table B.2.4 and multiply by .10)
(e) International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space: Some aspects concerning the use of the 
geostationary orbit
(Enter total from Table B.2.5 and multiply by .10)
(f) Application of the concept of the “launching State”
(Enter total from Table B.2.6 and multiply by .10)
(g) Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international intergovernmental organizations in 
registering space objects
(Enter total from Table B.2.7 and multiply by .10)
(h) Recommendations on national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space
(Enter total from Table B.2.8 and multiply by .10)
(i) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.9 and multiply by .10)
(j) Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.10 and multiply by .10)
(k) Voluntary guidelines for transparency and confidence-building, space code of conduct, and long-term 
sustainability of space
(Enter total from Table B.2.11)
Total
(Sum scores from above and bring total to Table A)
B.2.1
Principles Governing the Use by States of 
Artificial Earth Satellites for International 
Direct Television Broadcasting
Score
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Full implementation = 2
Partial implementation = 1 2
No implementation = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Principles Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 13
B.2.2 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space Score
Always= 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
2.      Do the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities promote the free dissemination and 
exchange of information and knowledge in cultural and scientific fields?
3.      Does the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities assist in education and social and 
economic development?
4.      Are the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities carried out on a friendly and cooperative 
basis with other countries?
5.      Does the country have in a place an authorisation system through its laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures for the conduct of satellite direct television activities?
Non-Binding International Law Score
Advanced: 1.30 / 1.80
Advanced: 1.20 / 1.80
Advanced: 3.0 / 3.0
Advanced: 0.5 / 1.0
Advanced: 0.3 / 0.4
Advanced: 0.5 / 0.6
Advanced: 0.8 / 0.8
Advanced: 1.30 / 1.40
Advanced: 1.40 / 1.40
Advanced: 2.0 / 2.0
Advanced: 2 / 6
Advanced: 14.3 / 20.4
1.      Are the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities respectful of state sovereignty, and do they 
follow the principle of non-intervention?
6.      Does the country consult with other states regarding broadcasting or receiving of satellite direct television 
broadcasting for purposes of coordinating the same service?
7.      Does the country participate in agreements with other states for the protection of copyright and similar rights?
9.      Does the country notify and consult the receiving state of a satellite direct television signal of its intent to 
broadcast?
1.      Does the country carry out remote sensing activities for the benefit and in the interests of all countries?
8.      Does the country notify the United Nations of satellite direct television broadcasting?
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Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
No = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Principles Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 12
B.2.3 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space Score
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable= 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable= 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Principles Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 30
9.      Does the country’s space objects with nuclear reactors include an effective and controlled disposal of the 
nuclear reactor for those in an operational orbit less than sufficiently high?
10.  Does the country allow for opportunities for a remotely sensed state to participate and benefit from activities 
that remotely sense it, including but not limited to access to remotely sensed data and participation in remote 
sensing activities ?
1.      Does the country design and use space objects with nuclear power sources with high degrees of confidence to 
avoid hazardous levels associated with operational or accidental circumstances?
2.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources follow design and construction that take into 
account generally accepted international radiological protection guidelines?
3.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources possess the capability of correcting or 
counteracting failures or malfunctions?
4.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources include systems that follow practices of 
redundancy, physical separation, functional isolation, and adequate independence of components?
5.      Does the country only operate nuclear power sources on space objects that are on interplanetary missions, in 
sufficiently high orbits, and in low-Earth orbits that are later stored in sufficiently high orbits after their mission 
operations?
6.      Does the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources only use highly enriched uranium 235 as fuel?
7.      Does the country only make critical its nuclear reactors once they have reached their operating orbit or 
interplanetary trajectory?
8.      Does the country design and constructs its satellites with nuclear power sources to ensure that they do not 
become critical before reaching their operating orbit or interplanetary trajectory?
9.      Does the country make available to remotely sensed states primary and processed data on the sensed state 
according to non-discriminatory and reasonable cost terms?
2.      Does the country’s remote sensing activities observe the principle of full and permanent sovereignty of all 
states over their own wealth and natural resources?
3.      Does the country allow for international cooperation and participation in its remote sensing activities?
4.      Does the country enter into agreements with other states for the establishment and operation of data collection 
and storage stations and processing and interpretation facilities?
5.      Does the country offer technical assistance on a regular basis to other states interested in conducting remote 
sensing activities?
6.      Does the country inform the United Nations of its remote sensing activities?
7.      Does the country disclose information to other states derived from remote sensing that could help avert harm 
to the Earth’s natural environment?
8.      Does the country disclose information to other states derived from processing and analysing remote sensing 
data that is useful to states affected, or likely to be affected, by natural disasters?
10.  Does the country only use radioisotope generators in space objects that are in interplanetary missions, or in 
missions in Earth orbit but which are later disposed of in high orbit?
11.  Does the country’s space object with radioisotope generators include containment systems that can withstand 
the heat and aerodynamic forces of re-entry, and which prevent the scattering of radioactive material in the 
environment?
12.  Does the country conduct a comprehensive safety assessment for all phases of a mission for a space object with 
a nuclear power source?
13.  Does the country indicate to the public and inform the United Nations of when it will launch a space object 
with a nuclear power source?
14.  Does the country provide timely and updated information on space objects with nuclear power sources that 
malfunction and which may re-enter?
15.  Does the country provide assistance to eliminate actual and possible harmful effects of re-entered space objects 
with nuclear power sources?
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B.2.4
Declaration on International Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the 
Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking 




Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
No = 0
Declaration Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 5
B.2.5
International cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
outer space: Some aspects concerning the use of 
the geostationary orbit
Score
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Resolution Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 3
B.2.6 Application of the concept of the “launching State” Score
Full implementation = 2
Partial implementation = 1 2
No implementation = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Full harmonization = 2
Partial harmonization = 1 1
No harmonization = 0
Resolution Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 5
B.2.7
Recommendations on enhancing the practice of 
States and international intergovernmental 
organizations in registering space objects
Score
All information = 1
Partial information = 0 2
No information = -1
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
All information = 2
Partial information = 1 2
No information = 0
Resolution Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 8
B.2.8
Recommendations on national legislation 




Some = 1 2
None = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
All procedures = 2
Some procedures = 1 2
No procedures = 0
2.      Does the country voluntarily provide information for the on-orbit transfer of ownership of space objects?
3.      Do the country’s space activities promote the development of space science and technology and its 
applications?
4.      Do the country’s space activities help develop relevant and appropriate capabilities in states interested in 
space?
1.      Does the country already having access to a geostationary orbit/spectrum take all practicable steps to enable a 
developing country, which wishes to use the same, to have equitable access to the requested orbit/spectrum?
2.      Does the country file satellite orbit and frequency requests according to International Telecommunications 
Union regulations?
1.      Does the country have in place national laws authorizing and providing for continuing supervision of non-
governmental entities operating in outer space?
5.      Do the country’s space activities facilitate the exchange of expertise and technology on a mutually acceptable 
basis?
2.      Does the country offer developing countries and countries with incipient space programmes opportunities to 
participate in advanced space activities?
1.      Does the country engage in equitable and mutually acceptable cooperation with other states according to fair 
and reasonable contractual terms?
1.      Does the country have a national framework that governs the launch of objects into and their return from 
outer space, the operation of launch or re-entry sites and the operation and control of space objects in orbit, design 
and manufacture of spacecraft, application of space science and technology, and exploration activities and 
research?
3.      Does the country have harmonized national space laws with international space laws?
1.      Does the country provide detailed information on its registered space objects to the United Nations, including: 
international designators, Coordinated Universal Time of launch date, kilometres and minutes and degrees of orbital 
parameters, geostationary orbit location (as applicable), change in status of operations, date decay or re-entry, date 
and condition of moving to a disposal orbit, and web links to space object information?
2.      Does the country from which the territory or facility a space object is launched jointly determine with other 
states or intergovernmental organisations which entity should register the space object?
3.      If participating in a joint launch, does the country register the space object separately from its joint launching 
state?
4.      If a space object changes supervision, does the country of registry provide to the United Nations detailed 
information, including date of change in supervision, identification of the new owner or operator, change in orbital 
position, and change of function?
2.      Does the country issue authorisations and ensure supervision over space activities carried out from its 
jurisdiction or elsewhere when carried out by its citizens or legally established persons?
3.      Does the country have a national authority that authorizes space activities, including procedures for granting, 
modifying, suspending, and revoking authorisations?
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Fully ensures = 2
Partially ensures = 1 1
Does not ensure = 0
Fully includes = 2
Partially includes = 1 2
Does not include = 0
Full recourse = 2
Partial recourse = 1 2
No recourse = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Recommendations Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 13
B.2.9 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Score
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Guidelines Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 14
B.2.10 Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space Score
All phases / not applicable = 2
Some phases = 1 2
No phases = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Repeatedly = 2
Once = 1 2
Never = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Framework Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 20
B.2.11
Voluntary guidelines for transparency and 
confidence-building, space code of conduct, and 
long-term sustainability of space
Score
3.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require spacecraft and launch vehicle 
orbital stages to have disposal and passivation measures in the case of failure?
4.      Does the country’s authorisation regime ensure the safe conduct and minimal risk to persons for space 
activities, including assessing the expertise and technical qualifications of space operators and requiring adherence 
to safety and technical standards in line with the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines?
5.      Does the country’s supervision and authorisation regime include on-site inspections or general reporting 
requirements?
6.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures offer recourse from operators or owners 
of space objects if the country’s liability is engaged in the case of damages, such as through the use of insurance 
requirements or indemnification procedures?
7.      Does the country’s supervision regime apply in case of transfer of ownership of space objects of non-
governmental entities?
1.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space systems to be designed to not 
release debris during normal operations?
2.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require spacecraft and launch vehicle 
orbital stages to be designed to avoid accidental break-ups?
6.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operators to include safety 
management to form part of overall space mission management?
4.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require spacecraft operators to follow 
collision avoidance procedures through adjustment of launch times and on-orbit avoidance manoeuvres?
5.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space objects to deplete or make 
safe their on-board sources of stored energy, including through passivation by removal of residual propellants, 
compressed fluids, and electrical storage devices?
6.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures limit the long-term presence of space 
objects in low-Earth orbit after their end of mission, including through controlled removal from orbit through re-
entry or in orbits beyond low-Earth orbit?
7.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures limit the long-term presence of space 
objects in geosynchronous Earth orbit after their end of mission, including through controlled removal to orbits 
beyond geosynchronous Earth orbit?
1.      Does the country have in place safety policies, requirements, and processes that protect people and the 
environment in Earth’s biosphere from potential hazards associated with relevant launch, operation, and end-of-
service phases of space nuclear power source applications?
2.      Does the country’s space activities authorisation regime verify the rationale and require justification for the 
use of space nuclear power source applications?
3.      Does the country’s space launch authorisation regime require an independent safety evaluation assessing the 
risk to people and the environment for launches, operations, and end-of-service phases for space nuclear power 
source applications?
4.      Does the country conduct emergency preparedness activities, including emergency planning, training, 
rehearsals and development of procedures and communication protocols, in preparation for radiation exposure to 
people and the environment as a result of space nuclear power applications?
5.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures identify space operators of space nuclear 
power source applications as the primary responsibility holders for operations of such applications?
7.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operations to have technical 
competence in nuclear safety, including qualified individuals and facilities for designing, testing, and analysing 
nuclear safety capabilities part of space missions?
8.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operators to integrate safety 
considerations from design to development to launch and operations and end-of-service for the entire space nuclear 
power source application?
9.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operators to conduct risk 
assessments on the launch, operation, and end-of-service phases of space nuclear power source applications?
10.  Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require mitigation measures for accidents 
of space nuclear power source applications with the potential to release radioactive material into the environment?
Individual recommendations included within these three separate sets of guidelines are not scored. However, if a country has implemented a majority of the individual 
recommendations contained within each set of guidelines in either its legal or administrative practice, it will be assessed a score of 2 per set of guidelines. Therefore, 
the following sets of guidelines for consideration are:




Guidelines Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 2
iii. Recommendations from the UNCOPUOS Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines
i. Recommendations from the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures
ii. Recommendations from the European Union's International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities
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Appendix II: 
Scoring for South Korea
A Aggregate Score
Binding International Law Score
(Enter total from last line of Table B.1)
Non-Binding International Law Score
Total 
Intermediate: 18.28 / 18.90
Intermediate: 12.4 / 20.40
Intermediate: 30.68 / 39.30(Sum binding and non-binding international law scores)
(Enter total from last line of Table B.2)
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B.1 Binding International Law Score
Space-specific International Treaties
(Use total from last line of Table B.1.1 and multiply by .50)
Space-related International Treaties
(Use total from last line of Table B.1.2 and multiply by .50)
Total 
(Sum space-specific and space-related treaties scores and then bring total to Table A)
B.1.1 Space-specific International Treaties Score
Yes, fully = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full affirmation = 2
Partial affirmation = 1 1
No affirmation = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 0
No affirmation = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Frequently = 2








Article III: Elements of this article are already captured in questions asked above, therefore no separate scoring is assessed. N/A
Repeatedly = 0








Always provided / not applicable = 2
Sometimes provided = 1 2
Never provided = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Yes = 2
Partial = 1 2
No = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 2
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Full account = 2
Partial account = 1 1
No account = 0
Full account = 2
Partial account = 1 2
No account = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Articles XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, and XVII: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 9
Yes, in full = 2
2.  Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (25 percent of section
score)
a. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
i.  Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures allow for, or encourage, the appropriation of outer space and celestial
bodies by claims of sovereignty, use, or occupation?
j.  Article II: Does the country, by its actions or the actions of those within its jurisdiction, appropriate, or encourage the appropriation of, outer space 
and celestial bodies and resources by claims of sovereignty, use, or occupation?
k.  Article IV: Has the country placed into orbit or installed on celestial bodies weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons?
l.  Article IV: Has the country established bases, installations, or fortifications, or tested weapons or conducted military manoeuvres on celestial
bodies?
y.  Article XII: Does the country allow access and visits to its outer space stations, installations, equipment, and vehicles, provided reasonable 
notification of a such visit is given by the visiting representatives?
n.  Article V: Has the country either provided assistance or rejected assistance to astronauts of other countries who are in distress?
o.  Article V: Does the country proactively inform the United Nations and other countries regarding potentially dangerous phenomena to astronauts?
p. Article VI: Does the country have in place an authorisation and supervision regime for space activities conducted by non-governmental entities?
q. Article VII: Does the country recognise its liability as a launching state in its laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
r. Article VII: Has the country denied its liability as a launching state for damage caused?
s. Article VIII: Does the country maintain an updated national registry of launched space objects?
t. Article VIII: Has the country ever returned a space object belonging to another country, but which landed in its jurisdiction?
u.  Article IX: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures account for avoiding harmful contamination, including debris, of the 
space environment?
v.  Article IX: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures seek to limit damage to the Earth environment by extraterrestrial
material?
w. Article X: Does the country allow other countries to observe the flight of space objects that it launches?
x.  Article XI: Does the country inform the United Nations and other countries of its space activities, including the nature, conduct, location, and results
of the activities?
d.  Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures affirm that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out
for the benefit and interests of all countries?
e. Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise outer space as the province of all mankind?
f. Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise that outer space should be free for exploration without
discrimination and with free access to celestial bodies?
g.  Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise the freedom of scientific investigation in outer space?
h.  Article I: Does the country facilitate and participate in international scientific investigation?
Intermediate: 12.38 / 13.0
Intermediate: 5.90 / 5.90
Intermediate: 18.28 / 18.90
a. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
1.  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(25 percent of section score)
m.  Article IV: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures allow for the conduct of such types of activities as described in 
Question ‘l’ above?
b. Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c. Article I: Do country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise the role of international law?
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Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 6
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Article I provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, therefore no scoring is assessed. 
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full account = 2
Partial account = 1 2
No account = 0
Articles VI and VII sets forth conditions under which other articles apply and is not actionable by states, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Full provision = 2
Partial provision = 1 2
No provision = 0
Article IX, X, XI, XII, and XIII prescribe the administrative details through which claims and compensation should be processed, therefore no
scoring is assessed.
Articles XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, and XVIII prescribe the administrative details through which a Claims Commission should be established and
make adjudications in the case of no settlements through diplomatic channels established elsewhere in the treaty, therefore no scoring is
assessed.
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Article XX prescribes the process through which the expenses associated with the Claims Commission should be borne by state participants,
therefore no scoring is assessed. 
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Articles XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 7
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
h.      Article IV: Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its joint and several liability apportioned according to fault 
with a second-party launching state if its space object caused damage to the second-party launching state’s space object, which then resulted in damage to 
a third state’s space object, person, or property in space?
i.        Article IV: Has the country refused to pay compensation according to its fault in cases of joint and several liability for damage caused to a third-
party state?
j.        Article V: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise joint and several liability in cases when it and another state 
jointly launch a space object?
k.      Article V: Do country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures account for its roles a joint launch participant if a space object is launched 
from its territory or facility?
l.        Article VIII: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures provide for a claims and compensation process for damage which it 
may suffer by other launching states?
m.    Article XIX: Has the country refused or failed to pay compensation or an award decided by a Claims Commission as set forth in other treaty articles?
n.      Article XXI: Has the country rendered appropriate and rapid assistance in cases when a space object presents large-scale danger to human life or 
interferes with a population’s living conditions or functioning of a vital centre?
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
4.      Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
g.      Article IV: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its absolute joint and several liability with a second-party 
launching state if its space object caused damage to the second-party launching state’s space object, which then resulted in damage on the Earth’s surface 
or aircraft in flight of a third state?
j.        Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space object landed returned the space object or its parts and provided their identifying data to the 
launching state?
k.      Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space object landed eliminated the possibility of its danger if it is found to be hazardous or 
deleterious?
l.        Article 5: Has the launching state paid for expenses related to the recovery and return of space object or its part incurred by the country in which the 
space object landed?
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c.       Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its liability to pay compensation for damage caused by its 
space objects on the Earth’s surface or aircraft in flight?
d.      Article II: Has the country refused to pay compensation in practice for damage caused by its space objects on the Earth's surface or aircraft in flight?
e.       Article III: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its liability owing to its fault or fault of persons for which it 
is responsible in the case of damage to another space object, persons, or property in space of another launching state?
f.        Article III: Has the country refused to accept liability in the case of damage to another space object, persons, or property in space of another 
launching state caused by its fault or fault of persons for which it is responsible?
i.        Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space object landed practicably assisted to recover the object or its parts?
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c.       Article 1: Has the country notified the launching state(s) of astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made emergency landings?
d.      Article 1: Has the country notified the United Nations of astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made emergency landings?
e.       Article 2: Has the country taken all possible steps to rescue and render all necessary assistance to astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in 
distress, or made emergency landings?
f.        Article 3: Has the country provided assistance in search and rescue operations for astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made 
emergency landings?
g.      Article 4: Has the country safely and promptly returned to their launching states astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made 
emergency landings?
h.      Article 5: Has the country notified the launching state and United Nations of a space object or part of a space object that has returned to Earth?
3.      Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
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Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Article I provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Article III describes actions to be taken by the United Nations rather than a specific country, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Full information / not applicable= 2
Partial information = 1 1
No information = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Article V describes a procedural administrative action, therefore no scoring is assessed. 
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Articles VII, VIII, IX, X, and XII: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 2.75
Total (Sum the above treaty score and bring total to Table B.1) 24.75
B.1.2 Space-related International Treaties Score
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Full prohibition = 2
Partial prohibition = 1 2
No prohibition = 0
Repeatedly = 0
Once = 1 2
Never = 2
Articles II, III, IV, and V: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
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Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Article 1 provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 2
Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 describe the conditions in which Article 2 applies, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
8
c.      Institution-related treaties
0.6
11.8
v. Agreement on Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes (INTERCOSMOS)
vi. Convention on the International Mobile Satellite Organization
vii. Convention Establishing the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT)
viii. Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT)
ix. International Telecommunication Constitution and Convention
iv. Agreement of the Arab Corporation for Space Communications (ARABSAT)
ii. Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
iii. Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures prevent the distribution on or from its territory programme-carrying
signals by distributors for whom the emitted signal to or passing through the satellite is not intended?
iv. Article II: Has the country, by its actions or the actions of those within its jurisdiction, allowed for the distribution on or from its territory programme-
carrying signals by distributors for whom the emitted signal to or passing through the satellite is not intended?
i. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO)
ii. Agreement on the Establishment of the INTERSPUTNIK International System and Organization of Space Communications
iii. Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (ESA)
i. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
e.       Article IV: Does the country update the United Nations on space objects for which it previously shared information, but which are no longer in Earth 
orbit?
f.        Article VI: Does the country assist with providing identifying information it has gained through space monitoring and tracking facilities for space 
objects that are unidentifiable and which are of a hazardous or deleterious nature?
i. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
ii. Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
iii. Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures prohibit, prevent, and forbid the carrying out of nuclear weapon tests at
places under its jurisdiction or control, including in the atmosphere and outer space and underwater?
iv. Article I: Since implementing the treaty, has the country carried out a nuclear weapon test at a place under its jurisdiction or control, including in the
atmosphere and outer space and underwater?
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores)
d.      Article IV: Does the country provide detailed information to the United Nations for its launched space objects, including name of the country, space 
object registration number, date and territory of launch, basic orbital parameters, and general function of the space object?
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c.       Article II: Does the country maintain an updated national registry of launched space objects that it launches and that it launches jointly with other 
launching states?
Total (Sum the treaty scores from (a) and (b) and multiply by .70 and then sum with © score; bring total to Table B.1)
Individual treaties within this subsection are not scored as they are institution-specific and in some cases outdated and therefore irrelevant. However, collectively if a country ratified or acceded to at least two of these 
treaties, it will be assessed a score of 2 to demonstrate its participation and cooperation in international legal instruments and organisations related to space, a key principle promoted in international space law 
documents. Therefore, the following treaties for consideration are: 
a.       Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
b.      Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores)
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B.2
(a) Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
Broadcasting
 (Enter total from Table B.2.1 and multiply by .10)
(b) Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.2 and multiply by .10)
(c) Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.3 and multiply by .10)
(d) Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the 
Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries
(Enter total from Table B.2.4 and multiply by .10)
(e) International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space: Some aspects concerning the use of the 
geostationary orbit
(Enter total from Table B.2.5 and multiply by .10)
(f) Application of the concept of the “launching State”
(Enter total from Table B.2.6 and multiply by .10)
(g) Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international intergovernmental organizations in 
registering space objects
(Enter total from Table B.2.7 and multiply by .10)
(h) Recommendations on national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space
(Enter total from Table B.2.8 and multiply by .10)
(i) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.9 and multiply by .10)
(j) Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.10 and multiply by .10)
(k) Voluntary guidelines for transparency and confidence-building, space code of conduct, and long-term 
sustainability of space
(Enter total from Table B.2.11)
Total
(Sum scores from above and bring total to Table A)
B.2.1
Principles Governing the Use by States of 
Artificial Earth Satellites for International 
Direct Television Broadcasting
Score
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 0
Never = 0
Full implementation = 2
Partial implementation = 1 2
No implementation = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Principles Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 15
B.2.2 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space Score
Always= 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
8.      Does the country notify the United Nations of satellite direct television broadcasting?
9.      Does the country notify and consult the receiving state of a satellite direct television signal of its intent to 
broadcast?
1.      Does the country carry out remote sensing activities for the benefit and in the interests of all countries?
Intermediate: 2.0 / 2.0
Intermediate: 0 / 6
Intermediate: 12.4 / 20.4
1.      Are the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities respectful of state sovereignty, and do they 
follow the principle of non-intervention?
6.      Does the country consult with other states regarding broadcasting or receiving of satellite direct television 
broadcasting for purposes of coordinating the same service?
Intermediate: 0.3 / 0.4
Intermediate: 0.6 / 0.6
Intermediate: 0.8 / 0.8
Intermediate: 1.30 / 1.40
Intermediate: 0.7 / 1.40
Non-Binding International Law Score
Intermediate: 1.50 / 1.80
Intermediate: 1.20 / 1.80
Intermediate: 3.0 / 3.0
Intermediate: 1.0 / 1.0
2.      Do the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities promote the free dissemination and 
exchange of information and knowledge in cultural and scientific fields?
3.      Does the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities assist in education and social and 
economic development?
4.      Are the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities carried out on a friendly and cooperative 
basis with other countries?
5.      Does the country have in a place an authorisation system through its laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures for the conduct of satellite direct television activities?
7.      Does the country participate in agreements with other states for the protection of copyright and similar rights?
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Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
No = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Principles Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 12
B.2.3 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space Score
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable= 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable= 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Principles Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 30
10.  Does the country only use radioisotope generators in space objects that are in interplanetary missions, or in 
missions in Earth orbit but which are later disposed of in high orbit?
11.  Does the country’s space object with radioisotope generators include containment systems that can withstand 
the heat and aerodynamic forces of re-entry, and which prevent the scattering of radioactive material in the 
environment?
12.  Does the country conduct a comprehensive safety assessment for all phases of a mission for a space object with 
a nuclear power source?
13.  Does the country indicate to the public and inform the United Nations of when it will launch a space object 
with a nuclear power source?
14.  Does the country provide timely and updated information on space objects with nuclear power sources that 
malfunction and which may re-enter?
15.  Does the country provide assistance to eliminate actual and possible harmful effects of re-entered space objects 
with nuclear power sources?
5.      Does the country offer technical assistance on a regular basis to other states interested in conducting remote 
sensing activities?
6.      Does the country inform the United Nations of its remote sensing activities?
7.      Does the country disclose information to other states derived from remote sensing that could help avert harm 
to the Earth’s natural environment?
8.      Does the country disclose information to other states derived from processing and analysing remote sensing 
data that is useful to states affected, or likely to be affected, by natural disasters?
2.      Does the country’s remote sensing activities observe the principle of full and permanent sovereignty of all 
states over their own wealth and natural resources?
3.      Does the country allow for international cooperation and participation in its remote sensing activities?
4.      Does the country enter into agreements with other states for the establishment and operation of data collection 
and storage stations and processing and interpretation facilities?
9.      Does the country’s space objects with nuclear reactors include an effective and controlled disposal of the 
nuclear reactor for those in an operational orbit less than sufficiently high?
10.  Does the country allow for opportunities for a remotely sensed state to participate and benefit from activities 
that remotely sense it, including but not limited to access to remotely sensed data and participation in remote 
sensing activities ?
1.      Does the country design and use space objects with nuclear power sources with high degrees of confidence to 
avoid hazardous levels associated with operational or accidental circumstances?
2.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources follow design and construction that take into 
account generally accepted international radiological protection guidelines?
3.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources possess the capability of correcting or 
counteracting failures or malfunctions?
4.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources include systems that follow practices of 
redundancy, physical separation, functional isolation, and adequate independence of components?
5.      Does the country only operate nuclear power sources on space objects that are on interplanetary missions, in 
sufficiently high orbits, and in low-Earth orbits that are later stored in sufficiently high orbits after their mission 
operations?
6.      Does the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources only use highly enriched uranium 235 as fuel?
7.      Does the country only make critical its nuclear reactors once they have reached their operating orbit or 
interplanetary trajectory?
8.      Does the country design and constructs its satellites with nuclear power sources to ensure that they do not 
become critical before reaching their operating orbit or interplanetary trajectory?
9.      Does the country make available to remotely sensed states primary and processed data on the sensed state 
according to non-discriminatory and reasonable cost terms?
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B.2.4
Declaration on International Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the 
Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking 




Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Declaration Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 10
B.2.5
International cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
outer space: Some aspects concerning the use of 
the geostationary orbit
Score
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Resolution Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 3
B.2.6 Application of the concept of the “launching State” Score
Full implementation = 2
Partial implementation = 1 2
No implementation = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Full harmonization = 2
Partial harmonization = 1 2
No harmonization = 0
Resolution Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 6
B.2.7
Recommendations on enhancing the practice of 
States and international intergovernmental 
organizations in registering space objects
Score
All information = 1
Partial information = 0 2
No information = -1
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
All information = 2
Partial information = 1 2
No information = 0
Resolution Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 8
B.2.8
Recommendations on national legislation 




Some = 1 2
None = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
All procedures = 2
Some procedures = 1 2
No procedures = 0
2.      Does the country issue authorisations and ensure supervision over space activities carried out from its 
jurisdiction or elsewhere when carried out by its citizens or legally established persons?
3.      Does the country have a national authority that authorizes space activities, including procedures for granting, 
modifying, suspending, and revoking authorisations?
1.      Does the country have a national framework that governs the launch of objects into and their return from 
outer space, the operation of launch or re-entry sites and the operation and control of space objects in orbit, design 
and manufacture of spacecraft, application of space science and technology, and exploration activities and 
research?
3.      Does the country have harmonized national space laws with international space laws?
1.      Does the country provide detailed information on its registered space objects to the United Nations, including: 
international designators, Coordinated Universal Time of launch date, kilometres and minutes and degrees of orbital 
parameters, geostationary orbit location (as applicable), change in status of operations, date decay or re-entry, date 
and condition of moving to a disposal orbit, and web links to space object information?
2.      Does the country from which the territory or facility a space object is launched jointly determine with other 
states or intergovernmental organisations which entity should register the space object?
3.      If participating in a joint launch, does the country register the space object separately from its joint launching 
state?
4.      If a space object changes supervision, does the country of registry provide to the United Nations detailed 
information, including date of change in supervision, identification of the new owner or operator, change in orbital 
position, and change of function?
2.      Does the country voluntarily provide information for the on-orbit transfer of ownership of space objects?
3.      Do the country’s space activities promote the development of space science and technology and its 
applications?
4.      Do the country’s space activities help develop relevant and appropriate capabilities in states interested in 
space?
1.      Does the country already having access to a geostationary orbit/spectrum take all practicable steps to enable a 
developing country, which wishes to use the same, to have equitable access to the requested orbit/spectrum?
2.      Does the country file satellite orbit and frequency requests according to International Telecommunications 
Union regulations?
1.      Does the country have in place national laws authorizing and providing for continuing supervision of non-
governmental entities operating in outer space?
5.      Do the country’s space activities facilitate the exchange of expertise and technology on a mutually acceptable 
basis?
2.      Does the country offer developing countries and countries with incipient space programmes opportunities to 
participate in advanced space activities?
1.      Does the country engage in equitable and mutually acceptable cooperation with other states according to fair 
and reasonable contractual terms?
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Fully ensures = 2
Partially ensures = 1 1
Does not ensure = 0
Fully includes = 2
Partially includes = 1 2
Does not include = 0
Full recourse = 2
Partial recourse = 1 2
No recourse = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Recommendations Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 13
B.2.9 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Score
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Guidelines Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 7
B.2.10 Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space Score
All phases / not applicable = 2
Some phases = 1 2
No phases = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Repeatedly = 2
Once = 1 2
Never = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Framework Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 20
B.2.11
Voluntary guidelines for transparency and 
confidence-building, space code of conduct, and 
long-term sustainability of space
Score
7.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operations to have technical 
competence in nuclear safety, including qualified individuals and facilities for designing, testing, and analysing 
nuclear safety capabilities part of space missions?
8.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operators to integrate safety 
considerations from design to development to launch and operations and end-of-service for the entire space nuclear 
power source application?
9.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operators to conduct risk 
assessments on the launch, operation, and end-of-service phases of space nuclear power source applications?
10.  Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require mitigation measures for accidents 
of space nuclear power source applications with the potential to release radioactive material into the environment?
Individual recommendations included within these three separate sets of guidelines are not scored. However, if a country has implemented a majority of the individual 
recommendations contained within each set of guidelines in either its legal or administrative practice, it will be assessed a score of 2 per set of guidelines. Therefore, 
the following sets of guidelines for consideration are:
6.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operators to include safety 
management to form part of overall space mission management?
4.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require spacecraft operators to follow 
collision avoidance procedures through adjustment of launch times and on-orbit avoidance manoeuvres?
5.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space objects to deplete or make 
safe their on-board sources of stored energy, including through passivation by removal of residual propellants, 
compressed fluids, and electrical storage devices?
6.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures limit the long-term presence of space 
objects in low-Earth orbit after their end of mission, including through controlled removal from orbit through re-
entry or in orbits beyond low-Earth orbit?
7.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures limit the long-term presence of space 
objects in geosynchronous Earth orbit after their end of mission, including through controlled removal to orbits 
beyond geosynchronous Earth orbit?
1.      Does the country have in place safety policies, requirements, and processes that protect people and the 
environment in Earth’s biosphere from potential hazards associated with relevant launch, operation, and end-of-
service phases of space nuclear power source applications?
2.      Does the country’s space activities authorisation regime verify the rationale and require justification for the 
use of space nuclear power source applications?
3.      Does the country’s space launch authorisation regime require an independent safety evaluation assessing the 
risk to people and the environment for launches, operations, and end-of-service phases for space nuclear power 
source applications?
4.      Does the country conduct emergency preparedness activities, including emergency planning, training, 
rehearsals and development of procedures and communication protocols, in preparation for radiation exposure to 
people and the environment as a result of space nuclear power applications?
5.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures identify space operators of space nuclear 
power source applications as the primary responsibility holders for operations of such applications?
3.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require spacecraft and launch vehicle 
orbital stages to have disposal and passivation measures in the case of failure?
4.      Does the country’s authorisation regime ensure the safe conduct and minimal risk to persons for space 
activities, including assessing the expertise and technical qualifications of space operators and requiring adherence 
to safety and technical standards in line with the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines?
5.      Does the country’s supervision and authorisation regime include on-site inspections or general reporting 
requirements?
6.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures offer recourse from operators or owners 
of space objects if the country’s liability is engaged in the case of damages, such as through the use of insurance 
requirements or indemnification procedures?
7.      Does the country’s supervision regime apply in case of transfer of ownership of space objects of non-
governmental entities?
1.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space systems to be designed to not 
release debris during normal operations?
2.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require spacecraft and launch vehicle 
orbital stages to be designed to avoid accidental break-ups?




Guidelines Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 0
iii. Recommendations from the UNCOPUOS Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines
i. Recommendations from the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures
ii. Recommendations from the European Union's International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities
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Appendix III: 
Scoring for South Africa
A Aggregate Score
Binding International Law Score
(Enter total from last line of Table B.1)
Non-Binding International Law Score
Total 
Emerging: 12.98 / 16.90
Emerging: 6.40 / 13.80
Emerging: 19.38 / 30.70(Sum binding and non-binding international law scores)
(Enter total from last line of Table B.2)
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B.1 Binding International Law Score
Space-specific International Treaties
(Use total from last line of Table B.1.1 and multiply by .50)
Space-related International Treaties
(Use total from last line of Table B.1.2 and multiply by .50)
Total 
(Sum space-specific and space-related treaties scores and then bring total to Table A)
B.1.1 Space-specific International Treaties Score
Yes, fully = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full affirmation = 2
Partial affirmation = 1 2
No affirmation = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 0
No affirmation = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Frequently = 2


















Always provided / not applicable = 2
Sometimes provided = 1 2





Partial = 1 2
No = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1





Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Full account = 2
Partial account = 1
No account = 0
Full account = 2
Partial account = 1





Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Articles XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, and XVII: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 5.5
Yes, in full = 2
2.  Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (25 percent of section
score)
a. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
i.  Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures allow for, or encourage, the appropriation of outer space and celestial
bodies by claims of sovereignty, use, or occupation?
j.  Article II: Does the country, by its actions or the actions of those within its jurisdiction, appropriate, or encourage the appropriation of, outer space 
and celestial bodies and resources by claims of sovereignty, use, or occupation?
k.  Article IV: Has the country placed into orbit or installed on celestial bodies weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons?
l.  Article IV: Has the country established bases, installations, or fortifications, or tested weapons or conducted military manoeuvres on celestial
bodies?
y.  Article XII: Does the country allow access and visits to its outer space stations, installations, equipment, and vehicles, provided reasonable 
notification of a such visit is given by the visiting representatives?
n.  Article V: Has the country either provided assistance or rejected assistance to astronauts of other countries who are in distress?
o.  Article V: Does the country proactively inform the United Nations and other countries regarding potentially dangerous phenomena to astronauts?
p. Article VI: Does the country have in place an authorisation and supervision regime for space activities conducted by non-governmental entities?
q. Article VII: Does the country recognise its liability as a launching state in its laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
r. Article VII: Has the country denied its liability as a launching state for damage caused?
s. Article VIII: Does the country maintain an updated national registry of launched space objects?
t. Article VIII: Has the country ever returned a space object belonging to another country, but which landed in its jurisdiction?
u.  Article IX: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures account for avoiding harmful contamination, including debris, of the 
space environment?
v.  Article IX: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures seek to limit damage to the Earth environment by extraterrestrial
material?
w. Article X: Does the country allow other countries to observe the flight of space objects that it launches?
x.  Article XI: Does the country inform the United Nations and other countries of its space activities, including the nature, conduct, location, and results
of the activities?
d.  Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures affirm that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out
for the benefit and interests of all countries?
e. Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise outer space as the province of all mankind?
f. Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise that outer space should be free for exploration without
discrimination and with free access to celestial bodies?
g.  Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise the freedom of scientific investigation in outer space?
h.  Article I: Does the country facilitate and participate in international scientific investigation?
Emerging: 9.88 / 11.0
Emerging: 3.10 / 5.90 
Emerging: 12.98 / 16.90
a. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
1.  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(25 percent of section score)
m.  Article IV: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures allow for the conduct of such types of activities as described in 
Question ‘l’ above?
b. Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c. Article I: Do country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise the role of international law?
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Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 0
No domestication = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
No = 0
Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 5
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Article I provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, therefore no scoring is assessed. 
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1 2
No recognition = 0
Full account = 2
Partial account = 1 2
No account = 0
Articles VI and VII sets forth conditions under which other articles apply and is not actionable by states, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Full provision = 2
Partial provision = 1 2
No provision = 0
Article IX, X, XI, XII, and XIII prescribe the administrative details through which claims and compensation should be processed, therefore no
scoring is assessed.
Articles XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, and XVIII prescribe the administrative details through which a Claims Commission should be established and
make adjudications in the case of no settlements through diplomatic channels established elsewhere in the treaty, therefore no scoring is
assessed.
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 2
Never / not applicable = 2
Article XX prescribes the process through which the expenses associated with the Claims Commission should be borne by state participants,
therefore no scoring is assessed. 
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Articles XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 7
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
h.      Article IV: Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its joint and several liability apportioned according to fault 
with a second-party launching state if its space object caused damage to the second-party launching state’s space object, which then resulted in damage to 
a third state’s space object, person, or property in space?
i.        Article IV: Has the country refused to pay compensation according to its fault in cases of joint and several liability for damage caused to a third-
party state?
j.        Article V: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise joint and several liability in cases when it and another state 
jointly launch a space object?
k.      Article V: Do country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures account for its roles a joint launch participant if a space object is launched 
from its territory or facility?
l.        Article VIII: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures provide for a claims and compensation process for damage which it 
may suffer by other launching states?
m.    Article XIX: Has the country refused or failed to pay compensation or an award decided by a Claims Commission as set forth in other treaty articles?
n.      Article XXI: Has the country rendered appropriate and rapid assistance in cases when a space object presents large-scale danger to human life or 
interferes with a population’s living conditions or functioning of a vital centre?
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
4.      Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
g.      Article IV: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its absolute joint and several liability with a second-party 
launching state if its space object caused damage to the second-party launching state’s space object, which then resulted in damage on the Earth’s surface 
or aircraft in flight of a third state?
j.        Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space object landed returned the space object or its parts and provided their identifying data to the 
launching state?
k.      Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space object landed eliminated the possibility of its danger if it is found to be hazardous or 
deleterious?
l.        Article 5: Has the launching state paid for expenses related to the recovery and return of space object or its part incurred by the country in which the 
space object landed?
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c.       Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its liability to pay compensation for damage caused by its 
space objects on the Earth’s surface or aircraft in flight?
d.      Article II: Has the country refused to pay compensation in practice for damage caused by its space objects on the Earth's surface or aircraft in flight?
e.       Article III: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures recognise its liability owing to its fault or fault of persons for which it 
is responsible in the case of damage to another space object, persons, or property in space of another launching state?
f.        Article III: Has the country refused to accept liability in the case of damage to another space object, persons, or property in space of another 
launching state caused by its fault or fault of persons for which it is responsible?
i.        Article 5: Has the country in which the returning space object landed practicably assisted to recover the object or its parts?
a.       Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c.       Article 1: Has the country notified the launching state(s) of astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made emergency landings?
d.      Article 1: Has the country notified the United Nations of astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made emergency landings?
e.       Article 2: Has the country taken all possible steps to rescue and render all necessary assistance to astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in 
distress, or made emergency landings?
f.        Article 3: Has the country provided assistance in search and rescue operations for astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made 
emergency landings?
g.      Article 4: Has the country safely and promptly returned to their launching states astronauts who have suffered accidents, been in distress, or made 
emergency landings?
h.      Article 5: Has the country notified the launching state and United Nations of a space object or part of a space object that has returned to Earth?
3.      Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
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Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Article I provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Article III describes actions to be taken by the United Nations rather than a specific country, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Full information / not applicable= 2
Partial information = 1 1
No information = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Article V describes a procedural administrative action, therefore no scoring is assessed. 
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Articles VII, VIII, IX, X, and XII: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores and multiply by .25) 2.25
Total (Sum the above treaty score and bring total to Table B.1) 19.75
B.1.2 Space-related International Treaties Score
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 2
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 2
No domestication = 0
Full prohibition = 2
Partial prohibition = 1 2
No prohibition = 0
Repeatedly = 0
Once = 1 2
Never = 2
Articles II, III, IV, and V: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
8
Yes, in full = 2
Yes, with reservations = 1 0
No = 0
Full domestication = 2
Partial domestication = 1 0
No domestication = 0
Article 1 provides for definitions of terms used in the treaty, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 0
Never = 0
Always = 0
Sometimes = 1 0
Never = 2
Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 describe the conditions in which Article 2 applies, therefore no scoring is assessed.
Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12: These are administrative articles, therefore no scoring is assessed.
0
c.      Institution-related treaties
0.6
6.2
v. Agreement on Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes (INTERCOSMOS)
vi. Convention on the International Mobile Satellite Organization
vii. Convention Establishing the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT)
viii. Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT)
ix. International Telecommunication Constitution and Convention
iv. Agreement of the Arab Corporation for Space Communications (ARABSAT)
ii. Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
iii. Article II: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures prevent the distribution on or from its territory programme-carrying
signals by distributors for whom the emitted signal to or passing through the satellite is not intended?
iv. Article II: Has the country, by its actions or the actions of those within its jurisdiction, allowed for the distribution on or from its territory programme-
carrying signals by distributors for whom the emitted signal to or passing through the satellite is not intended?
i. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO)
ii. Agreement on the Establishment of the INTERSPUTNIK International System and Organization of Space Communications
iii. Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (ESA)
i. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
e.       Article IV: Does the country update the United Nations on space objects for which it previously shared information, but which are no longer in Earth 
orbit?
f.        Article VI: Does the country assist with providing identifying information it has gained through space monitoring and tracking facilities for space 
objects that are unidentifiable and which are of a hazardous or deleterious nature?
i. Has the country ratified or acceded to this treaty?
ii. Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
iii. Article I: Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures prohibit, prevent, and forbid the carrying out of nuclear weapon tests at
places under its jurisdiction or control, including in the atmosphere and outer space and underwater?
iv. Article I: Since implementing the treaty, has the country carried out a nuclear weapon test at a place under its jurisdiction or control, including in the
atmosphere and outer space and underwater?
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores)
d.      Article IV: Does the country provide detailed information to the United Nations for its launched space objects, including name of the country, space 
object registration number, date and territory of launch, basic orbital parameters, and general function of the space object?
b.      Is the treaty domesticated in national laws or administrative regulations or procedures?
c.       Article II: Does the country maintain an updated national registry of launched space objects that it launches and that it launches jointly with other 
launching states?
Total (Sum the treaty scores from (a) and (b) and multiply by .70 and then sum with © score; bring total to Table B.1)
Individual treaties within this subsection are not scored as they are institution-specific and in some cases outdated and therefore irrelevant. However, collectively if a country ratified or acceded to at least two of these 
treaties, it will be assessed a score of 2 to demonstrate its participation and cooperation in international legal instruments and organisations related to space, a key principle promoted in international space law 
documents. Therefore, the following treaties for consideration are: 
a.       Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
b.      Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite
Treaty Score (Sum the above scores)
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B.2
(a) Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
Broadcasting
 (Enter total from Table B.2.1 and multiply by .10)
(b) Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.2 and multiply by .10)
(c) Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.3 and multiply by .10)
(d) Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the 
Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries
(Enter total from Table B.2.4 and multiply by .10)
(e) International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space: Some aspects concerning the use of the 
geostationary orbit
(Enter total from Table B.2.5 and multiply by .10)
(f) Application of the concept of the “launching State”
(Enter total from Table B.2.6 and multiply by .10)
(g) Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international intergovernmental organizations in 
registering space objects
(Enter total from Table B.2.7 and multiply by .10)
(h) Recommendations on national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space
(Enter total from Table B.2.8 and multiply by .10)
(i) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.9 and multiply by .10)
(j) Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space
(Enter total from Table B.2.10 and multiply by .10)
(k) Voluntary guidelines for transparency and confidence-building, space code of conduct, and long-term 
sustainability of space
(Enter total from Table B.2.11)
Total
(Sum scores from above and bring total to Table A)
B.2.1
Principles Governing the Use by States of 
Artificial Earth Satellites for International 
Direct Television Broadcasting
Score
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 0
Never = 0
Full implementation = 2
Partial implementation = 1 2
No implementation = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Principles Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 16
B.2.2 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space Score
Always= 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
8.      Does the country notify the United Nations of satellite direct television broadcasting?
9.      Does the country notify and consult the receiving state of a satellite direct television signal of its intent to 
broadcast?
1.      Does the country carry out remote sensing activities for the benefit and in the interests of all countries?
Emerging:0.0 / 0.0
Emerging: 0 / 6
Emerging: 6.4 / 13.8
1.      Are the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities respectful of state sovereignty, and do they 
follow the principle of non-intervention?
6.      Does the country consult with other states regarding broadcasting or receiving of satellite direct television 
broadcasting for purposes of coordinating the same service?
Emerging: 0.4 /0.4
Emerging: 0.6 / 0.6
Emerging: 0.3 / 0.4
Emerging: 1.10 / 1.20
Emerging: 0.7 / 1.40
Non-Binding International Law Score
Emerging: 1.60 / 1.80
Emerging: 1.70 / 1.80
Emerging: 0.0 / 0.0
Emerging: 0.0 / 0.0
2.      Do the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities promote the free dissemination and 
exchange of information and knowledge in cultural and scientific fields?
3.      Does the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities assist in education and social and 
economic development?
4.      Are the country’s satellite direct television broadcasting activities carried out on a friendly and cooperative 
basis with other countries?
5.      Does the country have in a place an authorisation system through its laws or administrative regulations or 
procedures for the conduct of satellite direct television activities?
7.      Does the country participate in agreements with other states for the protection of copyright and similar rights?
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Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
No = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Principles Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 17
B.2.3 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space Score
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable= 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable= 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Principles Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 0
10.  Does the country only use radioisotope generators in space objects that are in interplanetary missions, or in 
missions in Earth orbit but which are later disposed of in high orbit?
11.  Does the country’s space object with radioisotope generators include containment systems that can withstand 
the heat and aerodynamic forces of re-entry, and which prevent the scattering of radioactive material in the 
environment?
12.  Does the country conduct a comprehensive safety assessment for all phases of a mission for a space object with 
a nuclear power source?
13.  Does the country indicate to the public and inform the United Nations of when it will launch a space object 
with a nuclear power source?
14.  Does the country provide timely and updated information on space objects with nuclear power sources that 
malfunction and which may re-enter?
15.  Does the country provide assistance to eliminate actual and possible harmful effects of re-entered space objects 
with nuclear power sources?
5.      Does the country offer technical assistance on a regular basis to other states interested in conducting remote 
sensing activities?
6.      Does the country inform the United Nations of its remote sensing activities?
7.      Does the country disclose information to other states derived from remote sensing that could help avert harm 
to the Earth’s natural environment?
8.      Does the country disclose information to other states derived from processing and analysing remote sensing 
data that is useful to states affected, or likely to be affected, by natural disasters?
2.      Does the country’s remote sensing activities observe the principle of full and permanent sovereignty of all 
states over their own wealth and natural resources?
3.      Does the country allow for international cooperation and participation in its remote sensing activities?
4.      Does the country enter into agreements with other states for the establishment and operation of data collection 
and storage stations and processing and interpretation facilities?
9.      Does the country’s space objects with nuclear reactors include an effective and controlled disposal of the 
nuclear reactor for those in an operational orbit less than sufficiently high?
10.  Does the country allow for opportunities for a remotely sensed state to participate and benefit from activities 
that remotely sense it, including but not limited to access to remotely sensed data and participation in remote 
sensing activities ?
1.      Does the country design and use space objects with nuclear power sources with high degrees of confidence to 
avoid hazardous levels associated with operational or accidental circumstances?
2.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources follow design and construction that take into 
account generally accepted international radiological protection guidelines?
3.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources possess the capability of correcting or 
counteracting failures or malfunctions?
4.      Do the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources include systems that follow practices of 
redundancy, physical separation, functional isolation, and adequate independence of components?
5.      Does the country only operate nuclear power sources on space objects that are on interplanetary missions, in 
sufficiently high orbits, and in low-Earth orbits that are later stored in sufficiently high orbits after their mission 
operations?
6.      Does the country’s space objects with nuclear power sources only use highly enriched uranium 235 as fuel?
7.      Does the country only make critical its nuclear reactors once they have reached their operating orbit or 
interplanetary trajectory?
8.      Does the country design and constructs its satellites with nuclear power sources to ensure that they do not 
become critical before reaching their operating orbit or interplanetary trajectory?
9.      Does the country make available to remotely sensed states primary and processed data on the sensed state 
according to non-discriminatory and reasonable cost terms?
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B.2.4
Declaration on International Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the 
Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking 


















Declaration Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 0
B.2.5
International cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
outer space: Some aspects concerning the use of 
the geostationary orbit
Score
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Resolution Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 4
B.2.6 Application of the concept of the “launching State” Score
Full implementation = 2
Partial implementation = 1 2
No implementation = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Full harmonization = 2
Partial harmonization = 1 2
No harmonization = 0
Resolution Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 6
B.2.7
Recommendations on enhancing the practice of 
States and international intergovernmental 
organizations in registering space objects
Score
All information = 1
Partial information = 0
No information = -1
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
All information = 2
Partial information = 1 2
No information = 0
Resolution Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 3
B.2.8
Recommendations on national legislation 







Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
All procedures = 2
Some procedures = 1 2
No procedures = 0
2.  Does the country issue authorisations and ensure supervision over space activities carried out from its 
jurisdiction or elsewhere when carried out by its citizens or legally established persons?
3.  Does the country have a national authority that authorizes space activities, including procedures for granting,
modifying, suspending, and revoking authorisations?
1.  Does the country have a national framework that governs the launch of objects into and their return from 
outer space, the operation of launch or re-entry sites and the operation and control of space objects in orbit, design 
and manufacture of spacecraft, application of space science and technology, and exploration activities and 
research?
3. Does the country have harmonized national space laws with international space laws?
1.  Does the country provide detailed information on its registered space objects to the United Nations, including: 
international designators, Coordinated Universal Time of launch date, kilometres and minutes and degrees of orbital
parameters, geostationary orbit location (as applicable), change in status of operations, date decay or re-entry, date 
and condition of moving to a disposal orbit, and web links to space object information?
2.  Does the country from which the territory or facility a space object is launched jointly determine with other 
states or intergovernmental organisations which entity should register the space object?
3.  If participating in a joint launch, does the country register the space object separately from its joint launching 
state?
4.  If a space object changes supervision, does the country of registry provide to the United Nations detailed 
information, including date of change in supervision, identification of the new owner or operator, change in orbital
position, and change of function?
2. Does the country voluntarily provide information for the on-orbit transfer of ownership of space objects?
3.  Do the country’s space activities promote the development of space science and technology and its 
applications?
4.  Do the country’s space activities help develop relevant and appropriate capabilities in states interested in 
space?
1.  Does the country already having access to a geostationary orbit/spectrum take all practicable steps to enable a
developing country, which wishes to use the same, to have equitable access to the requested orbit/spectrum?
2.  Does the country file satellite orbit and frequency requests according to International Telecommunications 
Union regulations?
1.  Does the country have in place national laws authorizing and providing for continuing supervision of non-
governmental entities operating in outer space?
5.  Do the country’s space activities facilitate the exchange of expertise and technology on a mutually acceptable
basis?
2.  Does the country offer developing countries and countries with incipient space programmes opportunities to 
participate in advanced space activities?
1.  Does the country engage in equitable and mutually acceptable cooperation with other states according to fair 
and reasonable contractual terms?
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Fully ensures = 2
Partially ensures = 1 1
Does not ensure = 0
Fully includes = 2
Partially includes = 1 2
Does not include = 0
Full recourse = 2
Partial recourse = 1 2
No recourse = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1 2
Never = 0
Recommendations Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 11
B.2.9 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Score
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Always = 2
Sometimes = 1 1
Never = 0
Guidelines Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 7
B.2.10 Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space Score
All phases / not applicable = 2
Some phases = 1
No phases = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0






Full recognition = 2
Partial recognition = 1
No recognition = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Always / not applicable = 2
Sometimes = 1
Never = 0
Framework Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 0
B.2.11
Voluntary guidelines for transparency and 
confidence-building, space code of conduct, and 
long-term sustainability of space
Score
7.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operations to have technical 
competence in nuclear safety, including qualified individuals and facilities for designing, testing, and analysing 
nuclear safety capabilities part of space missions?
8.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operators to integrate safety 
considerations from design to development to launch and operations and end-of-service for the entire space nuclear 
power source application?
9.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operators to conduct risk 
assessments on the launch, operation, and end-of-service phases of space nuclear power source applications?
10.  Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require mitigation measures for accidents 
of space nuclear power source applications with the potential to release radioactive material into the environment?
Individual recommendations included within these three separate sets of guidelines are not scored. However, if a country has implemented a majority of the individual 
recommendations contained within each set of guidelines in either its legal or administrative practice, it will be assessed a score of 2 per set of guidelines. Therefore, 
the following sets of guidelines for consideration are:
6.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space operators to include safety 
management to form part of overall space mission management?
4.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require spacecraft operators to follow 
collision avoidance procedures through adjustment of launch times and on-orbit avoidance manoeuvres?
5.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space objects to deplete or make 
safe their on-board sources of stored energy, including through passivation by removal of residual propellants, 
compressed fluids, and electrical storage devices?
6.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures limit the long-term presence of space 
objects in low-Earth orbit after their end of mission, including through controlled removal from orbit through re-
entry or in orbits beyond low-Earth orbit?
7.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures limit the long-term presence of space 
objects in geosynchronous Earth orbit after their end of mission, including through controlled removal to orbits 
beyond geosynchronous Earth orbit?
1.      Does the country have in place safety policies, requirements, and processes that protect people and the 
environment in Earth’s biosphere from potential hazards associated with relevant launch, operation, and end-of-
service phases of space nuclear power source applications?
2.      Does the country’s space activities authorisation regime verify the rationale and require justification for the 
use of space nuclear power source applications?
3.      Does the country’s space launch authorisation regime require an independent safety evaluation assessing the 
risk to people and the environment for launches, operations, and end-of-service phases for space nuclear power 
source applications?
4.      Does the country conduct emergency preparedness activities, including emergency planning, training, 
rehearsals and development of procedures and communication protocols, in preparation for radiation exposure to 
people and the environment as a result of space nuclear power applications?
5.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures identify space operators of space nuclear 
power source applications as the primary responsibility holders for operations of such applications?
3.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require spacecraft and launch vehicle 
orbital stages to have disposal and passivation measures in the case of failure?
4.      Does the country’s authorisation regime ensure the safe conduct and minimal risk to persons for space 
activities, including assessing the expertise and technical qualifications of space operators and requiring adherence 
to safety and technical standards in line with the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines?
5.      Does the country’s supervision and authorisation regime include on-site inspections or general reporting 
requirements?
6.      Does the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures offer recourse from operators or owners 
of space objects if the country’s liability is engaged in the case of damages, such as through the use of insurance 
requirements or indemnification procedures?
7.      Does the country’s supervision regime apply in case of transfer of ownership of space objects of non-
governmental entities?
1.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require space systems to be designed to not 
release debris during normal operations?
2.      Do the country’s laws or administrative regulations or procedures require spacecraft and launch vehicle 
orbital stages to be designed to avoid accidental break-ups?




Guidelines Score (Sum the above scores and bring to Table B.2) 0
iii. Recommendations from the UNCOPUOS Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines
i. Recommendations from the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures
ii. Recommendations from the European Union's International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities
Appendix III: Scoring for South Africa
